Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations
Technical report on modeling Mode-5 space-booster failure responses in risk-analysis program DAMP. Covers impact density functions for unlikely failures of Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles.
Not a UAP document. Despite the DOW-UAP-D48 identifier, this is a 181-page technical report by Research Triangle Institute modeling what happens when a rocket turns the wrong way. Specifically, it calculates "Mode-5" failure risk -- a sustained malfunction turn that sends a booster toward population centers -- for Atlas, Delta, Titan, and Lockheed Launch Vehicles. The math covers failure probability estimation, impact zone modeling, and fading-memory filters that weight recent launch data over older data. It also catalogs every Atlas launch from 1957 to 1972 and detailed failure case studies (lightning strikes, frozen pumps, engine-out ground impacts). The document's inclusion in the UAP release appears to be a cataloging error.
- The report models six failure response modes for launch vehicles, with Mode-5 (sustained malfunction turn) posing the greatest risk to distant population centers more than 1 mile uprange or many miles from the flight line
- Atlas IIAS, Delta, Titan, and LLV1 launch vehicles are analyzed with vehicle-specific shaping constants for impact distribution modeling
- Detailed failure case studies include: Atlas 466 (December 1981) engine failure causing ground impact 19 seconds after liftoff; Atlas 489 (March 1987) lightning strike causing a hard right turn and vehicle breakup; Atlas 498 (April 1991) frozen LH2 pump causing tumble and destruct
- Risk contours map casualty probability zones around launch facilities at levels from 10^-4 to 10^-6 per square mile
- The mathematical framework uses fading-memory filters to weight recent launch data more heavily than older data for reliability estimation
- Comprehensive launch histories document 399 Atlas launches (1957-1972) and 100+ Titan launches (1963-1965), including transitions to human-rated Gemini and scientific/communications missions
- The report demonstrates the evolution of launch vehicle reliability from development-era failure rates through operational maturity
Page 1
View PDF ↗## Document Type
Technical Report (Final Report)
## Classification
Administrative/Operational Use Data (Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and contractors)
## Page Description
Title page and cover memoranda of a research report on space-booster failure risk analysis.
## Dates
- **Report Date**: September 10, 1996
- **Declassification/Release Date**: 19961025 (October 25, 1996)
- **Distribution Date**: 10 September 96
## Organizations
- **Research Triangle Institute (RTI)** - Contractor/Preparer
- **Department of the Air Force, 45th Space Wing (AFSPC), Safety Office** (45 SW/SE) - Patrick AFB, FL 32925 - Requestor
- **Department of the Air Force, 30th Space Wing (AFSPC), Safety Office** (30 SW/SE) - Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437 - Requestor
## Locations
- Patrick AFB, FL 32925
- Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437
- Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931-5029 (RTI address)
## Document Identifiers
- **Contract Number**: FO4703-91-C-0112
- **RTI Report Number**: RTI/5180/77-43F
- **Classification Stamp**: 19961025 122
## Title
"Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations"
## Notes
Document is marked "DTC QUALITY INSPECTED" indicating technical review compliance.
Page 2
View PDF ↗## Document Type
Technical Report - Credits and Contract Page
## Dates
- **Report Date**: September 10, 1996
- **Task Assignment**: 10/95-77, Subtask 2.0
## People
- **James A. Ward, Jr.** - Co-author/Preparer
- **Robert M. Montgomery** - Co-author/Preparer
## Organizations
- **Research Triangle Institute** - Preparer
- - Center for Aerospace Technology
- - Launch Systems Safety Department
- **Department of the Air Force, 45th Space Wing (AFSPC), Safety Office (45 SW/SE)** - Requestor/Sponsor
- **Department of the Air Force, 30th Space Wing (AFSPC), Safety Office (30 SW/SE)** - Requestor/Sponsor
## Locations
- Patrick AFB, FL 32925
- Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437
## Document Identifiers
- **Contract Number**: FO4703-91-C-0112
- **RTI Report Number**: RTI/5180/77-43F
- **Handwritten Reference**: 3D8W-TR-96-12 (visible on page)
## Classification
Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and contractors for administrative/operational use data.
Page 3
View PDF ↗## Document Type
Technical Report - Form Documentation Page (Standard Form 298)
## Classification
Unclassified
## Report Details
- **Report Date**: September 10, 1996
- **Report Type**: Final
- **Contract Number**: FO4703-91-C-0112
- **Task Assignment**: TA:10/95-77
- **Report Number**: RTI/5180/77-43F
## Authors
- James A. Ward, Jr.
- Robert M. Montgomery
## Organizations
- **Research Triangle Institute** (Performer) - 3000 N. Atlantic Avenue, Cocoa Beach, FL 32931
- **ACTA, Inc.** (Prime Contractor) - Skypark 3, 23430 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 300, Torrance, CA 90505
- **Department of the Air Force (AFSPC), 30th Space Wing** - Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437
- **Department of the Air Force (AFSPC), 45th Space Wing** - Patrick AFB, FL 32925
## Key Personnel
- Mr. Martin Kinna (30 SW/SEY) - Sponsor
- Louis J. Ullian, Jr. (45 SW/SED) - Sponsor
## Subject Terms
- Launch risk
- Unlikely failure modeling
- Booster failure probabilities
## Document Statistics
- **Total Pages**: 180
- **Distribution**: Authorized to US Government agencies and contractors for administrative/operational use data
## Abstract Summary
Report addresses modeling of Mode-5 (unlikely) failure responses in space-vehicle launches. Covers failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan missiles and provides failure history narratives from Eastern and Western Ranges through August 1996.
Page 4
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Technical Report - Table of Contents Pages
## Page Description
Continuation of front matter tables of contents and list of figures/tables
## Figures Referenced
- Figure 31-40: LLV1 simulation results, filter analysis, launch summaries
- Figure 32-36: Technical analysis data (f-ratios, impact distributions, filter characteristics)
## Tables Referenced
- Tables 19-46: Impact distributions, shaping constants, launch histories, flight-phase definitions
- Covers: Atlas, Delta, Titan, Thor vehicles and their configurations
- Launch history data for all major launch vehicles
## Content Structure
- Document organized into 7 major sections with appendices
- Appendix A: Failure Response Modes in Program DAMP
- Appendix B: Shaping-Constant Effects on Mode-5 Impact Distributions
- Appendix C: Filter Characteristics
- Appendix D: Launch and Performance Histories
## Organizations Referenced
Page 5
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Technical Report - Table of Figures and Tables
## Page Description
Comprehensive listing of all figures (31 total) and tables (18 total) referenced in report
## Figures Listed
- Figures 31-40 continuing from earlier sections
- LLV1 simulation results with various shaping constants (pages 69-71)
- Technical analysis: f-Ratios, impact percentages, filter characteristics (pages 86-94)
- Launch summaries for Atlas, Delta, Titan, Thor (pages 102-164)
## Tables Listed
- Table 19: Sample impact distribution for Atlas IIAS with no breakup (page 41)
- Table 20-25: Shaping constants for various launch vehicles (pages 48-72)
- Table 26-32: Summary of shaping constants and optimization results (pages 72-77)
- Table 33-46: Detailed technical analysis and launch histories (pages 82-165)
## Key Vehicles Covered
- Atlas (multiple configurations)
- Delta (Delta-GEM variant)
- Titan IV
- LLV1
- Thor/Eastern Range
## Organization
- RTI document with structured appendices
- Date: 9/10/96
Page 6
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Technical Report - Table of Contents (Text Pages)
## Page Description
Detailed table of contents for main body of report showing section structure and page numbers
## Sections
1. **Introduction** (page 1)
2. **Examples Showing Need for Mode 5** (page 3)
3. **Understanding the Mode-5 Failure Response** (page 7)
- 3.1 Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constants (page 9)
- 3.2 Effects of Shaping Constant on DAMP Results (page 9)
4. **Methodology for Assessing Failure Probabilities** (page 13)
- 4.1 The Parts-Analysis Approach (page 13)
- 4.2 The Empirical Approach (page 15)
5. **Computation of Failure Probabilities** (page 16)
- 5.1 Overall Failure Probability (page 16)
- 5.2 Relative and Absolute Probabilities for Response Modes (page 24)
- 5.3 Relative Probability of Tumble for Response-Modes 3 and 4 (page 30)
6. **Shaping Constants Through Simulation** (page 31)
7. **Potential Future Investigations** (page 73)
8. **Summary** (page 74)
## Appendices
## Date
9/10/96
Page 7
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Technical Report - Appendix Contents
## Page Description
Continuation of front matter showing appendix structure and major content sections
## Appendix D: Launch and Performance Histories
- **D.1 Basic Data**
- - D.1.1 Data Sources (page 96)
- - D.1.2 Assignment of Failure-Response Modes (page 98)
- - D.1.3 Assignment of Flight Phase (page 98)
- - D.1.4 Representative Configurations (page 100)
- **D.2 Atlas Launch and Performance History** (page 101)
- - D.2.1 Atlas Launch History (page 103)
- - D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (page 115)
- **D.3 Delta Launch and Performance History** (page 133)
- - D.3.1 Delta Launch History (page 136)
- - D.3.2 Delta Failure Narratives (page 142)
- **D.4 Titan Launch and Performance History** (page 146)
- - D.4.1 Titan Launch History (page 149)
- - D.4.2 Titan Failure Narratives (page 157)
- **D.5 Thor Launch and Performance History** (page 164)
- - D.5.1 Thor Launch History (page 164)
- - D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives (page 167)
## References Section
Page 171
## Date
9/10/96
Page 8
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Technical Report - Body Text (Section 1: Introduction - continued)
## Page Description
Continuation of opening material with figure listing continuation
## Figures Listed (Continuation)
- Figure 31: LLV1 Simulation Results with Best-Fit Shaping Constants (page 71)
- Figure 32: f-Ratios for Ranges from 1 to 25 Miles (page 86)
- Figure 33: Percentage of Impacts Between Flight Line and Any Radial (page 87)
- Figure 34: Percentage of Impacts in 5-Degree Sectors (page 88)
- Figure 35: Exponential Weights for Fading-Memory Filters (page 93)
- Figure 36: Recursive Filter Factor for Last Data Point (page 94)
- Figure 37-40: Atlas, Delta, Titan, Thor Launch Summaries (pages 102-164)
## Tables Listed (Selected)
- Table 1: Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constant A on Atlas IIA Risks (page 10)
- Table 2-6: Predicted failure probabilities and comparative analyses (pages 17-24)
- Table 7-11: Number of failures for various vehicles (page 25)
- Table 12-18: Additional failure probability and response-mode data (pages 26-30)
## Document Organization
Foundational material for main technical content beginning with Introduction section
## Date
9/10/96
Page 9
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Technical Report - Abstract
## Classification
Unclassified
## Page Description
Formal abstract summarizing purpose and scope of entire 180-page technical report
## Key Concepts Explained
- **Mode-5 Failure Responses**: Less likely but possible vehicle failure modes causing significant deviations from intended flight line
- **Program DAMP**: RTI's risk-analysis program ("facility DAMage and Personnel injury")
- **Shaping Constants**: Mathematical parameters controlling impact density function distribution
## Methodology
- Simulates certain Mode-5 malfunctions
- Uses trial-and-error approach to match simulated impacts with theoretical density function
- Ensures impacts from simulated malfunctions agree with theoretical predictions
## Data Coverage
- Appendix contains launch and failure history narratives for Atlas, Delta, and Titan
- Data period: Beginning of each program through August 1996
- Includes vehicle configuration, flight success/failure status, anomalous behavior flight phases
- Classification of vehicle behavior per defined failure-response modes
- Filtering and data weighting techniques described
## Results
- Estimates failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan
- Determines percentages of future failures resulting in Mode-5 responses
## Date
9/10/96
Page 10
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Technical Report - Section 1: Introduction (Main Body)
## Page Description
Opening section explaining purpose, background, and framework of Mode-5 failure analysis in launch vehicle risk assessment
## Key Concepts
- **Launch Vehicle Failure Debris**: Most impacts occur close to intended flight line
- **Typical Failure Modes**: Premature thrust termination, stage ignition failure, tank rupture/explosion, rapid out-of-control tumble
- **Unlikely Malfunctions**: Control failures and guidance platform orientation errors causing vehicle to execute sustained turn away from flight line
- **Hazard Distribution**: Significant risks to population centers more than 1 mile uprange or many miles from flight line
## Program Description
- **Program Name**: "Facility DAMage and Personnel Injury" (DAMP)
- **Purpose**: Analyze launch-area risk levels for ballistic missiles and space vehicles
- **Inputs**: Launch vehicle characteristics, trajectory, failure responses, facilities, populations
- **Outputs**: Hit probabilities, casualty expectations
## Analysis Framework
- Models failure **responses** not specific failures
- Six possible response modes affecting ground risks (5 failure modes + 1 normal vehicle mode)
- Hazards greatest in launch area and along intended flight line
- Lesser hazards exist throughout impact limit lines
- Small hazards outside lines due to flight termination system failure or unlikely events
## Organizations Referenced
## Date
9/10/96
Page 11
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Technical Report - Section 1: Introduction (Continuation)
## Page Description
Continued explanation of Mode-5 failure response methodology and mathematical framework
## Mode-5 Characteristics
**Defined by three key properties:**
1. **Impact Range and Direction**: Impacts can occur in any direction from launch point at any range within vehicle's energy capabilities
2. **Angular Deviation Effects**:
- Likelihood of impact decreases as angular deviation from flight line increases
- Becomes least likely in uprange direction
- For fixed angular deviation, impact likelihood decreases with range increase
3. **Density Function Behavior**:
- At fixed impact ranges near launch point: impact density changes gradually as impact direction swings 180° from downrange to uprange
- As impact range increases: decrease in density function becomes progressively more rapid with change in direction
- Greater impact range means more rapid density function change with angular deviation
## Destruct Action Effects
## Vehicle Dependency
- Shaping constants should be vehicle-dependent due to:
- - Rugged missiles vs. fragile space vehicles with different breakup characteristics
- - Differences in vehicle stabilization vs. tumble behavior after malfunction
## Critical Importance
- Hit probabilities computed by DAMP for targets >2 miles uprange or >few miles from flight line are due almost entirely to Mode-5 function
- Mode-5 probability of occurrence and selected constants are of considerable importance
## Study Tasking
- Task No. 10/95-77, Paragraph 2.0, Contract FO4703-91-C-0112
- Primary purpose: "Determine best values for Mode-5 failure probability and Mode-5 density-function shaping constant A"
## Date
9/10/96
Page 12
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Technical Report - Section 1: Introduction (Continuation)
## Page Description
Continuation of study scope and methodology, addressing data limitations and simulation approaches
## Data Challenge
- **Problem**: Limited historical Mode-5 failure data makes accurate empirical determination of shaping constants impossible
- **Contributing Factors**:
- - Inadequate descriptions of vehicle behavior in available historical records
- - Uncertainty in impact location following malfunction
- - Difficulty classifying failure responses
## Study Approach
- Values for Mode-5 constants depend on simulations of vehicle behavior following failure
- Cannot rely solely on empirical historical data
## Study Objectives (Additional to Primary Task)
Beyond primary task to determine Mode-5 constants, study also develops:
1. **Absolute failure probabilities** for Atlas, Delta, and Titan
2. **Relative probabilities** of occurrence for all failure-response modes
3. Applications to LLV1 and other new launch systems
## Organizations
- RTI (Research Triangle Institute) - Contractor
- Department of the Air Force (AFSPC) - Sponsor
- - 45th Space Wing Safety Office
- - 30th Space Wing Safety Office
## Technical Framework
- Program DAMP as analytical tool
- Failure response modes 1-5 plus normal vehicle mode
- Shaping constants A and B for density function control
## Date
9/10/96
Page 13
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Technical Report - Section 2: Examples Showing Need for Mode 5
## Page Description
Eight detailed examples of historical vehicle failures demonstrating why Mode-5 response classification is necessary
## Historical Examples Documented
**(1) Atlas 8E, 24 Jan 61**
- Event: Missile stability lost at 161 seconds (30 seconds after BECO)
- Cause: Failure of servo-amplifier power supply
- Engine Shutdown: Sustainer engine at 248 seconds, vernier engines 10 seconds later
- Impact Location: 1316 miles downrange, 215 miles crossrange
- Classification: Cannot fit standard modes
**(2) Titan M-4, 6 Oct 61**
- Event: One-bit error in W velocity accumulation
- Impact Deviation: 86 miles short, 14 miles right of target
- Classification: Possible Mode-2 response only
**(3) Atlas 145D (Mariner R-1), 22 July 62**
- Event: Guidance system failure after booster staging at 157 seconds
- Guidance Rate Beacon: Intermittent operation
- Guidance System: Faulty equations leading to erroneous commands
- Timing: Vehicle deviations evident at 172 seconds, continued throughout flight
- Deviations: Maximum yaw 60°, pitch 28° at 270 seconds
- Destruction: RSO destroyed vehicle at 293.5 seconds (12 seconds after SECO)
- Classification: Abnormal trajectory with abnormal pitch/yaw maneuvers
**(4) Atlas SLV-3 (GTA-9), 17 May 66**
- Event: Vehicle unstable when B2 pitch control lost at 121 seconds
- Control Loss: Loss of pitch control resulting in pitch-down >90°
- Guidance: Control lost at 132 seconds
- Recovery: After BECO, vehicle stabilized in abnormal attitude
- Trajectory: Did not follow planned trajectory but separated normally
- Classification: Cannot model as Modes 1-4
**(5) Atlas 95F (ABRES/AFSC), 3 May 68**
- Event: Erratic roll and yaw rates immediately after liftoff
- Behavior: Hard yaw left (first 10 seconds), then hard yaw right
- Crossover: Crossed flight line toward right destruct line
- Pitch: Pitched up violently, began moving back toward beach
- Destruct: Vehicle destroyed at 45 seconds, altitude 14,000 feet, downrange 9 miles
- Impact: Major pieces impacted less than mile offshore
- Classification: Uprange movement during thrusting flight
**(6) Delta Intelsat III, 18 Sep 68**
- Event: Loss of rate gyro triggered undamped pitch oscillations at 20 seconds
- Maneuvers: Violent maneuvers at 59 seconds
- Motion: Pitched down 270°, up 210°, large yaw left during 13-second period
- Recovery: Regained control at 72 seconds, flew stably in down/leftward direction until 100 seconds
- Engine Position: Main engine against pitch and yaw stops
- Breakup: First stage broke up at 103 seconds, second stage destroyed by RSO at 110.6 seconds
- Impact: Major pieces 12 miles downrange, 2 miles left of flight line
**(7) Delta Pioneer E, 27 Aug 69**
- Event: First-stage hydraulics failure few seconds before MECO
- Loss of Control: Pitched down, yawed left, rolled counterclockwise, gyros off limits, then tumbled
- Stage Separation: Occurred while vehicle out of control
- Recovery: Second stage regained control after 20 seconds in yaw-right, pitch-up attitude
- Stable Flight: Flew stably in this attitude for 240 seconds
- Destruction: Destroyed by safety officer at T+484 seconds
**(8) Atlas 68E, 8 Dec 80**
- Event: Lube oil pressure on B2 booster engine dropped at 102.7 seconds
- Engine Shutdown: B2 shutdown at 120.1 seconds, B1 engine shutdown 385 msec later
- Control Loss: Asymmetric thrust caused yaw/roll rates flight-control could not correct
- Attitude Loss: Thrusting sustainer pivoted missile to retrofire attitude
- Recovery: After booster package jettisoned, stabilized and decelerating in retrofire mode by 148 seconds
- Continued Thrusting: Sustainer continued in this attitude until 282.9 seconds
- Failure: Reentry heating apparently caused sustainer shutdown and vehicle breakup
## Analysis Note
None of these described vehicle failures can be classified as Mode 1, 2, or 3 response, or standard Mode-4 on-trajectory failure. Except possibly example (2), none can be modeled as either rapid tumble or slow turn.
## Date
9/10/96
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Technical Report - Discussion and Footnote
## Page Description
Analysis of historical examples and clarification of safety procedures
## Classification Analysis
From the eight historical examples on previous pages, the document states:
"It is obvious from the response-mode definitions in Appendix A that none of the described vehicle failures can be considered as a Mode 1, 2, or 3 response, or a Mode-4 on-trajectory failure."
**Exception noted**: Except possibly for example (2) (Titan M-4), it seems apparent that none can be modeled as either a rapid tumble or a slow turn.
## Safety Philosophy Footnote
**Important clarification**: "Although prompt destruct action during any of the described flights might have resulted in a Mode-4 classification, the safety officer typically needs several seconds to evaluate data after a malfunction. Quick action is contrary to safety philosophy if impact limit lines are not threatened and the destruct system is not at risk, since additional flight time enhances the user's opportunity to pinpoint the nature of the problem."
## Key Points
1. **Safety Officer Procedure**: Needs time to evaluate telemetry data before taking destruct action
2. **Risk Assessment**: Only activates destruct system if immediate threat to impact limit lines exists
3. **System Integrity**: Must ensure destruct system itself is not at risk before committing to action
4. **Information Gathering**: Additional flight time allows better problem diagnosis
## Purpose
This footnote explains why vehicles that could theoretically be classified as Mode-4 responses (on-trajectory failures) through immediate destruct action are instead allowed to continue flying, resulting in Mode-5 classification.
## Date
9/10/96
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Technical Report - Case Study Examples of Mode-5 Failure Response
## Page Description
Two recent documented examples demonstrating Mode-5 failure response with RSO console impact trace diagram
## Case Study 1: Prospector (Joust) Launch
- **Date**: June 1991
- **Location**: Eastern Range
- **Vehicle Type**: Single-stage Castor IV-A solid-propellant rocket motor with payload module
- **Failure Type**: Aft-skirt structural failure
- **Failure Timing**: Approximately T+14 seconds
- **Failure Behavior**: Vehicle made radical pitch-up maneuver
- **Critical Window**: If safety officer had taken destruct action between 18-25 seconds, impact would have been well away from flight line
- **Impact Trace**: Vacuum instantaneous impact trace from RSO console shown in Figure 1
- **Classification**: Mode-5 failure response
**Figure 1 Details** (Joust Impact Trace - JOUST1761-R):
- **Status**: UNCLASSIFIED (marked as "IP MAP 1")
- **Vehicle Designation**: Joust 1761-R
- **Cyber Reference**: CYBER A
- **Time Markers**: 18 SEC through 30 SEC marked with impact trajectory deviations
- **Guidance Status**: ON TRACK indicators show vehicle capability variations
- **Telemetry Data**: Shows chevenaux angles, altitude, heading (HDG), velocity (VEL)
- **Delay Tracking**: Multiple delay measurements and directional references (LEFT, RIGHT, SHORT)
## Case Study 2: Red Tigress Sounding Rocket
- **Date**: 20 August 1991
- **Location**: Pad 20, Cape Canaveral
- **Vehicle Type**: Guided sounding rocket
- **Failure Behavior**: Made near 90° right turn within 1-2 seconds of clearing launcher
- **Stable Flight**: Flew stably in this direction until destroyed by safety officer at 23.3 seconds
- **Impact Location**: Pieces impacted 2-3 miles from launch pad
- **Alternative Classification**: Might have been classified as Mode-2 response if destruct action had been taken shortly after launch
- **Significance**: Illustrates how timing of destruct decision affects failure response classification
## Key Insight
Both examples demonstrate that Mode-5 failure responses result from vehicle malfunctions that cause sustained deviations from intended flight line, where the safety officer must make judgment calls about timing of destruct action based on incomplete information during flight.
## Date
9/10/96
Page 16
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View PDF ↗Technical section on Mode-5 failure response analysis. Discusses impact-density functions for debris dispersion modeling in launch vehicle risk assessment.
## Observations
- Mode-5 and Mode-2 failure responses not directly time-dependent (unlike Modes 3 and 4)
- Primary impact-density function accounts for vehicle flight variability
- Secondary density function accounts for debris dispersion and aerodynamic effects
- Impact probability determined through integration of density functions
- Mathematical equation presented: f(R,φ) with parameters R (range), φ (angle), R-dot (impact-range rate), A and C (dimensionless constants), D (mile units)
- Earliest occurrence time: TP (pitch-over time)
- Latest occurrence time: T5 (burnout, orbital injection, or termination)
- Primary function depends on range (R) and direction (φ) from launch point, not directly on time
## Assessments
- Mode-5 response manifestation timing within defined span is inconsequential for probability calculations
- Population center impact probability determined by integrating primary impact-density function over specified region or building
## References
- Reference [1] cited for original Eq. (9.5) presentation
- Supplement of φ designated as θ used in report plots and tables
## Page Number
7 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 17
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Mode-5 failure response analysis with secondary impact-density function and practical failure mechanisms.
## Observations
- Secondary Mode-5 impact-density function is circular normal form
- Mathematical equation: f(d) = 1/(2πσc) × e^(-(1/2)(d/σc)²)
- d = distance from mean piece impact point to target center
- σc = standard deviation (dispersion) for debris class
- Dispersions computed via root-sum-squaring of individual dispersions (winds, vehicle-breakup velocities, drag uncertainties)
- Center of secondary function may lie off population center without ensuring hit
- All possible mutually-exclusive secondary function locations must be considered for impact probability calculation
- Mode-5 primary function models independence from impact arrival path
- Example: vehicle failing at 15 seconds can later move impact point uprange and crossrange to position two miles crossrange left from launch point
- Alternative paths possible: flying wrong direction from liftoff (north instead of east) achieves same impact location
## Failure Mechanisms
Four specific Mode-5 failure types described:
1. Re-orientation of guidance platform
2. Insertion of erroneous spatial target into guidance system
3. Locking of engine nozzle in fixed position near null, producing near-constant angular acceleration and slow velocity vector turn
4. Erroneous accumulation of velocity bits by guidance system
## Assessments
- Exact failure mechanism and vehicle behavior irrelevant; all possibilities accounted for by Mode-5 equation
- Dispersions for secondary function computed from nominal trajectory
- Can be explicitly expressed as function of impact range
## Page Number
8 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 18
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View PDF ↗Effects of Mode-5 shaping constants on impact-density function and DAMP risk assessment results.
## Observations
- Mode-5 impact-density function originally contained three shaping constants
- Algebraic substitution reduces to two constants: A and B = D/C
- Simplified equation: f(R,φ) = (e^Aφ + B/R) / [2(T5-TP) × (1/A)(e^A-1) + B/R × Dπ/RR-dot]
- Historical values: A = 2.5, B = 1000 used in Eastern Range ship-hit computations
- Recent studies increased A to 3.0 based on observation that modern developmental vehicles deviate less from intended flight line than earlier vehicles
## Section 3.1: Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constants
- A and B values influence but do not fundamentally change Mode-5 impact-density function nature
- Understanding requires analysis of various A and B value combinations (Appendix B)
## Section 3.2: Effects of Shaping Constant on DAMP Results
- 1. Probability of Mode-5 failure response
- 2. Values of Mode-5 shaping constants A and B (currently 3.0 and 1000)
## Assessments
- DAMP results far more sensitive to changes in A than in B
- Shaping constant effects illustrated through case studies
## Page Number
9 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 19
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View PDF ↗Case study 1 showing effects of Mode-5 shaping constant A on Atlas IIA baseline risks with tabular results.
## Case 1: Baseline Risks for Atlas IIA
- Baseline risk analysis for Atlas IIAM
- Mode-5 failure response probability estimated at 12.5% of total failure probability during first 120 seconds of flight
- Mode-5 responses accounted for approximately 90% of total risks for people inside impact limit lines (ILL)
## Observations - Table 1: Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Constant A on Atlas IIA Risks
B = 1,000 constant across all rows
- IPs Uprange (Percent of Mode-5): ranges from 10.0% (A=4.0) to 28.6% (A=2.5)
- Casualty Expectancy x 10^6 for Mode 5: ranges from 30.5 (A=4.0) to 246 (A=2.5)
- Total Casualty Expectancy for all Modes: ranges from 44.3 (A=4.0) to 259.9 (A=2.5)
## Assessments
- Results in third column directly proportional to probability that Mode-5 failure occurs
- For Atlas IIA analysis, Mode-5 absolute probability assumed at 1/200 = 0.005
- Increasing shaping constant A substantially reduces predicted casualty expectancy
## Case 2: Risk Contours for Atlas IIAS
Definitions of Flight Hazard Area and Flight Caution Area may be based on risk contours for inner-ear injury.
- Constant A can significantly affect 10^-6 contour location
- Illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 for Atlas IIAS
- Mode-5 absolute probability of occurrence: 0.005
- Constant A values: 3.0 and 3.5
- Constant B: 1000
## Page Number
10 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 20
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View PDF ↗Risk contour visualization for Atlas IIAS showing inner-ear injury risk zones with shaping constant A = 3.0. Complex cartographic representation with multiple concentric zones and labeled areas.
## Observations
- Map depicts Atlas IIAS Inner-Ear Injury contours
- Multiple risk zones identified with different shading/boundary demarcation
- Labeled regions include populated areas (shown as hatched boxes)
- Risk contours show radial dispersion pattern from launch point
- Various distance markers and grid references present
- Contour lines labeled with risk level indicators (10^-6, 10^-5, 10^-4)
- Launch facility and clearance zones depicted in center region
## Locations
- Central launch/pad facility area
- Multiple surrounding population zones at varying distances
- Coastal and inland regions represented
## Assessments
- Visual representation demonstrates spatial distribution of casualty risk from Mode-5 launch vehicle failures
- Contours show risk decreasing with distance from launch corridor
- Multiple population concentrations within hazard zones identified
## Page Number
11 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 21
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Risk contour visualization for Atlas IIAS showing inner-ear injury risk zones with shaping constant A = 3.5. Comparative cartographic representation to page 020 with modified constant value.
## Observations
- Atlas IIAS Inner-Ear Injury contours with A = 3.5
- Similar map structure to previous figure but with different contour locations/distributions
- Multiple risk zones identified with varying boundary positions
- Populated areas represented as hatched/shaded boxes
- Contour lines show 10^-6, 10^-5, 10^-4 risk level indicators
- Central launch facility and surrounding region depicted
- Spatial distribution of contours reflects sensitivity to shaping constant A value
## Locations
- Central launch/pad facility
- Surrounding population centers at variable distances
- Coastal and inland regions
## Assessments
- Comparison with A = 3.0 contours (page 020) demonstrates material effect of shaping constant on risk zone locations
- Increasing A from 3.0 to 3.5 affects contour expansion/contraction pattern
- Higher A value results in modified casualty risk distribution across geography
## Page Number
12 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 22
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View PDF ↗Section 4: Methodology for Assessing Failure Probabilities. Introduces two primary approaches for estimating launch-vehicle failure probabilities with critical analysis of each method's limitations.
## Observations
- Primary purpose: develop relative probability estimates for Mode-5 failure responses for Atlas, Delta, Titan vehicles
- Secondary outcomes: relative probabilities for other failure-response modes and overall vehicle failure probabilities
- Two commonly used approaches identified:
- 1. Parts-analysis or engineering approach: engineering assessment of component/subsystem reliability
- 2. Empirical statistical approach: based on actual launch results
## Section 4.1: The Parts-Analysis Approach
Extensive discussion with quotations from Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. (1992) draft report for Air Force Space Command.
Key limitations of parts-analysis approach:
- Assumes sufficient understanding of subsystem interrelationships for reliability block diagram development (questionable for complex space launch vehicles)
- Assesses reliability in perfectly assembled condition, ignoring manufacturing/processing/operations variations and errors
- Subjectivity in piece/component reliability estimates
- Cannot account for undetected design flaws
- Improper component installation
- Erroneous computer programs
- Insertion of improper computer programs
- Support-personnel fatigue
- Lightning strikes
- Aging effects (solid propellants)
- Corrosion
- Insufficient thermal insulation for critical components
- Icing
- Erroneous antenna patterns or instrumentation
K-factor criticism:
- All parts-analysis approaches involve explicit or implicit "K-factor" to compensate for testing-to-flight-environment differences
- K-factor varies by component and system, making entire process highly subjective
- Multiple K-factor values must be assumed
## Organizations
- Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. (consulting firm)
- Air Force Space Command
- Office of Technology Assessment (cited reference)
## Assessments
- Parts-analysis approach rejected for this study due to fundamental limitations
- Engineering estimates of design reliability are incomplete and subjective
- Experience shows design flaws do cause failures in operational launch systems and will likely continue
## Page Number
13 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 23
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Section 4.1 (Parts-Analysis Approach) and introduction of Section 4.2 (Empirical Approach). Detailed critique of engineering reliability assessment methodologies and transition to statistical approach.
## Section 4.1 Continued
- Laboratory test data from previously-built systems and components
- Engineer's judgments about reliability of unbuilt systems/components
- Failure analysis for system/component interdependencies
- Tacit assumptions:
- - Laboratory test conditions precisely duplicate operational conditions
- - System will operate under design conditions
- - Engineer's reliability judgments are correct
- - Failure analyses considered all relevant circumstances and details
- Lightning strikes
- Aging effects (particularly solid propellants)
- Corrosion
- Insufficient heat or cold insulation for critical components
- Icing
- Erroneous antennae patterns or instrumentation
Booz-Allen conclusion: Engineering approach cannot account for undetected design flaws. However, experience shows design flaws do cause operational launch system failures and will likely continue.
## Section 4.2: The Empirical Approach
## Observations
- Agreement with OTA statement acknowledged
- Primary difficulty: no sample of identical vehicles exists or is likely to exist
- Booz-Allen statement: empirical approach cannot project effects of launch system changes; only further flight testing can objectively assess such changes
- RTI relies exclusively on empirical method for relative probability estimates of failure-response modes
- Total objectivity cannot be claimed; answers depend on:
- - How performance data are filtered
- - Risk acceptability regarding true failure probability underestimation
## Assessments
- Empirical approach more objective than parts-analysis but has significant limitations
- Difficulty in projecting success/failure rates from past to future tests clearly recognized
- Data filtering methods and risk acceptance criteria introduce necessary subjectivity
## Page Number
14 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 24
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Section 5: Computation of Failure Probabilities. Details empirical approach for predicting failure probabilities and establishing response mode distributions.
## Section 5: Computation of Failure Probabilities
Three primary purposes for test results analysis (Atlas, Delta, Titan from Appendix D tables):
1. Predict overall probability each vehicle will fail during various flight phases (see Table 39, Appendix D for flight-phase definitions)
2. Establish relative and overall probabilities for Response Modes 1 through 5
3. Establish relative frequency of tumble for Response Modes 3 and 4
## Section 5.1: Overall Failure Probability
Prediction methodology for Atlas, Delta, Titan:
- Test results for representative configurations ("1" in last column) filtered using three weighting techniques (Appendix C):
- 1. Equal weighting
- 2. Index-count weighting
- 3. Exponential weighting
## Observations
- Score of one: failure or anomalous behavior occurrence
- Score of zero: no failure
- Inclusive definition (e.g., "0 - 3" includes phases 0, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3)
- Definitions in column 2 of Table 2, detailed in Appendix D.1.3
- 'NA' in response-mode column indicates failure/anomaly affecting final orbit/impact point without creating additional ground risk or necessarily failing mission
- 'NA' considered as success for all flight phases except "0 - 5"
- Only in flight phase "0 - 5" is 'NA' response considered a failure
- For flights with multiple Response-Mode and Flight-Phase entries, first listed value used
Representative configuration results presented in Table 2 for six flight phases.
## Assessments
- Launch agency may classify some flights as successful/partially successful while showing as failures in Appendix D
- Better to consider non-normal events (particularly late-flight) as anomalies rather than definitive failures
- Filtering process acknowledges inherent classification ambiguities
## Page Number
16 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 25
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Table 2: Predicted Failure Probabilities for Representative Configurations. Comprehensive data table showing failure probability estimates for Atlas, Delta, and Titan across multiple flight phases and filtering techniques.
## Table 2 Observations
### Atlas (156 total flights, representative configuration)
Flight phases 0 through 0-5* with sample failures/total:
- Phase 0: 0/7 (all filters: 0)
- Phase 0-1: 4/156 (Equal: 0.0256, Index: 0.0253, Expon F=0.99: 0.0245, F=0.98: 0.0219, F=0.97: 0.0186)
- Phase 0-2: 7/156 (0.0449, 0.0385, 0.0387, 0.0313, 0.0243)
- Phase 0-3: 12/156 (0.0769, 0.0715, 0.0714, 0.0643, 0.0568)
- Phase 0-4: 13/156 (0.0833, 0.0811, 0.0801, 0.0740, 0.0663)
- Phase 0-5*: 17/156 (0.1090, 0.1100, 0.1078, 0.1019, 0.0929)
### Delta (125 total flights)
- Phase 0: 0/125 (all filters: 0)
- Phase 0-1: 2/125 (0.0160, 0.0126, 0.0134, 0.0104, 0.0075)
- Phase 0-2: 2/125 (0.0160, 0.0126, 0.0134, 0.0104, 0.0075)
- Phase 0-3: 2/125 (0.0160, 0.0126, 0.0134, 0.0104, 0.0075)
- Phase 0-4: 2/125 (0.0160, 0.0126, 0.0134, 0.0104, 0.0075)
- Phase 0-5*: 8/125 (0.0640, 0.0447, 0.0535, 0.0469, 0.0442)
### Titan (171 total flights)
- Phase 0: 3/98 (0.0306, 0.0210, 0.0225, 0.0292, 0.0352)
- Phase 0-1: 4/171 (0.0234, 0.0305, 0.0314, 0.0403, 0.0470)
- Phase 0-2: 7/171 (0.0409, 0.0496, 0.0514, 0.0642, 0.0750)
- Phase 0-3: 9/171 (0.0526, 0.0581, 0.0597, 0.0689, 0.0773)
- Phase 0-4: 9/171 (0.0526, 0.0581, 0.0597, 0.0689, 0.0773)
- Phase 0-5*: 19/171 (0.1111, 0.1167, 0.1188, 0.1284, 0.1358)
*Includes response mode 'NA'
## Assessments
- Predicted failure probabilities depend significantly on filtering technique applied
- Many filtering methods available, each producing slightly different results
- Choice of filtering method cannot be totally objective
- Subjective decisions necessary regarding:
- - Representative past configurations for future vehicles
- - Flight tests to include in sample
- - Individual flight weighting
- - Flight success/failure classification in unusual cases
- - Flight phase attribution for failures
- For Atlas/Delta: exponential filter produces decreasing probabilities as F decreases (F = 0.99 to 0.97), indicating improving reliability
- For Titan: mixed results suggest either no recent reliability improvement or improvements not yet reflected in test results
- Atlas/Delta: equal weighting produces higher probabilities than other filters
- Atlas/Delta: index-count filtering produces larger probabilities than exponential filtering
- Titan: results mixed, suggesting flat or declining reliability trend
## Page Number
17 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 26
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View PDF ↗Table 3: Predicted Failure Probabilities for All Configurations. Comparative data showing failure probabilities when including all flight test configurations rather than representative samples only.
## Table 3 Observations
### Atlas (532 total flights, all configurations)
Flight phases 0 through 0-5*:
- Phase 0: 0/7 (all filters: 0)
- Phase 0-1: 56/532 (Equal: 0.1053, Index: 0.0641, Expon F=0.99: 0.0422, F=0.98: 0.0273, F=0.97: 0.0190)
- Phase 0-2: 91/532 (0.1711, 0.0990, 0.0555, 0.0311, 0.0204)
- Phase 0-3: 111/532 (0.2086, 0.1261, 0.0802, 0.0559, 0.0455)
- Phase 0-4: 114/532 (0.2143, 0.1330, 0.0873, 0.0627, 0.0511)
- Phase 0-5*: 137/532 (0.2575, 0.1671, 0.1150, 0.0866, 0.0725)
### Delta (232 total flights, all configurations)
- Phase 0: 0/196 (all filters: 0)
- Phase 0-1: 4/232 (0.0172, 0.0164, 0.0148, 0.0110, 0.0077)
- Phase 0-2: 6/232 (0.0259, 0.0232, 0.0201, 0.0133, 0.0085)
- Phase 0-3: 10/232 (0.0431, 0.0279, 0.0263, 0.0150, 0.0089)
- Phase 0-4: 10/232 (0.0431, 0.0279, 0.0263, 0.0150, 0.0089)
- Phase 0-5*: 25/232 (0.1078, 0.0766, 0.0740, 0.0536, 0.0459)
### Titan (337 total flights, all configurations)
- Phase 0: 3/98 (0.0306, 0.0137, 0.0187, 0.0281, 0.0349)
- Phase 0-1: 18/337 (0.0534, 0.0319, 0.0351, 0.0399, 0.0467)
- Phase 0-2: 48/337 (0.1424, 0.0771, 0.0719, 0.0662, 0.0750)
- Phase 0-3: 55/337 (0.1632, 0.0924, 0.0830, 0.0711, 0.0770)
- Phase 0-4: 56/337 (0.1662, 0.0942, 0.0840, 0.0712, 0.0771)
- Phase 0-5*: 66/337 (0.1958, 0.1369, 0.1326, 0.1277, 0.1346)
*Includes response mode 'NA'
## Comparative Analysis
Comparison of Table 2 (representative configurations) vs Table 3 (all configurations):
- Most cases: exponential filtering produces representative-configuration probabilities smaller than all-configuration probabilities
- Small differences attest to exponential filter effectiveness in down-weighting early launch failures
- NOT true for equal weighting: all-configuration probabilities up to 3.6 times larger than representative-configuration probabilities
## Assessments
- RTI favors exponential filter over equal-weight or index-count filters for missile/space-vehicle performance data
- Equal weighting significantly over-weights old data, failing to account for learning process and hardware improvements
- Equal weighting inappropriate for this application despite potential use in other large-sample situations
- Weighting percentages for all three filters provided in Table 4 for sample sizes 4 to 1,000
## Page Number
18 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 27
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Table 4: Comparison of Weighting Percentages. Comprehensive analysis of how three filtering techniques (Exponential, Index-count, Equal) distribute weight across data samples of varying sizes.
## Table 4 Observations
### Key Findings by Sample Size
**Sample = 4:**
- Exponential: 25.8%, -, -, -, -, 51.0%
- Index: 40.0%, -, -, -, -, 70.0%
- Equal: 25.0%, -, -, -, -, 50.0%
**Sample = 10:**
- Exponential: 10.9%, 52.5%, 100.0%, -, -, 52.5%
- Index: 18.2%, 72.7%, 100.0%, -, -, 72.5%
- Equal: 10.0%, 50.0%, 100.0%, -, -, 50.0%
**Sample = 20:**
- Exponential: 6.0%, 28.9%, 55.0%, -, -, 55.0%
- Index: 9.5%, 42.9%, 73.8%, -, -, 73.8%
- Equal: 5.0%, 25.0%, 50.0%, -, -, 50.0%
**Sample = 100:**
- Exponential: 2.3%, 11.1%, 21.1%, 45.7%, 73.3%, 73.3%
- Index: 2.0%, 9.7%, 18.9%, 43.6%, 74.8%, 74.8%
- Equal: 1.0%, 5.0%, 10.0%, 25.0%, 50.0%, 50.0%
**Sample = 200:**
- Exponential: 2.0%, 9.8%, 18.6%, 40.4%, 64.7%, 88.3%
- Index: 1.0%, 4.9%, 9.7%, 23.4%, 43.7%, 74.9%
- Equal: 0.5%, 2.5%, 5.0%, 12.5%, 25.0%, 50.0%
**Sample = 500:**
- Exponential: 2.0%, 9.6%, 18.3%, 39.7%, 63.6%, 99.4%
- Index: 0.4%, 2.0%, 4.0%, 9.7%, 19.0%, 75.0%
- Equal: 0.2%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 5.0%, 10.0%, 50.0%
**Sample = 1000:**
- Exponential: 2.0%, 9.6%, 18.3%, 39.7%, 63.6%, 99.996%
- Index: 0.1%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 4.9%, 9.7%, 75.0%
- Equal: 0.1%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.5%, 5.0%, 50.0%
*F = 0.98 for exponential filter
+"Last" refers to most recent data point
## Assessments
Index-count filter deficiencies:
- For small samples: excessive emphasis on recent data
- - Sample of 4: 40% weight to last test, 70% to last two tests
- - Sample of 10: 18.2% to last test, 72.7% to last five tests
- - Reliability improvement rate implied seems too optimistic unless serious early design flaws corrected
- For large samples: under-weights current data
- - Sample 200, 500, 1000: Last 50 tests weighted 43.7%, 19.0%, 9.7% respectively
- - Assigns 25% weight to oldest half of data regardless of sample size (too much)
- Except for small samples, places too much emphasis on old data
- Fails to account for learning process and hardware improvements
- For samples approaching 100+: seriously over-weights old data, under-weights recent events
- May be appropriate for other large-sample situations (devices manufactured simultaneously by same process)
- For small samples (<20): little difference from equal weighting
- For samples near 80: produces results similar to index-count filter
- For samples 200+: weights for last 5, 10, 25, 50 tests essentially constant (fading-memory characteristic)
- Last data point always weighted minimum 2% (never less, no matter sample size)
- For samples 200-300: oldest half receives 11.7% and 5% of weight respectively
- For samples 500+: oldest half essentially omitted
- Clearly demonstrates fading-memory nature appropriate for space-vehicle performance data
## Page Number
19 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 28
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Detailed analysis of exponential filter characteristics and selection of optimal filter constant F for missile/space-vehicle performance data weighting.
## Observations
Exponential filter equation denominator is geometric series asymptotically approaching [1/(1-F)] as n approaches infinity.
- For F = 0.98: limit = 50
- Last data point always weighted one, never <2% of total regardless of sample size
- For samples 200-300: oldest half receives 11.7% and 5% respectively
- For samples 500+: oldest half essentially omitted
- Clearly a fading-memory filter appropriate for space-vehicle performance data
- For small samples (<20): minimal difference from equal weighting
- For samples near 80: similar results to index-count filter
- For samples 200+: weights for recent data (5, 10, 25, 50 tests) essentially constant
## Section on Filter Constant Selection
- Examined weighting percentages for various samples using F values 0.96 to 0.995
- Results shown in Table 5
- F < 0.97 or F > 0.99 produces undesirable weightings
- F = 0.96 example for Titan: most recent test weighted 1030 times oldest; last 50 points receive 87.1% weight (leaving only 12.9% for first 121 flights); last 100 flights receive 98.4% weight (effectively omitting oldest 71 flights)
- F = 0.995 example for Atlas: most recent data (1/31/96) weighted only 2.2 times oldest (8/14/64); oldest half (8/14/64 to 3/06/73) receives 40% weight; earliest 56 launches (36% of data) receive 27% weight—not substantially different from equal weighting; fails to acknowledge 32-year Atlas reliability improvements
## Selection Objectives
- 1. Down-weight substantially those failures reduced through redesign, component replacement, improved test procedures, etc.
- 2. (objective 2 continues on next page)
## Assessments
- RTI favors exponential filter over equal-weight or index-count alternatives
- Choice of filter constant F cannot be completely objective
- Values outside 0.97-0.99 range produce problematic results
- Optimal F balances down-weighting of corrected failures while maintaining relevance for recurring failure modes
## Page Number
20 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 29
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Table 5: Filter Factor Influence on Weighting Percentages. Analysis of how exponential filter constant F (ranging 0.96-0.995) affects data weighting across Atlas, Delta, and Titan samples.
## Table 5 Observations
### Atlas (156 flights)
- F=0.96: 4.01%, 33.6%, 87.2%, 96.0%, 98.5%, ratio 560
- F=0.97: 3.03%, 26.5%, 78.9%, 91.5%, 96.1%, ratio 112
- F=0.98: 2.09%, 19.1%, 66.4%, 82.9%, 90.6%, ratio 22.9
- F=0.99: 1.26%, 12.1%, 49.9%, 68.7%, 80.1%, ratio 4.7
- F=0.995: 0.92%, 9.0%, 40.9%, 59.7%, 72.7%, ratio 2.2
### Delta (125 flights)
- F=0.96: 4.02%, 33.5%, 87.5%, 92.9%, 98.9%, ratio 158
- F=0.97: 3.07%, 26.9%, 80.0%, 87.3%, 97.4%, ratio 43.7
- F=0.98: 2.17%, 19.9%, 69.1%, 78.3%, 94.3%, ratio 12.2
- F=0.99: 1.40%, 13.4%, 55.2%, 65.6%, 88.6%, ratio 3.5
- F=0.995: 1.07%, 10.5%, 47.6%, 58.2%, 84.7%, ratio 1.9
### Titan (171 flights)
- F=0.96: 4.00%, 33.5%, 87.1%, 97.1%, 98.4%, ratio 1030
- F=0.97: 3.02%, 26.4%, 78.6%, 93.2%, 95.8%, ratio 177
- F=0.98: 2.07%, 18.9%, 65.7%, 85.1%, 89.6%, ratio 31.0
- F=0.99: 1.22%, 11.7%, 48.1%, 70.5%, 77.2%, ratio 5.5
- F=0.995: 0.87%, 8.5%, 38.5%, 60.8%, 68.5%, ratio 2.3
*Last half + 1 if sample size is odd
## Critical Analysis
### F = 0.96 Issues
- Most recent test weighted 1030 times oldest test
- Last 50 data points receive 87.1% total weighting
- Only 12.9% remains for first 121 flights
- Last 100 flights receive 98.4% weighting
- In effect, oldest 71 flights omitted from solution
- Produces undesirable weightings
### F = 0.995 Issues
- Most recent data point (1/31/96) weighted only 2.2 times oldest (8/14/64)
- Oldest half of data (8/14/64 to 3/06/73) receives 40% weight
- Earliest 56 launches (36% of data) receive 27% weight (100 - 73)
- Not substantially different from equal weighting
- Fails to acknowledge 32-year Atlas reliability improvements
### Optimal Range
- F values < 0.97 or > 0.99 produce undesirable weightings
- Optimal range appears 0.97-0.99 for balancing improvement recognition with recurring failure detection
## Assessments
- Although F selection cannot be completely objective, values outside 0.97-0.99 range create problematic weighting distributions
- F = 0.98 provides reasonable balance across all three vehicles
- Higher F values preserve relevance of old data for detecting recurring failure modes
- Lower F values emphasize recent improvements and learning processes
## Page Number
21 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 30
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Conclusion of Section 5.1 discussing selection of exponential filter constant F, with detailed enumeration of two contrary objectives guiding F selection and preliminary assessment of optimal values.
## Section: Filter Constant Selection (Continued from page 20)
1. Down-weight substantially those failures for which probability of occurrence has been greatly reduced through redesign and replacement of components, improved test procedures, and related improvements
2. (Objective continues but text truncated on visible portion)
## Observations
- Choice of filter constant F cannot be completely objective
- Balance required between down-weighting corrected failures and maintaining relevance of recurring-failure detection
- Process involves examining weighting percentages for various samples using F from 0.96 to 0.995
- Results shown in Table 5 (previous page)
## Vehicles and Data Volumes
- Atlas: 156 representative flights analyzed
- Delta: 125 representative flights analyzed
- Titan: 171 representative flights analyzed
## Assessment of Weighting Effects
From Table 5 analysis:
- F = 0.96: Extreme emphasis on recent data—may miss recurring failure modes
- F = 0.97: Strong recent-data emphasis but more balanced
- F = 0.98: Moderate recent-data emphasis with reasonable recurring-mode detection
- F = 0.99: More equal distribution but still emphasizes recent events
- F = 0.995: Approaches equal weighting, reduces perceived reliability improvements
## Overall Assessment
- Exponential filter selected as superior to equal-weight and index-count alternatives
- Filter constant F selection involves inherent subjectivity despite methodology rigor
- Value selection must balance competing demands of recognizing improvements while detecting persistent failure modes
- Detailed weighting analysis provides basis for defensible F selection
## Organizations Cited
## Page Number
21 (dated 9/10/96, RTI)
Page 31
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Technical discussion of filtering methodology for failure probability predictions and data weighting approaches. Contains narrative text and Figure 4 showing filter factor results for Atlas representative configurations.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Filter Factor Analysis
- Discussion of filter constant (F) values in range 0.97-0.99
- F = 0.98 selected as best weighting of performance data
- F = 0.97 produces higher filter volatility with faster jumps and drops
- Values below 0.97 place too much emphasis on small recent sample
- Values above 0.99 extend sample too far back, reducing emphasis on improvements
### Sample Size Principles
- Large representative samples essential for good failure probability estimates
- More reliable vehicles require larger samples for accurate estimates
- Statistical example: 1% population characteristic has 0.37 probability of not appearing in 100-item sample; 0.61 probability if sample size is 50
### Data Samples
- Atlas, Delta, and Titan data samples made as large as possible
- Consistent data weighting across all vehicle programs
### Figure 4
Shows inverse relationship between filter volatility and F value for Atlas across sample index 0-160, with three curves for F = 0.97, 0.98, and 0.99
Page 32
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of filter factor analysis with Figure 4 graphical presentation and interpretation of filter factor selection rationale for future risk studies.
## Dates
## Organizations
- RTI (Reliability and Test International)
- 45 SW/SE (Strategic Wing/Space Expeditionary - launch area reference)
## Key Content
### Filter Factor Selection Rationale
- No "correct" value for F; difficult to argue one value superior to another
- Conservative position: F = 0.99
- Optimistic position: F = 0.97
- Value of F crucial in predicting failure probability
### Future Risk Analysis Plans
- RTI plans to use overall failure probabilities from Table 6 (F = 0.98) for future launch-area risk analyses for 45 SW/SE
- Will continue using these probabilities unless directed otherwise or data justifies changes
- Focus on flight-phase 2; failure probabilities beyond this of minor interest for launch-area analysis
### Figure 4 Interpretation
Demonstrates that filter factor choice significantly affects predicted failure probability trajectory over launch sequence history
Page 33
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Failure probability data for Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles with response mode analysis. Contains Table 6 showing predicted failure probabilities and Table 7-10 showing failure counts by response mode.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Table 6: Failure Probabilities (Exponential filter F = 0.98)
**Atlas:**
- Flight Phase 0-1: 0.022
- Flight Phase 0-2: 0.031
**Delta:**
- Flight Phase 0-1: 0.010
- Flight Phase 0-2: 0.013
**Titan:**
- Flight Phase 0-1: 0.040
- Flight Phase 0-2: 0.064
### Delta Second-Stage Analysis
- No second-stage failures in 125-flight representative sample
- Does not mean probability is zero
- F = 0.98 used for flight phases 0-1; F = 0.99 for flight phases 0-2 to show difference
- 80% confidence level: Delta failure probability during second-stage burn no bigger than 0.013
### Response Mode Probabilities
- Modes 1, 2, 3 much less likely than Modes 4, 5
- Only 16 failures in combined Atlas/Delta/Titan samples during flight phases 0-2
- None of 16 failures resulted in response-modes 1, 2, or 3
- Relative probabilities estimated using all vehicle configurations (Appendix D)
### Failure Count Tables
- Table 7: Atlas failures all configurations (532 flights)
- Table 8: Delta failures all configurations (232 flights)
- Table 9: Titan failures all configurations (337 flights)
- Table 10: Eastern-Range Thor failures (85 flights)
### Note
Thor Western Range flights excluded due to incomplete performance records
Page 34
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Detailed failure count tables for all launch vehicles across flight phases and failure-response modes.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Table 7: Atlas Failures - All Configurations (532 Flights)
Failure-response modes by flight phase (0 through 0-5):
- Mode 1: 7 failures across all phases
- Mode 2: 1 failure across all phases
- Mode 3: 2 failures across all phases
- Mode 4: 38-89 failures (increasing through phases)
- Mode 5: 8-15 failures
- 'NA'/Tumble: 4-27 failures
### Table 8: Delta Failures - All Configurations (232 Flights)
- Modes 1-3: 0 failures across all phases
- Mode 4: 2-7 failures
- Mode 5: 2-3 failures
- NA/Tumble: 0-15 failures
### Table 9: Titan Failures - All Configurations (337 Flights)
- Mode 1: 2 failures across all phases
- Mode 2: 2 failures across all phases
- Mode 3: 0 failures across all phases
- Mode 4: 3-47 failures
- Mode 5: 0-5 failures
- NA/Tumble: 1-11 failures
### Table 10: Eastern-Range Thor Failures (85 Flights)
- Mode 1: 0-4 failures
- Mode 2: 0-1 failures
- Mode 3: 0-1 failures
- Mode 4: 15-22 failures
- Mode 5: 4-5 failures
- NA/Tumble: 0-5 failures
Page 35
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Combined failure analysis across all vehicles and last-occurrence dates for each failure mode. Contains Tables 11-12 with aggregate data and temporal information.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Table 11: Number of Failures for All Vehicles (1186 Total Flights)
Aggregate across Atlas, Delta, Titan, Thor by flight phase (0 through 0-5):
- Mode 1: 0-13 failures
- Mode 2: 0-4 failures
- Mode 3: 0-3 failures
- Mode 4: 3-165 failures (significant increase through phases)
- Mode 5: 0-28 failures
- NA/3&4 Tumble: 1-53 failures
### Table 12: Date of Most Recent Failure by Response Mode and Vehicle
**Mode 1 Last Occurrence:**
- Atlas: 03/02/65
- Delta: none
- Titan: 12/12/59
- Thor: 04/19/58
**Mode 2 Last Occurrence:**
- Atlas: 12/18/81
- Delta: none
- Titan: 05/01/63
- Thor: 12/30/58
**Mode 3 Last Occurrence:**
- Atlas: 04/25/61
- Delta: none
- Titan: none
- Thor: 07/21/59
**Mode 4 Last Occurrence:**
- Atlas: 08/22/92
- Delta: 05/03/86
- Titan: 10/05/93
- Thor: 03/24/64
**Mode 5 Last Occurrence:**
- Atlas: 12/08/80
- Delta: 08/27/69
- Titan: 11/30/65
- Thor: 01/24/62
### Notes
- Last Thor launch: 02/23/65
- Data shows Delta has never experienced Modes 1-3
- Titan has never experienced Mode 3
Page 36
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Filter weighting analysis and response-mode occurrence percentages. Contains Table 13 showing percentage weightings across filter constants and Table 14 showing response-mode occurrence percentages.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Table 13: Percentage Weighting for Sample of 1186 Launches
Shows weighting distribution across filter constants (0.999 to 0.980):
**At F = 0.999:**
- Last Point: 0.14%
- Last 100 Points: 13.7%
- Last 200 Points: 26.1%
- Last 300 Points: 37.3%
- Last 500 Points: 56.7%
- Point Ratio Last:First: 3.3
**At F = 0.990:**
- Last Point: 1.00%
- Last 100 Points: 63.4%
- Last 200 Points: 86.6%
- Last 300 Points: 95.1%
- Last 500 Points: 99.3%
**At F = 0.980:**
- Last Point: 2.00%
- Last 100 Points: 86.7%
- Last 200 Points: 98.2%
- Last 300 Points: 99.8%
- Last 500 Points: 99.996%
### Filter Factor Appropriateness
- F = 0.999 inappropriate: Recent data weighted only 3.3x more than 39-year-old data
- Most recent 200-300 points (16.8%-25.2% of data) receive only 26.1%-37.3% total weight
- F = 0.99 throws out oldest 600-700 launches needed for adequate sample size
- F values 0.990-0.994 provide reasonable compromise
### Table 14: Response-Mode Occurrence Percentages (Flight Phases 0-2)
- Modes 2 and 4 relatively insensitive to filter-factor values
- Modes 1, 3, 5 decrease as filter memory decreases
- Suggests Modes 1, 3, 5 occurrences decreasing over time
- Modes 2 and 4 occurrences stable through years
Page 37
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Selection of filter constant for mature and new launch systems, with recommended response-mode percentages for different vehicle categories.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Filter Constant Selection Rationale
- F = 0.993 selected for mature launch systems (Atlas, Delta, Titan)
- Cannot argue 0.993 superior to 0.992 or 0.994, or values outside this interval
- 0.993 balance between over-weighting recent data (0.97) and under-weighting improvements (0.99)
### New Liquid-Propellant Systems
- Use F = 0.999 (nearly equal weighting)
- Rationale: New systems based on mature designs expected to fail at higher rates
- Impact distributions of failure modes more likely similar to earlier versions of Atlas, Delta, Titan
### New Solid-Propellant Systems
- Use F = 0.996 as compromise
- F = 0.999 results in Mode-1 percentage too high for solid systems
- All 13 Mode-1 failures in composite sample involved liquid-propellant vehicles
- No Atlas, Delta, or Titan configurations with solid-propellant boosters experienced Mode-1 response
- F = 0.993 reduces Mode-5 probability too much
- Red Tigress and Joust vehicles (Cape, 1991) both experienced Mode-5 failures with solid boosters
### Table 15: Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases O-2
**Mature Launch Systems (F = 0.993):**
- Mode 1: 0.4%
- Mode 2: 5.4%
- Mode 3: 0.1%
- Mode 4: 86.2%
- Mode 5: 7.9%
**New Solid Systems (F = 0.996):**
- Mode 1: 2.2%
- Mode 2: 4.3%
- Mode 3: 0.4%
- Mode 4: 80.4%
- Mode 5: 12.7%
**New Liquid Systems (F = 0.999):**
- Mode 1: 7.4%
- Mode 2: 2.3%
- Mode 3: 1.7%
- Mode 4: 73.3%
- Mode 5: 15.3%
Page 38
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Recommended response-mode percentages for flight phases 0-1 and methodology for calculating absolute failure probabilities by response mode.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Table 16: Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases 0-1
**Mature Launch Systems (F = 0.993):**
- Mode 1: 0.5%
- Mode 2: 7.4%
- Mode 3: 0.1%
- Mode 4: 81.9%
- Mode 5: 10.1%
**New Solid Systems (F = 0.996):**
- Mode 1: 3.4%
- Mode 2: 6.6%
- Mode 3: 0.6%
- Mode 4: 74.5%
- Mode 5: 14.9%
**New Liquid Systems (F = 0.999):**
- Mode 1: 10.7%
- Mode 2: 4.3%
- Mode 3: 2.4%
- Mode 4: 67.0%
- Mode 5: 15.6%
### Absolute Probability Calculation Method
- Multiply absolute failure probabilities for flight phases 0-1 and 0-2 (Table 6)
- By relative failure probabilities in Tables 15 and 16
- More precise values used for calculation than shown in tables
### Observations
- Modes 1, 2, 3 percentages higher in flight phase 0-1 vs 0-2 for most systems
- Mode 4 percentages lower in 0-1, higher in 0-2 (logical given longer time span)
- Mode 5 percentages relatively consistent across phases
Page 39
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Absolute failure probabilities for individual response modes across three launch vehicles and analysis of differences between flight phases.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Table 17: Absolute Failure Probabilities for Response Modes 1-5
**Atlas:**
- Flight Phase 0-1 (0-170 sec):
- - Mode 1: 0.000119
- - Mode 2: 0.001637
- - Mode 3: 0.000011
- - Mode 4: 0.018007
- - Mode 5: 0.002226
- - Total: 0.022
- Flight Phase 0-2 (0-280 sec):
- - Mode 1: 0.000121
- - Mode 2: 0.001665
- - Mode 3: 0.000012
- - Mode 4: 0.026738
- - Mode 5: 0.002465
- - Total: 0.031
**Delta:**
- Flight Phase 0-1 (0-270 sec):
- - Mode 1: 0.000054
- - Mode 2: 0.000744
- - Mode 3: 0.000005
- - Mode 4: 0.008185
- - Mode 5: 0.001012
- - Total: 0.010
- Flight Phase 0-2 (0-630 sec):
- - Mode 1: 0.000051
- - Mode 2: 0.000698
- - Mode 3: 0.000005
- - Mode 4: 0.011212
- - Mode 5: 0.001034
- - Total: 0.013
**Titan:**
- Flight Phase 0-1 (0-300 sec):
- - Mode 1: 0.000216
- - Mode 2: 0.002976
- - Mode 3: 0.000020
- - Mode 4: 0.032740
- - Mode 5: 0.004048
- - Total: 0.040
- Flight Phase 0-2 (0-540 sec):
- - Mode 1: 0.000250
- - Mode 2: 0.003437
- - Mode 3: 0.000026
- - Mode 4: 0.055200
- - Mode 5: 0.005088
- - Total: 0.064
### Analysis Notes
- Probabilities listed to six decimal places to show differences, not because all figures significant
- Modes 1, 2, 3 cannot occur beyond flight phase 1 (Mode 4, 5 distribution differences expected across phases)
- Unequal data weighting from exponential filter produces slight variations
Page 40
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analysis of phase-dependent failure probabilities and explanation of differences between flight phases for different response modes.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Mode 1-3 Phase Differences
- Absolute probabilities differ slightly for flight phases 0-1 vs 0-2
- Difference due to unequal data weighting from exponential filter
- With equal weighting, probabilities would be identical (expected, since Modes 1, 2, 3 cannot occur beyond phase 1)
### Mode 4-5 Phase Differences
- Absolute probabilities increase noticeably from phase 0-1 to 0-2
- Part of difference from unequal data weighting
- Primary cause: fewer Mode 4 and 5 failures occur during shorter flight phase 0-1 than during longer span of phase 0-2
- Longer duration of phase 0-2 increases opportunity for these failure modes to manifest
### Proportional Relationships
- Mode 4 shows largest absolute increase across phases
- Mode 5 shows more moderate increase
- Pattern consistent across all three vehicle types (Atlas, Delta, Titan)
### Data Quality Notes
- Probabilities listed to six decimal places for comparison purposes
- Actual significance varies; not all decimal places equally reliable
- Based on empirical flight test data with exponential filtering
Page 41
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analysis of tumble response characteristics for failure modes 3 and 4, including filter-based estimation methodology and observed trends.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Section 5.3: Relative Probability of Tumble for Response-Modes 3 and 4
### Methodology
- Exponential filters with F values 0.98-0.999 used to estimate percentage of Mode-3 and Mode-4 responses that terminate with thrusting tumble
- Results given for flight phases 0-2 and 0-5
- Data sample: chronological composite of all Atlas, Delta, Titan, Thor tests (Appendix D)
- Total sample size: 1,186 flight tests
### Table 18: Percent of Response Modes 3 and 4 That Tumble
**Flight Phases 0-2:**
- F = 0.999: 25.0%
- F = 0.996: 26.3%
- F = 0.993: 27.3%
- F = 0.990: 28.3%
- F = 0.980: 31.3%
**Flight Phases 0-5:**
- F = 0.999: 25.0%
- F = 0.996: 27.0%
- F = 0.993: 28.6%
- F = 0.990: 30.1%
- F = 0.980: 34.8%
### Observed Trends
- Smaller filter factor produces greater weight on recent test data
- Percentage of Mode-4 responses ending with thrusting tumble increasing gradually over time
- Same conclusion reached for both flight phases 0-2 and 0-5
### Sample Data
- Through flight phase 2: 33 tumbles out of 132 Mode-3 and Mode-4 responses
- Through flight phase 5: 42 tumbles out of 168 Mode-3 and Mode-4 responses
### Future Assumption
Page 42
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Introduction to Mode-5 shaping constants determination through simulation, explaining the need for simulation-based approach and overview of methodology.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Section 6: Shaping Constants Through Simulation
### Rationale for Simulation Approach
- Adequate test data not available to establish Mode-5 shaping constants empirically
- Other methods needed for this purpose
- Mode-5 defined as: after vehicle pitchover, any malfunction with potential to cause substantial deviation from intended flight line
### Mode-5 Failure Classification
- Malfunction need not actually cause large deviation to be classified as Mode-5
- Two main failure classes investigated:
- 1. **Random-attitude failures**: Guidance and control failures leading to erroneous orientation or spatial target
- 2. **Slow turns**: Engine nozzle locks in fixed position (near null or otherwise)
### Simulation Methodology
1. Run large sample of random-attitude and slow-turn failures
2. Calculate percentages of impacts in five-degree sectors from 0° to 180°
3. Compare with percentages from Mode-5 impact density function
4. Assign values to shaping constants A and B until best fit obtained
### Section 6.1: Malfunction Turn Simulations
### Random-Attitude Failure Program (RAFIP)
- Written in Fortran: 3,900 lines of code
- Execution on personal computer
- Uses Monte Carlo approach
### RAFIP Monte Carlo Process
1. Select starting time
2. Select random thrust direction on attitude sphere (all directions equally likely)
3. Begin with nominal vehicle position/velocity at start time
4. Apply instantaneous change in thrust direction
5. Numerically integrate equations of motion until one of four conditions:
- Final stage burnout
- Vehicle impacts while thrusting
- Orbital insertion
- Vehicle breaks up from aerodynamic forces
6. For burnout/breakup: extend trajectory to impact using Kepler's equations
7. For orbital insertion: no impact point exists
### Calculation Scope
- Individual calculations for Atlas, Delta, Titan, LLV1
- Starting shortly after pitchover, continuing until vehicle cannot endanger launch area
- 10,000 impact-point samples at each starting time
- Ten-second interval calculations
Page 43
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Detailed explanation of random-attitude failure calculations and slow-turn failure methodology for Mode-5 impact distribution analysis.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Section 6.1.2: Slow-Turn Failures
### Definition and Mechanism
- Certain guidance/control failures cause thrusting engine to gimbal to null or near-null position
- After engine commanded to null, may not thrust precisely through center of gravity
- Causes: structural misalignments, shifting center of gravity, canted nozzles
- Slow turns constitute subset of Mode-5 failure responses
### Slow-Turn Calculation Assumptions
1. Effective thrust offset of "nulled" engine normally distributed with zero mean and 0.1° standard deviation
2. Fixed thrust offset results in constant angular acceleration of airframe and thrust vector
3. For small thrust misalignments, angular acceleration proportional to angular thrust misalignment
### Atlas IIAS Slow-Turn Data
- Provided for three gimbal angles
- Smallest gimbal angle: 1 degree
- Results plotted as cumulative angle turned versus time
### Angular Acceleration Calculation
- Slope greatest when thrust directed at right angles to velocity vector
- Average angular acceleration computed during first 90° rotation
- Formula: θ = (2θ(deg))/(t²(sec²)) = 180 deg/t² sec²
- Where t is elapsed time from tumble beginning until ~90° rotation
### Small Deflection Proportionality
- If assumption: angular acceleration directly proportional to thrust offset angle
- Angular acceleration θd for small deflection angle:
- θd = θ × (δd/δ)
- Where θ is acceleration for reference deflection δ, and δd is small deflection angle
### Slow-Turn Simulation Process
- Using Atlas IIAS data, computed angular accelerations at ten-second intervals
- Time span: 15 seconds to 275 seconds for δ = 1°
- At each starting time: normal distribution (zero mean, 0.1° std dev) sampled for thrust misalignment
- Angular acceleration applied throughout turn
- Calculations analogous to random-attitude turns
- Turn assumed in randomly oriented plane containing starting velocity vector
- Four termination conditions same as random-attitude turns
- 10,000 impact-point calculations per starting time
Page 44
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analysis of factors affecting malfunction-turn simulation results, including weighting methodology, breakup thresholds, end-time considerations, and vacuum calculation approaches.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Section 6.1.3: Factors Affecting Malfunction-Turn Results
### Data Limitations
- Random-attitude and slow-turn simulations only subsets of total Mode-5 failure responses
- Other behavior types numerous and largely impossible to categorize or simulate
- Ideal approach would combine all Mode-5 response types before comparing with theoretical impact density function
### Factor a: Weighting of Turn Data
- Both random-attitude and slow-turn simulations conducted for Atlas IIAS
- Random-attitude turns assumed 3x more likely than slow turns in combining impact datasets
- Weighting factor of 3 selected from Mode-5 failure response frequencies in performance summaries
- Rationale: among Atlas, Delta, Titan Mode-5 responses, random-attitude turns appeared ~3x more frequent
- Difficulty distinguishing between turn types in many failure summaries
- Relative weighting makes little difference (impact distributions similar)
- Composite weighted distribution lies between two types
- Assumption: similar results for Delta, Titan, LLV1
- Slow-turn computations omitted for other vehicles to reduce time
### Factor b: Breakup qa (Dynamic Pressure × Angle of Attack)
- Assumption: vehicle breaks up if qa reached certain value
- Investigated: no-breakup case (unrealistic) plus three constant qa limits
- Constant qa limits: 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
- Realistic: vehicle breakup more complicated than simple qa threshold
- Rationale for simple approach: better than none at all
### Titan Vehicle Data
- Titan IV allowable (non-breakup) qa's provided as Mach number functions:
- - Titan/Centaur: 6,819 deg-lb/ft² at Mach 0.77
- - Titan/NUS: 5,332 deg-lb/ft² at Mach 0.815
- - Titan/IUS: 17,000 deg-lb/ft² at Mach 0.325
### Atlas, Delta, LLV1
- No breakup qa data available
- Breakup qa's used bracket range of permissible qa's for Titan vehicles
### Factor c: End Time T5
- Simulated impact distributions from random-attitude and slow turns compared with Mode-5 theoretical impact-density function
- For meaningful comparison: T5 value in Mode-5 impact-density equation must match stop time for thrusting-turn simulations
- Shaping constants A and B derived by fitting depend partially on T5
### Destruct Action Considerations
- If destruct action (impact limit lines) included in DAMP calculations, supplemental Mode-5 risks must be accounted for
- Termination time has minor influence when destruct included
- If destruct omitted: T5 immaterial provided impact range at time T5 exceeds range to all targets of interest
### Factor d: Vacuum Calculations
- Atmospheric effects accounted for in breakup determination and during thrusting turns
- Used accelerations from nominal trajectory
- Post-breakup/burnout free fall: vacuum calculations to reduce computation time/cost
- Increased impact dispersions somewhat
- Vacuum results should not differ drastically from maximum-beta piece approach
- Single set of Mode-5 shaping constants used for all debris classes
- Attempts to derive unique constants per class not justified given uncertainties
Page 45
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Presentation of malfunction-turn simulation results for Atlas IIAS showing combined random-attitude and slow-turn impact distributions with supporting figure.
## Dates
## Organizations
## Key Content
### Section 6.1.4: Malfunction-Turn Results for Atlas IIAS
### Simulation Results
- Distribution of impacts for simulated random-attitude turns shown
- Distribution of impacts for slow turns shown
- Weighted combination distribution (75% random-attitude, 25% slow turn) shown
- Failures through 280 seconds
- Breakup qa-alpha = 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
### Key Findings
- Impact distribution for weighted composite not significantly different from random-attitude failures alone
- Impact distributions for two failure types similar
### Implications for Other Vehicles
- Slow-turn computations NOT performed for Delta, Titan, LLV1
- Rationale: impact distribution similarity justifies omitting slow-turn calculations
- Reduces number of time-consuming simulations by approximately half
### Figure 5: Combined Random-Attitude and Slow-Turn Results
Graph showing percent in 5-degree sector (log scale, 0.1-100%) vs angle from flight path (0-180 degrees)
**Three curves displayed:**
1. Random-attitude turns (circle markers)
2. Slow turns (square markers)
3. Combined turns (75% random, 25% slow) (diamond markers)
**Curve Characteristics:**
- Highest impact density near 0 degrees (immediately downrange)
- Rapid decrease through 0-40 degree range
- Gradual decrease from 40-180 degrees
- All three curves show similar shape and proximity
- Log scale shows wide dynamic range from ~0.1% to ~100% per sector
Page 46
View PDF ↗- - Random-attitude failures simulated for no-breakup and three breakup cases (20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²)
- - Total of 1,080,000 trajectories run across all cases
- - Breakup q-alpha value critical to determining shaping constant A
- - Lower q-alpha results in less thrusting time before breakup
- - Higher percentages of impacts in sectors near flight line with lower q-alpha values
- - For Atlas IIAS, effects of q-alpha on breakup shown in Figure 6
- - For failures between 10-30 seconds, most breakups occur later in flight after vehicle builds significant velocity
- - For failures between 40-105 seconds, more than 80% breakup occurs even for q-alpha as high as 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
Page 47
View PDF ↗- - Beyond 170 seconds, dynamic pressure between failure and 280 seconds stays sufficiently low
- - Vehicle remains intact beyond 170 seconds for cases analyzed
- - Dramatic differences in impact distributions depending on breakup occurrence timing
- - Compares no-breakup scenario (Figure 7) vs breakup q-alpha 5,000 deg-lb/ft² (Figure 8)
- - Both patterns use 10,000 impact points from random-attitude failures at 130 seconds
- - Data from Table 19 comprises 270,000-point sample of random-attitude failures
- - Failures run at 10-second intervals from 15 to 275 seconds
- - 10,000 impacts computed at each failure time
- - Five-degree sectors identified for impact analysis
Page 48
View PDF ↗- - Depicts Atlas IIAS impacts with random-attitude failures at 130 seconds
- - No breakup scenario
- - Dense concentration of impact points in central pattern
- - Broader geographic distribution visible across mapped region
Page 49
View PDF ↗- - Depicts Atlas IIAS impacts with random-attitude failures at 130 seconds
- - Breakup q-alpha = 5,000 deg-lb/ft² scenario
- - Noticeably different impact distribution pattern compared to no-breakup case
- - More concentrated toward edges of mapped region
- - Dramatic shift in impact locations due to breakup characteristics
Page 50
View PDF ↗- - 270,000-point sample of random-attitude failures
- - Failure times from 15 to 275 seconds at 10-second intervals
- - 10,000 impacts computed at each failure time
- - Five-degree sectors identified in left column (0-175 degrees)
- - Total impacts across all failure times and sector percentages shown
- - Data shows impact concentration increases with failure time up to 215 seconds
- - No impacts recorded beyond 155 seconds for sectors beyond 80-90 degrees
Page 51
View PDF ↗- - Figure 9 plots percentages of impacts in 5-degree sectors from 0° to 180°
- - B = 1,000 used for theoretical Mode-5 impact percentages
- - Best-fit values of A obtained by trial and error
- - Multiple A values tested: 1.90, 2.75, 3.20, 3.45
- - Breakup q-alpha values tested: none, 20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - No single value of A produces perfect match across entire 180-degree range
- - Attempts to improve match on one end of curve degrade match on other end
- - Good agreement achieved from ±80° to ±180° with proper A selection
- - Atlas IIAS has few significant population centers in launch area within ±80° of flight line
- - Curve matching failures near flight line of little consequence for risk calculation
Page 52
View PDF ↗- - Many types of Mode-5 responses cannot be simulated
- - Malfunction-turn impact distributions in Figure 9 represent only subset of all possible Mode-5 impacts
- - Based on twelve Mode-5 failure responses with available impact data
- - Inclusion of "non-simulatable" Mode-5 responses would improve match in sector ±10° to ±80°
- - Risks near flight line dominated by Mode-4 failure responses
- - Five B values tested: 50,000, 100,000, 500,000, and 5,000,000
- - Best-fit A values determined by trial and error for each B value
- - Results shown in Figure 10 through Figure 13
Page 53
View PDF ↗- - B = 50,000 parameter case
- - A values tested: 3.15, 4.10, 4.50, 4.75
- - Breakup q-alpha values: none, 20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Graph shows percent in 5-degree sector vs angle from flight path
- - Y-axis scale logarithmic from 0.1 to 100 percent
- - X-axis shows 0-180 degrees
Page 54
View PDF ↗- - B = 100,000 parameter case
- - A values tested: 3.40, 4.30, 4.75, 5.00
- - Breakup q-alpha values: none, 20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Logarithmic scale plot of percent in 5-degree sector
- - Shows progressive steepening of curves with increasing A values
Page 55
View PDF ↗- - B = 500,000 parameter case
- - A values tested: 4.00, 4.85, 5.30, 5.55
- - Breakup q-alpha values: none, 20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Logarithmic scale plot showing percent in 5-degree sector
- - Demonstrates sensitivity to A value selection for this B range
Page 56
View PDF ↗- - B = 5,000,000 parameter case (highest B value tested)
- - A values tested: 4.75, 5.65, 6.10, 6.30
- - Breakup q-alpha values: none, 20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Logarithmic scale plot showing percent in 5-degree sector
- - Shows flattening of distribution curves at large B values
Page 57
View PDF ↗- - Five B values analyzed: 1,000, 50,000, 100,000, 500,000, 5,000,000
- - For each B value, multiple A values derived for different breakup q-alpha conditions
- - Breakup q-alpha values: none, 20,000, 14,000 (interpolated), 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - A value dependent on both q-alpha and B
- - Larger B requires larger A value to fit random-attitude-turn data
- - Increased breakup q-alpha requires decreased A value
- - Only q-alpha is critical for launch-area risk computations
- - Any B value with corresponding A can be used if significant targets not within ±80° of flight line
- - Figure 14 provides graphical representation for interpolating A values
- - Table 20. Shaping Constants for Atlas IIAS
- - Figure 14. Effects of Breakup q-alpha on A for Atlas IIAS
Page 58
View PDF ↗- - Twenty sets of A and B from Table 20 used to compute Mode-5 launch-area risks
- - Analysis for Atlas IIAS daytime launch of Telstar-4 payload from Pad 36A
- - Results given in Table 21 with comparison cases
- - Old baseline case Mode-5 Ec = 227 x 10^-6
- - For old baseline: total failure probability 0.04, Mode-5 response probability 0.005
- - For new baseline: total failure probability 0.031, Mode-5 response probability 0.08
- - New baseline absolute probability: 0.031 x 0.08 = 0.0025
- - Risk values highly dependent on A parameter
- - Risk values insensitive to B parameter with proper A selection
- - Mode-5 risks differ by only 12% between B=1,000 and B=5,000,000 for q-alpha=5,000
- - Differences probably reflect A value choice rather than B parameter effect
- - For Atlas IIAS: 24% of total Mode-5 Ec due to one population center
- - 51% of total Ec concentrated in five population centers
- - Table 20. Shaping Constants for Atlas IIAS
- - Table 21. Shaping Constants and Related Risks for Atlas IIAS
- - Table 6 for total failure probability
- - Table 15 for Mode-5 response probability
- - Table 45 from earlier RTI study for comparison
Page 59
View PDF ↗- - Figure 14 graphs five lines showing A vs breakup q-alpha for B values: 1,000, 50,000, 100,000, 500,000, 5,000,000
- - X-axis shows breakup q-alpha from 0 to 25,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Y-axis shows Mode-5 constant A from 2.5 to 6.5
- - All lines show negative slope (A decreases with increasing q-alpha)
- - Table 21 shows Mode-5 Ec values ranging from 19.8 to 144.9 x 10^-6
- - Multiple rows for same P_s and T_B with varying breakup q-alpha conditions
- - New baseline case (P_s=0.0025, T_B=280) produces Mode-5 Ec = 49.1 x 10^-6
- - Mode-5 risks highly dependent on A value
- - Mode-5 risks insensitive to B parameter when A properly selected
- - Values of A can be interpolated from Figure 14 for any q-alpha between 5,000-20,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Even for B values differing by factor of 5,000, risks differ by only 12% at q-alpha=5,000
- - Figure 14. Effects of Breakup q-alpha on A for Atlas IIAS
- - Table 21. Shaping Constants and Related Risks for Atlas IIAS
Page 60
View PDF ↗- - For each breakup q-alpha and every B, good agreement between theoretical and simulated data achieved over 5-degree sectors from ±100° to ±180°
- - Figure 15 plots Mode-5 density-function values at three miles range
- - Values of A and B from Table 21 used with q-alpha = 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Equation (3) does not include probability factor for Mode-5 failure
- - Plotted values are conditional impact probabilities per square mile
- - For sector 120°-180° (where most population centers located), B=5,000,000 produces largest density-function value
- - B=1,000 produces smallest density-function value in 120°-180° sector
- - Results consistent with Mode-5 Ec values in Table 21
- - Largest and smallest Ec values correspond to B=5,000,000 and B=1,000 respectively
- - Density-function analysis explains why small differences in Ec exist across B values
- - Figure 15. Mode-5 Density-Function Values at Three Miles
- - Table 21. Shaping Constants and Related Risks for Atlas IIAS
- - Equation (3) for Mode-5 density function
Page 61
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Technical analysis of Atlas IIAS launch vehicle risk assessment, specifically addressing Mode-5 failure response shaping constants and ship-hit contour computations.
## Technical Content
### Subjects
- Atlas IIAS best-fit conditions for breakup scenarios
- Mode-4 vs Mode-5 failure response dominance
- Impact distribution modeling
### Key Parameters and Data
- **Breakup Conditions Table (Table 22)**:
- - None: B = 50,000, A = 3.15
- - 20,000 deg-lb/ft²: B = 100,000, A = 4.30
- - 10,000 deg-lb/ft²: B = 100,000, A = 4.75
- - 5,000 deg-lb/ft²: B = 5,000,000, A = 6.30
### Analysis Notes
- Agreement between theoretical and simulated curves deteriorates below ±100° in some cases, remarkably good to ±40° in others
- Agreement poor except between ±3° and ±6° where curves cross
- Population centers at Cape located in sectors ±100° to ±180°
- Mode-4 failure response dominates computations (11 times more likely than Mode-5)
- Computed risk contours show imperceptible differences when all response modes included
### References
- DAMP program used for ship-hit contour plotting
- Figure 16-21 showing Mode-5 and all-mode ship-hit contours
- Failure probability during first two minutes of flight: 0.04
- Mode-4 probability: 0.033
- Mode-5 probability: 0.005
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 52)
Page 62
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph and mathematical discussion of Atlas IIAS Mode-5 ship-hit contours with parametric analysis.
## Content
### Figure 16 Details
Atlas IIAS Mode-5 Ship-Hit Contours
- Parameters: B = 1,000, A = 3.00
- Crossrange distance axis (nm): -15 to 15
- Downrange distance axis (nm): -5 to 25
- Probability levels: 10⁻⁵ and 10⁻⁶
- Contour shows concentrated impact distribution around flight path
### Mathematical Content
- Reference equation 3 regarding Mode-5 impact-density functions
- Calculation methodology for contours based on probability thresholds
- Impact concentration relationship with parameter A values
### Technical Discussion
- Mode-5 response probability 10.9 times (rather than 6.6) relative to Mode-5 response yields even less contour difference
- Constant parameters discussion showing independence of Mode-5 impact percentage from A and B values
- Integration methodology between angle limits (0 to π) and range limits
### Footnote
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 53)
Page 63
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph showing Atlas IIAS all-mode ship-hit contours with combined failure response distribution analysis.
## Content
### Figure 17 Details
Atlas IIAS All-Mode Ship-Hit Contours
- Parameters: B = 1,000, A = 3.00
- Crossrange distance (nm): -15 to 15
- Downrange distance (nm): -5 to 25
- Probability contours: 10⁻⁴, 10⁻⁵, 10⁻⁶
- Solid and dashed lines showing multiple probability levels
### Technical Purpose
Demonstrates combined effect of all failure response modes on impact distribution, showing dominance of Mode-4 response in overall risk computation.
### Key Observation
When all response modes included in calculations, contour differences compared to Mode-5 alone are almost imperceptible, validating the dominance assertion.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 54)
Page 64
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph showing Atlas IIAS Mode-5 ship-hit contours with alternative parameter set.
## Content
### Figure 18 Details
Atlas IIAS Mode-5 Ship-Hit Contours
- Parameters: B = 1,000, A = 3.45
- Crossrange distance (nm): -15 to 15
- Downrange distance (nm): -5 to 25
- Probability contours: 10⁻⁵ and 10⁻⁶
- Elongated impact distribution pattern compared to lower A value
### Parameter Sensitivity
Demonstrates effect of increased A value (3.45 vs 3.00) on impact concentration near flight line. More concentrated distribution expected with higher A.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 55)
Page 65
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph showing Atlas IIAS all-mode ship-hit contours with parameter set B=1,000, A=3.45.
## Content
### Figure 19 Details
Atlas IIAS All-Mode Ship-Hit Contours
- Parameters: B = 1,000, A = 3.45
- Crossrange distance (nm): -15 to 15
- Downrange distance (nm): -5 to 25
- Probability contours: 10⁻⁴, 10⁻⁵, 10⁻⁶
- Multiple dashed and solid lines showing probability thresholds
### Technical Analysis
Comparison case showing all-mode impacts with increased A parameter. Contours demonstrate broader distribution than Mode-5 alone due to Mode-4 contribution.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 56)
Page 66
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph showing Atlas IIAS Mode-5 ship-hit contours with extreme parameter values.
## Content
### Figure 20 Details
Atlas IIAS Mode-5 Ship-Hit Contours
- Parameters: B = 5,000,000, A = 6.30
- Crossrange distance (nm): -15 to 15
- Downrange distance (nm): -5 to 25
- Probability contours: 10⁻⁵ and 10⁻⁶
- Narrow, highly concentrated distribution pattern
### Technical Significance
Demonstrates effect of maximum breakup scenario (qa = 5,000 deg-lb/ft² with B = 5,000,000). Results in most concentrated impact distribution near flight line, reflecting high structural integrity and distributed fragmentation pattern.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 57)
Page 67
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph and technical discussion of Atlas IIAS all-mode ship-hit contours with extreme parameters and introduction of range distribution analysis.
## Content
### Figure 21 Details
Atlas IIAS All-Mode Ship-Hit Contours
- Parameters: B = 5,000,000, A = 6.30
- Crossrange distance (nm): -15 to 15
- Downrange distance (nm): -5 to 25
- Probability contours: 10⁻⁴, 10⁻⁵, 10⁻⁶
- Narrow concentrated pattern showing mode-4 dominance
### Section 6.2.4: Range Distributions of Theoretical and Simulated Impacts
#### Methodology
- Random-attitude turns at 2-second intervals from 15 to 279 seconds
- Breakup qa scenarios: none, 5,000, and 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
- Sampling: 2,000 trajectories per time interval, 266,000 total per breakup condition
- Impact range computed from pad
- 10-mile range intervals to 350 miles
#### Parameters
- Impact points calculated for each scenario
- Total impacts in 10-mile intervals tabulated
- Percentages computed for each range interval
### Technical Purpose
Testing agreement between range component of Mode-5 impact-density function and simulated random-attitude data.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 58)
Page 68
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph and analysis of impact range distributions for Atlas IIAS with theoretical and simulated data comparison.
## Content
### Figure 22 Details
Impact-Range Distributions
- Axes: Impact Range (nm) 0-350 vs Percent Impacts in 10-nm Interval (0.1-100 log scale)
- Atlas IIAS configurations shown
- Multiple curves for theoretical and breakup scenarios
#### Data Series
- **Theoretical**: solid line
- **Breakup qa = 5,000 deg-lb/ft²**: solid line
- **Breakup qa = 20,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dashed line
- **No Breakup**: dotted line
#### Key Findings
- Range impact distributions for theoretical Mode-5 and random-attitude failures with qa between 5,000 and 20,000 deg-lb/ft² in excellent agreement out to 50 miles
- Theoretical and random-attitude percentages for qa = 5,000 deg-lb/ft² (most realistic value) in good agreement out to 190 miles
- Beyond 190 miles: differences appear fairly large on logarithmic scale, but maximum absolute difference only 0.4%
- Steep rise at 350 miles artificially created by lumping all impacts beyond 350 miles into single interval
### Methodology
- Theoretical percentages obtained by integrating Mode-5 impact-density function Eq. (3)
- Integration between angle limits (0 to π) and range limits (R₁ to R₂), doubled
### Technical Note
Percentage of impacts in any range interval independent of values of A and B
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 59)
Page 69
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Introduction and methodology section for Delta-GEM shaping constants development.
## Content
### Section 6.3: Shaping Constants for Delta-GEM
#### Overview
Computations and graphs to establish Mode-5 shaping constants for Delta parallel those for Atlas IIAS (Section 6.2), though less extensive.
#### Methodology Summary
Four-step approach:
1. **Impact Point Calculation**
- 10,000 simulated random-attitude turns
- 10-second intervals from programming time (6 seconds) to staging (270 seconds)
- Total: 260,000 simulations
- Impact points assumed representative of totality of Mode-5 impacts
2. **Angle Distribution Analysis**
- Determine percentages of impacts in 5° sectors from 0° to 180°
3. **Theoretical Computation**
- For assumed values of A and B, compute percentages in same 5° sectors
- Use Mode-5 impact-density function
4. **Parameter Optimization**
- Trial and error method
- Find values of A and B providing best fit between simulated and theoretical data
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 60)
Page 70
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph showing Delta-GEM vehicle breakup percentages versus failure time with multiple breakup scenarios.
## Content
### Section 6.3.1: Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants
### Figure 23 Details
Delta-GEM Breakup Percentages
- Axes: Failure Time (sec) 0-280 vs Breakup Percent (%) 0-100
- Y-axis linear scale
#### Breakup Scenarios
- **q-alpha = 5,000 deg-lb/ft²**: solid line
- **q-alpha = 10,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dashed line
- **q-alpha = 20,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dotted line
#### Key Observations
- Over 50% of vehicles break up (either immediately or eventually)
- Turn initiation window: approximately 10 to 115 seconds failure time
- Progressive breakup percentages across all qa scenarios
- Peak breakup rates around 40-80 second interval
### Technical Context
Same breakup qa values used in Atlas IIAS calculations applied to Delta-GEM analysis.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 61)
Page 71
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Comprehensive graph showing Delta-GEM malfunction-turn impact distributions with multiple breakup scenarios and parameter variations.
## Content
### Figure 24 Details
Delta-GEM Simulation Results with B = 1,000
- Axes: Angle From Flight Path (deg) 0-180 vs Percent in 5-deg sector (0.01-100 log scale)
- Malfunction-turn impact data for multiple breakup conditions
#### Data Series
- **No breakup**: heavy solid line
- **Breakup 20,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dashed line
- **Breakup 10,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dash-dot line
- **Breakup 5,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dotted line
- **Theoretical lines** with B = 1,000 and best-fit A values:
- - A = 1.90 (solid)
- - A = 2.90 (dashed)
- - A = 3.10 (dash-dot)
- - A = 4.30 (dotted)
### Key Findings
- B = 1,000 chosen because currently used by RTI for 45th Space Wing launch-area risk studies
- Sectors ±80° to ±180°: where most population centers located
- Fairly good data fits possible for all breakup qa except 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- No A value could produce good fit for qa = 5,000 deg-lb/ft² with B = 1,000
- Alternative B values can achieve excellent fit for qa = 5,000 (shown in Figure 25)
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 62)
Page 72
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Graph showing optimized Delta-GEM simulation results with best-fit shaping constants across all breakup scenarios.
## Content
### Figure 25 Details
Delta-GEM Simulation Results with Best-Fit Shaping Constants
- Axes: Angle From Flight Path (deg) 0-180 vs Percent in 5-deg sector (0.01-100 log scale)
- Random-attitude failures through 270 seconds
#### Data Series and Parameter Sets
- **Simulated impact percentages**: identical to Figure 24
- **Theoretical percentages** optimized for ±60° to ±180° sectors:
- - No breakup: A = 2.60, B = 10,000
- - qa = 20,000 deg-lb/ft²: A = 3.15, B = 2,000
- - qa = 10,000 deg-lb/ft²: A = 3.35, B = 2,000
- - qa = 5,000 deg-lb/ft²: A = 3.50, B = 4
### Technical Achievement
Excellent fit between malfunction-turn and theoretical Mode-5 impact data possible for any qa between 5,000 and 20,000 deg-lb/ft² with appropriate parameter selection.
### Methodology Note
Best-fit optimization conducted by trying various combinations of B and A until best possible agreement achieved in ±60° to ±180° sectors (where population centers located).
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 63)
Page 73
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Technical analysis of Delta-GEM launch-area Mode-5 risks with parametric sensitivity study.
## Content
### Section 6.3.2: Launch-Area Mode-5 Risks
#### Methodology
DAMP program used to compute Mode-5 launch-area risks for population centers inside impact limit lines. Case study: Delta-GEM/GPS-10 daytime launch from Pad 17A.
### Table 23: Shaping Constants and Related Risks for Delta-GEM
| Ps | Tb (sec) | Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft²) | B | A | Mode-5 Ec (x 10⁴) |
|----|----------|------------------------|-------|--------|-----------|
| 0.0025 | 130 | 12,000* | 1,000 | 3.00 | 394 |
| | | (baseline) | | | |
| 0.001 | 270 | 12,000* | 1,000 | 3.00 | 88.8 |
| | | (new p&Tb) | | | |
| 0.001 | 270 | none | 1,000 | 1.90 | 220.0 |
| | | 20,000 | | 2.90 | 104.4 |
| | | 10,000 | | 3.10 | 74.1 |
| | | 5,000 | | 4.30 | 5.2 |
| 0.001 | 270 | none | 10,000 | 2.60 | 224.4 |
| | | 20,000 | 2,000 | 3.15 | 102.4 |
| | | 10,000 | 2,000 | 3.35 | 72.0 |
| | | 5,000 | 4 | 3.50 | 5.1 |
*Interpolated from data in Figure 24
### Key Findings
#### Risk Dependence on qa and A
- Risks highly dependent on qa and corresponding A value
- Relatively insensitive to changes in B if proper A value selected
#### Quantitative Examples
- qa = 10,000: B = 1,000 (A = 3.10) vs B = 2,000 (A = 3.35) differ by less than 3%
- No-breakup cases (B = 1,000 then 10,000): differences less than 2%
#### Vehicle Strength Effects
- Launch-area risks highly dependent on vehicle's capability to withstand aerodynamic forces
- Except early in flight: low-strength vehicles break up quickly after malfunction turn begins
- Later turns occur → more likely pieces impact downrange → less risk to uprange populations
#### Critical Observation
Risks over 20 times greater if vehicle breakup qa is 20,000 rather than 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
### References
- Figure 24: simulation results with B = 1,000
- Figure 25: best-fit shaping constants
- Table 6 and Table 15: failure probability data
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 64)
Page 74
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Introduction to Titan IV Mode-5 shaping constants development with breakup analysis graph.
## Content
### Section 6.4: Shaping Constants for Titan IV
#### Overview
Mode-5 shaping constants for Titan IV developed using methodology described in Section 6.3 for Delta, with extended sampling:
- Total simulations: 290,000
- Time window: 18 seconds (programming) to 300 seconds (staging)
- Same qa values used with Atlas and Delta
- Similar breakup results obtained
### Figure 26 Details
Titan IV Breakup Percentages
- Axes: Failure Time (sec) 0-280 vs Breakup Percent (%) 0-100
- Y-axis linear scale
#### Breakup Scenarios
- **q-alpha = 5,000 deg-lb/ft²**: solid line
- **q-alpha = 10,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dashed line
- **q-alpha = 20,000 deg-lb/ft²**: dotted line
#### Key Observations
- Peak breakup rates concentrated around 40-120 second interval
- Rapid transition from breakup to stable phases
- Similar response pattern to Delta-GEM vehicle
- Steeper initial rise and faster burnout compared to Delta
- All scenarios converge to zero breakup by ~240 seconds
### Technical Context
Demonstrates structural response characteristics of larger Titan IV vehicle to aerodynamic forces during failure scenarios.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 65)
Page 75
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Comprehensive graph showing Titan IV malfunction-turn impact distributions with parametric analysis and optimization discussion.
## Content
### Figure 27 Details
Titan IV Simulation Results with B = 1,000
- Axes: Angle From Flight Path (deg) 0-180 vs Percent in 5-deg sector (0.01-100 log scale)
- Malfunction-turn impacts through 300 seconds
#### Data Series
- **No breakup**: heavy line
- **Breakup 20,000 deg-lb/ft²**: multiple curves
- **Breakup 10,000 deg-lb/ft²**: multiple curves
- **Breakup 5,000 deg-lb/ft²**: multiple curves
- **Theoretical curves** with B = 1,000 and best-fit A values:
- - A = 2.00
- - A = 2.95
- - A = 3.25
- - A = 3.50
### Key Findings
#### Sector Performance
- Sectors ±60° to ±180°: where most population centers located
- Data fits reasonably good within this region
#### Parameter Selection
- B = 1,000 chosen for current RTI use in 45 SW/SE (45th Space Wing/Space Expeditionary) launch-area risk studies
- Divergence for no-breakup case can be greatly reduced by selecting alternative B and A values (addressed in subsequent analysis)
#### Technical Assessment
Reasonable agreement achieved in population-center sectors, with optimization possible for specific breakup scenarios through alternative parameter combinations.
### Optimization Note
Figure 28 (referenced but not shown on this page) would demonstrate best-fit shaping constants for Titan IV similar to Delta-GEM Figure 25 analysis.
### Date
9/10/96
### Organization
RTI (page 66)
Page 76
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Technical analysis of Titan IV Random-Attitude Failures through 300 seconds. Figure 28 displays simulation results with best-fit shaping constants for Mode-5 impact distribution modeling. Content includes comparative graph showing theoretical percentages derived from testing various combinations of parameters (B and A constants) to achieve good fit between simulated malfunction-turn results and theoretical impact-distribution data.
## Observations
- Simulated impact distributions in Figure 28 are identical to Figure 27
- Theoretical Mode-5 percentages obtained by testing combinations of B and A parameters
- Good fit achieved in sectors from ±60° to ±180°
- Best-fit values prioritize sectors where population centers are located
- Lower breakup dynamic pressure (qa) conditions investigated but deemed less critical for population-protection calculations
## Assessments
- Adequate fits achieved in sectors corresponding to population center locations
- Effort to find better fits for lower breakup qa values not considered worthwhile
- Parameters shown in figure produce more than adequate results for risk assessment purposes
## Shaping Constants (from Figure 28)
- A = 2.70, B = 10,000
- A = 3.15, B = 2,000
- A = 3.25, B = 1,000
- A = 3.50, B = 1,000
## References
- Figure 27 (referenced for comparison)
- Mode-5 impact distribution methodology
- Malfunction-turn simulation data
Page 77
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Summary table of shaping constants for Titan IV vehicle. Table 24 presents best-fit values of B and A parameters for convenient reference, organized by thrust burning time (T_B) and breakup dynamic pressure (qa) conditions.
## Observations
- Best-fit values of B and A shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28 tabulated for reference
- For breakup qa values of 10,000 and 5,000 deg-lb/ft², currently-used value of B = 1,000 provided better data fit than other investigated B values
- Multiple breakup conditions analyzed: none, 20,000, 10,000, 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
## Data - Table 24: Shaping Constants for Titan IV
| T_B (sec) | Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft²) | B | A |
|-----------|-------------------------|-------|-------|
| 300 | none | 1,000 | 2.00 |
| | 20,000 | | 2.95 |
| | 10,000 | | 3.25 |
| | 5,000 | | 3.50 |
| 300 | none | 10,000 | 2.70 |
| | 20,000 | 2,000 | 3.15 |
| | 10,000 | 1,000 | 3.25 |
| | 5,000 | 1,000 | 3.50 |
## Assessments
- Risk calculations in launch area were not made for Titan IV
- Parameter values provide basis for Mode-5 impact distribution modeling
Page 78
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Introduction to LLV1 shaping constants development methodology (Section 6.5). Describes simulation procedures and presents Figure 29 showing LLV1 breakup percentages as function of failure time and dynamic pressure conditions.
## Observations
- Shaping constants for LLV1 developed using same methodology as described for Delta in Section 6.3
- Total of 290,000 simulations conducted between programming time of 1 second and staging at 290 seconds
- Due to LLV1's higher acceleration, rapid drop-off from near 100% breakup occurs at earlier time compared to Atlas, Delta, and Titan vehicles
- Results similar to previously shown vehicles but with earlier failure-time characteristics
## Breakup Percentages (Figure 29)
- q-alpha = 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- q-alpha = 10,000 deg-lb/ft²
- q-alpha = 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
## Methodology
- Failure times range from 0 to 280 seconds
- Random-attitude turn simulations
- Impact distribution in 5-degree sectors
## Assessments
- Results consistent with Atlas, Delta, and Titan patterns
- Vehicle's higher acceleration produces earlier breakup transition timeline
- Methodology appropriate for developing vehicle-specific shaping parameters
Page 79
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analysis of LLV1 malfunction-turn impact distributions with fixed B parameter value. Figure 30 displays percentage of impacts in 5-degree sectors for no-breakup case and three breakup dynamic pressure conditions (qa values of 20,000, 10,000, and 5,000 deg-lb/ft²).
## Observations
- Three breakup qa conditions produced surprisingly similar impact distributions
- Similarity possibly due to vehicle's higher acceleration characteristics
- Theoretical Mode-5 impact distributions plotted for B = 1,000 with best-fit A values
- B = 1,000 chosen because currently used by RTI in launch-area risk studies for 45 SW/SE
- Good fits achieved between malfunction-turn and Mode-5 impact distributions in sectors from ±60° to ±180°
- For no-breakup case, no good-fit A value found in same parameter range
## Shaping Constants (from Figure 30)
For no-breakup case and each breakup condition:
- B = 1,000 (fixed value)
- A = 1.85 (no breakup)
- A = 2.60 (20,000 deg-lb/ft²)
- A = 2.70 (10,000 deg-lb/ft²)
- A = 2.75 (5,000 deg-lb/ft²)
## Methodology
- Analysis conducted for LLV1 Random-Attitude Failures through 290 seconds
- Impact distributions normalized as percent in 5-degree sectors
- Range from 0° (downrange) to 180° (uprange)
## Assessments
- Convergence of qa conditions suggests vehicle response characteristics
- Results support use of B = 1,000 for RTI risk calculations
Page 80
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analysis of LLV1 malfunction-turn impact distributions using optimized shaping constants. Figure 31 presents simulation results with best-fit shaping constants combining higher values of both B and A parameters to achieve improved overall fit across impact sectors.
## Observations
- Good fit for no-breakup case possible with higher B and A values
- Simulated malfunction-turn impact distributions for breakup cases in Figure 31 identical to Figure 30
- Theoretical percentages for B = 1,000 produced excellent fits, therefore replotted in Figure 31
- For no-breakup case, various combinations of B and A tested before arriving at plotted result
- Optimized parameters extend good fit coverage across broader sector range
## Shaping Constants (from Figure 31)
Best-fit values for LLV1:
- A = 2.45, B = 10,000 (no breakup)
- A = 2.60, B = 1,000 (20,000 deg-lb/ft²)
- A = 2.70, B = 1,000 (10,000 deg-lb/ft²)
- A = 2.75, B = 1,000 (5,000 deg-lb/ft²)
## Methodology
- LLV1 Random-Attitude Failures through 290 seconds
- Parameter search procedure for B and A combinations
- Comparison of simulated vs. theoretical impact distributions
## Assessments
- Optimized constants provide improved fits compared to fixed B parameter
- Demonstrates relationship between B and A in impact distribution modeling
- Flexibility in parameter selection for different breakup conditions
Page 81
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Summary table of best-fit shaping constants for LLV1 vehicle (Table 25) and introduction to methodology for developing shaping constants for other launch vehicles (Section 6.6).
## Observations
- Best-fit values of B and A from Figure 30 and Figure 31 listed in Table 25 for convenient reference
- For all breakup conditions, currently-used value of B = 1,000 provided better data fit than any other B value investigated
- No launch-area risk calculations were made for LLV1
- Procedures for developing Mode-5 shaping constants A and B fully described in report
- For Atlas, Delta, Titan, and LLV1, best-fit A values derived for four breakup conditions
## Data - Table 25: Shaping Constants for LLV1
| T_B (sec) | Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft²) | B | A |
|-----------|-------------------------|---------|-------|
| 290 | none | 1,000 | 1.85 |
| | 20,000 | | 2.60 |
| | 10,000 | | 2.70 |
| | 5,000 | | 2.75 |
| 290 | none | 10,000 | 2.45 |
| | 20,000 | 1,000 | 2.60 |
| | 10,000 | 1,000 | 2.70 |
| | 5,000 | 1,000 | 2.75 |
## Methodology (Section 6.6)
- 1. Follow procedures to obtain best-fit A and B for new vehicles
- 2. Compare new vehicle with reference vehicles (Atlas, Delta, Titan, LLV1) and estimate constants from Table 26
## Assessments
- B = 1,000 consistently provides good fits for LLV1
- Alternative estimation method available for new vehicles with similar configurations
- Mean values provided for vehicles with no direct reference match
Page 82
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Summary table of A parameter values for B = 1,000 (Table 26) across reference launch vehicles and breakup conditions. Provides basis for estimating shaping constants for new or unstudied launch vehicles.
## Data - Table 26: Summary of A Values for B = 1,000
| Vehicle | IP Range (nm) at 30 sec | Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft²) | | | |
| | | 5,000 | 10,000 | 20,000 | None |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atlas IIAS | 0.3 | 3.45 | 3.20 | 2.75 | 1.90 |
| Delta-GEM | 5.2 | 4.30 | 3.10 | 2.90 | 1.90 |
| Titan IV | 1.9 | 3.50 | 3.25 | 2.95 | 2.00 |
| LLV1 | 33.4 | 2.75 | 2.70 | 2.60 | 1.85 |
| Other vehicles | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 1.9 |
## Observations
- Reference vehicles span range of impact potential ranges (IP) at 30 seconds post-launch
- Atlas IIAS: 0.3 nm (minimal early-phase range)
- Delta-GEM: 5.2 nm
- Titan IV: 1.9 nm
- LLV1: 33.4 nm (substantial early-phase range)
- Mean values calculated for vehicles not directly matching studied configurations
## Methodology
- A values provided for standard B = 1,000
- IP Range correlation suggests trajectory/acceleration relationship to shaping constants
- Four breakup conditions represented: 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 deg-lb/ft², and no breakup
## Assessments
- Table provides practical reference tool for new vehicle analysis
- Vehicle acceleration characteristics correlate with A parameter values
- Broader IP ranges generally associated with lower A values
Page 83
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Section 7: Potential Future Investigations. Lists identified research areas and limitations encountered during study due to contract funding constraints and publication deadlines.
## Observations
- Report acknowledges several interesting aspects of Mode-5 modeling not fully investigated
- Issues listed in considered order of importance
- Constraints on time and budget limited investigation scope
- Multiple avenues identified for future refinement
## Potential Future Investigations (in priority order)
1. Effects on shaping constants A and B of using more precise breakup (qa) conditions during malfunction-turn simulations
2. Effects on shaping constants A and B (and overall risks) if different T_B values used in computing theoretical and simulated impacts
- Example: T_B corresponding to burnout of zero, first, and second stages
3. Effects on shaping constants A and B if drag accounted for in computing freefall impact points after malfunction turn
- Could determine constants for maximum, minimum, and intermediate ballistic coefficients, then interpolate
- Would require extensive modifications to DAMP program
4. Effects on shaping constants A and B if sectors smaller than 5° used to compare theoretical and simulated impact data
- Example: 1° or 2° sectors instead of 5°
5. Effects on relative failure probabilities for solid-propellant vehicles if unclassified solid-propellant vehicles or declassified test results used in historical data samples
- Example vehicles: Pershing, Polaris, Poseidon, Trident
## Future Tasks
- Update absolute failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, Titan, and perhaps other vehicles
- Develop suitable shaping constants A and B for new vehicles per Section 6.6 methodology
## Assessments
- Research directions clearly identified for program enhancement
- Trade-offs between precision and computational feasibility documented
Page 84
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Section 8: Summary. Comprehensive overview of report objectives, methodology, and key findings. Summarizes primary purpose of study and other implicit objectives regarding failure-response modes and risk computation.
## Observations
- RTI's DAMP program models five failure response modes plus normal operation mode
- Vehicle failures produce response modes that are modeled, not specific failure types
- Mode-5 represents failure responses with potential for debris dispersal outside standard impact zones
- Primary study purpose: determine best values for A, B, and p5 for vehicle programs
- Additional objectives: develop absolute failure probabilities for Atlas, Delta, Titan and derive relative probabilities for five failure-response modes
## Methodology Summary
- Section 2 documents need for Mode-5 response through actual flight descriptions
- Section 3 and Appendix B explain Mode-5 impact-density function and shaping constant effects
- Section 4 discusses approaches to assessing vehicle failure probability
- - Empirical method chosen over parts-analysis method
- - Acknowledges difficulties in both approaches
- Sections 5-6 detail failure-probability estimation and shaping-constant determination
## Key Process Steps
1. Performance histories gathered and tabulated by launch date for Atlas, Delta, Titan, Thor (Appendix D)
2. Filtering technique applied (Section 5.1, Appendix C) to launch failure data
3. Overall failure probabilities estimated by flight phase
4. Recommended probabilities based on representative vehicle configurations (Section D.1.4)
5. Results from representative configurations form basis of absolute probabilities (Table 27)
6. Relative failure probabilities estimated from combined samples (Tables 28-29)
## Assessments
- Empirical approach provides practical basis for risk estimation
- Data filtering technique addresses representativeness issues
- Configuration-specific analysis distinguishes historical from current vehicle capabilities
Page 85
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Section 8 Summary with failure probability data tables and Mode-5 shaping constant methodology description.
## Data - Table 27: Failure Probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan
| Vehicle | Flight Phase O-1 | Flight Phase O-2 |
|---------|------------------|------------------|
| Atlas | 0.022 | 0.031 |
| Delta | 0.010 | 0.013 |
| Titan | 0.040 | 0.064 |
- O-1: Liftoff through first-stage or booster cutoff
- O-2: Through second-stage or sustainer cutoff
## Observations
- Absolute overall failure probabilities based only on "representative" vehicle configurations
- Due to small number of failures in individual representative samples, results for all configurations combined (including Thor) and filtered
- Relative failure-response mode probabilities estimated from composite chronological sample
## Data - Table 28: Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases O-2
| Response Mode | Mature Launch Systems (F = 0.993) | New Solid Systems (F = 0.996) | New Liquid Systems (F = 0.999) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.4% | 2.2% | 7.4% |
| 2 | 5.4% | 4.3% | 2.3% |
| 3 | 0.1% | 0.4% | 1.7% |
| 4 | 86.2% | 80.4% | 73.3% |
| 5 | 7.9% | 12.7% | 15.3% |
## Data - Table 29: Recommended Response-Mode Percentages for Flight Phases O-1
| Response Mode | Mature Launch Systems (F = 0.993) | New Solid Systems (F = 0.996) | New Liquid Systems (F = 0.999) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.5% | 3.4% | 10.7% |
| 2 | 7.4% | 6.6% | 4.3% |
| 3 | 0.1% | 0.6% | 2.4% |
| 4 | 81.9% | 74.5% | 67.0% |
| 5 | 10.1% | 14.9% | 15.6% |
## Methodology - Mode-5 Shaping Constants
- Empirical data insufficient to determine A and B constants
- Alternate approach: simulate Mode-5 failure responses at series of failure times for four vehicles (Atlas, Delta, Titan, LLV1)
- Simulated malfunctions: random-attitude turns and slow turns
- 10,000 impact points computed at each time
- Percentages determined in 5-degree sectors from 0° (downrange) to 180° (uprange)
- Compared with theoretical Mode-5 impact-density function percentages
- Trial and error used to establish B and A values producing good match
## Assessments
- Response mode distribution varies significantly by system maturity
- Mode 4 dominates (73-86%) across all conditions
- Mode 5 representation increases for new systems (12.7-15.3% for phases O-2)
Page 86
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Mode-5 methodology and presentation of absolute failure probabilities for individual response modes (Table 30).
## Observations
- 270,000 malfunction turns simulated for each of four breakup conditions per vehicle
- Three breakup qa values and no-breakup case investigated: 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
- Conditional probability estimate: Mode-3 or Mode-4 response terminating with rapid tumble approximately one-third
- Basis: chronological composite sample used for mode-distribution analysis
- Impact percentages verified in 10-mile range increments for Atlas IIAS
- Verification confirmed range part of Mode-5 impact-density function consistent with 266,000 simulated responses
- Shaping constants A and B highly dependent on breakup dynamic pressure (qa) assumptions
## Data - Table 30: Absolute Failure Probabilities for Response Modes 1-5
| Vehicle: | Atlas | | Delta | | Titan | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight Phase: | 0-1 (0-170 sec) | 0-2 (0-280 sec) | 0-1 (0-270 sec) | 0-2 (0-630 sec) | 0-1 (0-300 sec) | 0-2 (0-540 sec) |
| Mode 1 | 0.000119 | 0.000121 | 0.000054 | 0.000051 | 0.000216 | 0.000250 |
| Mode 2 | 0.001637 | 0.001665 | 0.000744 | 0.000698 | 0.002976 | 0.003437 |
| Mode 3 | 0.000011 | 0.000012 | 0.000005 | 0.000005 | 0.000020 | 0.000026 |
| Mode 4 | 0.018007 | 0.026738 | 0.008185 | 0.011212 | 0.032740 | 0.055200 |
| Mode 5 | 0.002226 | 0.002465 | 0.001012 | 0.001034 | 0.004048 | 0.005088 |
| Total | 0.022 | 0.031 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.040 | 0.064 |
## Assessments
- Mode 4 dominates all vehicles across all flight phases
- Titan shows higher failure rates than Atlas or Delta
- Flight phase 0-2 consistently shows higher total failures than 0-1, reflecting extended exposure period
- Mode 5 probabilities relatively small but significant for off-nominal trajectory analysis
Page 87
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View PDF ↗Analysis of traditional and optimized shaping constants for Mode-5 impact distribution modeling. Describes practical methodology using B = 1,000 (established value) and development of optimized B and A combinations.
## Observations
- Value of B = 1,000 traditionally used by 45 SW/SE and RTI for risk analyses
- For each vehicle, A values found producing good match between simulated and theoretical data using B = 1,000
- Results provided for qa = 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 deg-lb/ft²
- No single A value produces good fit over entire 180-degree sector
- Exception noted: good match exists in uprange portion (about ±90° to ±180°) for most vehicles
- Cape Canaveral population centers located primarily in uprange sector
- Downrange sector risks assumed dominated by Mode-4 failure response
## Data - Table 31: Summary of A Values for B = 1,000
| Vehicle | Flight Phase | T_B (sec) | Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft²) | | |
| | | | 5,000 | 10,000 | 20,000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atlas IIAS | 0-2 | 280 | 3.45 | 3.20 | 2.75 |
| Delta-GEM | 0-1 | 270 | 4.30 | 3.10 | 2.90 |
| Titan IV | 0-1 | 300 | 3.50 | 3.25 | 2.95 |
| LLV1 | 0-2 | 290 | 2.75 | 2.70 | 2.60 |
| Other vehicles | --- | --- | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
## Observations on Optimization
- Alternative investigation: find combinations of B and A providing best possible fits over largest sector portions
- Attempts to extend fit from uprange direction to within about 40° of downrange direction
- Full 180-degree sector fit not achievable with any B/A combination
## Data - Table 32: Summary of Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants
| Vehicle | Flight Phase | T_B (sec) | Breakup qa (deg-lb/ft²) | B | A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atlas | 0-2 | 280 | 5,000 | 5,000,000 | 6.30 |
| Delta | 0-1 | 270 | 5,000 | 4 | 3.50 |
| Titan | 0-1 | 300 | 5,000 | 1,000 | 3.50 |
| LLV1 | 0-2 | 290 | 5,000 | 1,000 | 2.75 |
## Assessments
- Traditional B = 1,000 remains practical standard
- Optimized constants provide marginal improvements in overall fit
- Parameter selection trade-off between fit coverage and practical usability
Page 88
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View PDF ↗Analysis of launch-area risk calculation results comparing traditional and optimized shaping constants. Demonstrates sensitivity of Mode-5 risk calculations to parameter choices and provides risk reduction factors from previous RTI studies.
## Observations
- Launch-area risk calculations made for Atlas and Delta with different A and B parameter combinations
- Example case: Atlas IIAS launch from Complex 36, breakup qa of 5,000 deg-lb/ft²
- - Parameters A = 3.45, B = 1,000 (Table 31)
- - vs. A = 6.30, B = 5,000,000 (Table 32)
- - Total Mode-5 launch-area risks differed by about 10%
- Additional results for Atlas IIAS (Table 21) and Delta (Table 23) presented
- Value of B found to be not important in launch-area risk calculations provided appropriate A value selected
- Ship-hit calculations investigated for effect of parameter selection
- Risks to shipping near flight line totally dominated by Mode-4 failure response
- Conclusion: A and B parameter selection inconsequential for ship-hit calculations
## Risk Recomputation Results
Mode-5 baseline risks for Atlas and Delta recomputed using newly derived values:
1. Shaping constants A and B
2. Overall vehicle failure probability
3. Relative probabilities of occurrence of individual failure-response modes
## Risk Reduction Factors
**Atlas**: Mode-5 launch-area risks reduced by factor of 3 to 11
- Exact factor dependent on assumed breakup qa for vehicle
- Range reflects different breakup condition assumptions
**Delta**: Mode-5 launch-area risks reduced by factor of 4 to 75
- Exact factor dependent on assumed breakup conditions
- Wider reduction range indicates greater sensitivity to parameter assumptions
## Assessments
- Parameter selection has measurable but limited impact on overall launch-area risks (10% difference)
- Much larger risk reductions (factors of 3-75) achieved through updated failure probability estimates and response-mode distributions
- Ship-hit risk insensitive to Mode-5 shaping constant selection
- Suggests Mode-4 response dominates ship-proximity scenarios
- Baseline risk reductions indicate previous RTI studies may have overestimated Mode-5 risk contributions
Page 89
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View PDF ↗## Observations
- DAMP program does not model specific system/component failures
- Instead, models categorical failure responses applicable across vehicles
- Six possible response modes defined in program
- Response-mode definitions independent of specific failure causation
## Failure Response Modes
**Mode 1: Immediate Ground Impact**
- Vehicle topples or falls back on launch point after minimal rise (few feet)
- Propellants deflagrate or explode with assumed TNT equivalency
**Mode 2: Loss of Control at Liftoff**
- Vehicle loses control at or shortly after liftoff
- All flight directions equally likely
- Destruct transmitted upon erratic flight confirmation
- Typical destruct time: 6-12 seconds post-launch
- Latest destruct time established per vehicle for maximum impact distance calculation
**Mode 3: Pitch-Program Failure**
- Vehicle fails to pitch-program normally
- Results in near-vertical flight with normal thrust levels
- May tumble rapidly and uncontrollably
- May result in spontaneous breakup
- Destruct upon violation of criteria
- Mode terminated at "straight-up" time (varies by vehicle/mission)
- Typical occurrence: 30-70 seconds post-launch (Cape Canaveral)
**Mode 4: Normal Flight Until Malfunction**
- Vehicle flies within normal limits until malfunction
- Malfunction results in: thrust termination, spontaneous breakup, or destruct action
- Breakup may or may not be preceded by rapid tumble
- Vehicle debris impacts near intended flight line
**Mode 5: Anomalous Direction Impacts**
- Vehicle may impact in any direction from launch point within range capability
- At any range, impacts most likely along flight line
- Likelihood decreases with angular deviation from flight line
- As range increases, weighting favors downrange direction
- Impact probability decreases with range in any fixed direction
- Begins at vehicle pitch-over or programming (vertical launch) or liftoff (non-vertical launch)
- Flight termination may be spontaneous or by destruct action
**Mode 6: Normal Flight Impacts** (not failure mode)
- Impacts result from normal flights
- Includes separated stages and components
- Jettisoned components assumed non-explosive
- Mean impact point and bivariate-normal dispersions calculated per stage/component
## Key Distinctions
- Mode 5 only assumes flight-termination-system failure potential
- Modes 2-4 assume successful flight termination system operation
- Mode 2-4 failures may be reclassified as Mode 5 if flight termination system fails
- Mode NA (not applicable): failures affecting mission success without ground-impact risk
## Assessments
- Response-mode framework provides comprehensive categorization without vehicle-specific complexity
- Mode 5 critical for off-nominal trajectory risk assessment
- Flight-termination-system reliability implicit in mode selection
Page 90
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View PDF ↗## Observations
- Values chosen for shaping constants A and B have significant effect on angular impact distribution around launch point
- Appendix demonstrates effects on two key metrics:
- 1. Ratio of downrange impacts to impacts along other radials from launch point
- 2. Percentages of impacts in various angular sectors relative to downrange line
- Analysis conducted using f-ratio expression derived from Mode-5 impact-density function
## Methodology
**f-ratio Formula** (from Section 9.7 of Reference 1, Equation 9.19):
f-ratio = (e^(Aπ + B/R)) / (e^(Aφ + B/R))
- φ = angle to flight line (downrange = π)
- θ = angle off flight line = π - φ
- R = impact range
- Demonstrates likelihood ratio of downrange impact vs. other directional impacts
## Data Tables Referenced
**Table 33 and 34**: f-ratios for A values of 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0; B = 1,000
**Table 35 and 36**: Effects of halving and doubling constant B
- Fixed A = 3.0
- Demonstrates B parameter sensitivity
## Example Analysis (A = 3.0)
- Secondary Mode-5 density function 4.7 times more likely centered 10 miles downrange on flight line than 10 miles at 30° off flight line
- At 25-mile range: 82.2 times more likely downrange vs. 90° crossrange
- Ratio calculation: 303.2/82.2 = 3.7 times more likely crossrange (90°) than uprange (180°)
## Key Concept
- Values in Tables 33-36 derived from primary Mode-5 impact-density function
- Indicate likelihood ratios for secondary Mode-5 density function locations
- Secondary functions describe debris-class dispersion around mean impact point
## Assessments
- A parameter controls downrange weighting strength
- B parameter affects range-dependent weighting
- Together create complex directional/radial probability surface
- f-ratio provides quantitative basis for parameter selection
- Methodology enables detailed sensitivity analysis of constant choices
Page 91
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View PDF ↗Numerical data table presenting f-Ratio values for varying Mode-5 constants.
## Content
**Table 33. Effect on f-Ratio of Varying Mode-5 Constant A (B = 1000) - Part 1**
- Left section: R = 1 nm (ranging from 1 to 25 nanometers)
- Right section: R = 5 nm
Columns show values for A = 2.5, A = 3.0, A = 3.5, A = 4.0
180-φ angle values range from 0° to 180° in 5-degree increments
- At 0°: all A values = 1.0
- At 90°: A=2.5 (3.4), A=3.0 (12.1), A=3.5 (48.7), A=4.0 (187.4)
- At 180°: A=2.5 (3.6), A=3.0 (13.4), A=3.5 (60.5), A=4.0 (287.5)
## References
Page 92
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of f-Ratio numerical data table for Mode-5 constant variation analysis.
## Content
**Table 34. Effect on f-Ratio of Varying Mode-5 Constant A (B = 1000) - Part 2**
- Left section: R = 10 nm
- Right section: R = 25 nm
Columns show values for A = 2.5, A = 3.0, A = 3.5, A = 4.0
180-φ angle values from 0° to 180° in 5-degree increments
- At 0°: all A values = 1.0
- At 90°: R=10nm shows A=2.5 (17.8), A=3.0 (59.1), A=3.5 (173.5), A=4.0 (451.4)
- At 180°: R=25nm shows A=2.5 (63.8), A=3.0 (303.2), A=3.5 (1454.9), A=4.0 (6994.9)
## References
Page 93
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Numerical data table for Mode-5 constant B variation analysis with fixed A = 3.
## Content
**Table 35. Effect on f-Ratio of Varying Mode-5 Constant B (A = 3) - Part 1**
- Left section: R = 1 nm
- Right section: R = 5 nm
Columns show values for B = 500, B = 1000, B = 2000
180-φ angle values from 0° to 180° in 5-degree increments
- At 0°: all B values = 1.0
- At 90°: R=1nm shows B=500 (21.1), B=1000 (12.1), B=2000 (6.8)
- At 180°: R=5nm shows B=500 (123.7), B=1000 (62.6), B=2000 (31.9)
Pattern shows inverse relationship between B value and f-ratio results.
## References
Page 94
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Mode-5 constant B variation data table.
## Content
**Table 36. Effect on f-Ratio of Varying Mode-5 Constant B (A = 3) - Part 2**
- Left section: R = 10 nm
- Right section: R = 25 nm
Columns show values for B = 500, B = 1000, B = 2000
180-φ angle values from 0° to 180° in 5-degree increments
- At 0°: all values = 1.0
- At 90°: R=10nm shows B=500 (77.1), B=1000 (59.1), B=2000 (40.4)
- At 180°: R=25nm shows B=500 (591.0), B=1000 (303.2), B=2000 (154.0)
## References
Page 95
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analytical text explaining f-ratio data interpretation with reference to Figure 32.
## Content
Discusses f-ratio tables (33, 34, 35, 36) and their graphical representation in Figure 32.
**Key observation:** For A = 3.0 and B = 1000, reading from 10-mile plot at θ = 90°, a vehicle experiencing Mode-5 response is approximately 60 times more likely to impact along flight line than along 90-degree radial. The actual value in Table 34 is 59.1.
**Figure 32: f-Ratios for Ranges from 1 to 25 Miles**
- Four line curves representing R = 1 nm, 5 nm, 10 nm, 25 nm
- X-axis: Angular Deviation From Downrange (degrees), 0-180
- Y-axis: f-Ratio, 0-300
- Parameters: A = 3.0, B = 1000
- Shows exponential relationship between angle and ratio
## References
Page 96
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Analysis of Mode-5 impact density function behavior with varying constant A parameter.
## Content
**Discussion:** Shows how the value chosen for A affects Mode-5 impact density function. Examines percentages of Atlas IIAS impacts lying between flight line and any radial through launch point at angle θ from flight line.
**Key findings:**
- If A = 3.0: approximately 46% of all Mode-5 impacts lie between 0° and 20°
- If A = 4.0: percentage of impacts between 0° and 20° increases to approximately 64%
**Figure 33: Percentage of Impacts Between Flight Line and Any Radial**
- Curves for five values of A: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0
- X-axis: Theta (degrees), 0-180
- Y-axis: Percent, 0-100
- Data: Atlas IIAS, B = 1000
- Shows increasing steepness with higher A values
**Note:** Mode-5 impact density function requires numerical integration. Results vary for different trajectories and vehicles since R is trajectory-dependent.
## References
Page 97
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View PDF ↗Analysis showing Mode-5 impact distribution in angular sectors with varying A parameter values.
## Content
**Discussion:** Another presentation method for A parameter effects on Mode-5 impacts. Shows percentages of impacts in any 5-degree sector between radials making angles 0° and (0+5)° from flight line.
**Key observation:** When A = 1.0 with B = 1000, impacts in all 5-degree sectors are approximately the same, resulting in essentially uniform directional impact-density function.
**Figure 34: Percentage of Impacts in 5-Degree Sectors**
- Log scale (0.1 to 10% on Y-axis)
- Linear scale (0-180 degrees Theta on X-axis)
- Five curves for A = 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0
- Data: Atlas IIAS, B = 1000
- Shows decreasing percentages with increasing angle
**Historical reference:** Mode-5 with A = 1 equivalent to Gross Flight Deviation Failure (GFDF) mode formerly used in Launch Risk Analysis (LARA) Program at Western Range.
**GFDF characteristics:** Range and azimuth portions assumed independent. Impact azimuths uniformly distributed. Range density function: f(R) = p/(Tₐ·R)
## References
Page 98
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Mathematical analysis of GFDF model and Mode-5 density function equivalence.
## Content
**Mathematical formulation:**
GFDF range density function cannot be applied early in flight before programming when R ≈ 0.
Mode-5 density function integration (Eq. 3, limits 0 to π) reduces to:
f(R) = 1/((Tₐ - Tₚ)·R) [Equation 9]
- Tₚ = programming time
- Tₐ = stage burn time
- R = rate of change of impact range
Absolute values obtained by multiplying f(R) by Mode-5 failure probability.
**Discussion:** GFDF suitable for random-attitude failures at programming or shortly after. Performance histories (Appendix D) show such failures no more likely at programming than other times.
**Key insight:** No need to include separate GFDF mode in risk calculations since all random-attitude failures accounted for by Mode-5 density function.
**Alternative approaches if GFDF inclusion desired:**
1. Run GFDF separately using Mode-5 with A = 1 (zero other response modes)
2. Modify DAMP for two separate Mode-5 density functions with own A, B values
**Property:** Probability of impact in annular range interval (integrating Mode-5 density between interval boundaries) independent of A and B values. When integrated 0 to π, A and B cancel, leaving probability function of range alone.
## References
Page 99
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Introduction to Appendix C on filter characteristics and methodology.
## Content
**Appendix C. Filter Characteristics**
**Context:** Estimating launch-vehicle failure probabilities using empirical launch data is uncertain with small sample sizes and evolving systems.
**Approach:** Least-squares fit to trial outcome values (0 = success, 1 = failure).
**Observation:** Mature launch vehicles show marked decrease in failure rates from early experimental days. New programs may have scant or nonexistent empirical data.
**Key decision:** Type of function to fit. True nature may be unknown, complex, or insufficient data for complex function.
**Simple approach:** Constant failure-rate function assumed.
**Reality:** Available data indicate failure rates decrease as program matures. Launch-vehicle failure probabilities decrease over time (as launches increase).
**Options:**
- Fit non-constant function (linear or exponential)
- Weight data as function of time
- Adopt Duane model (General Dynamics approach for Atlas)
**RTI approach for mature programs:** Fit failure-rate function to constant using:
- Simple least squares with fixed-length sliding-window filter for time-based changes
- Least squares fit with unequal weighting
**Mathematical foundation:** Constant function least-squares solution given by mean:
X̄ = (1/n)Σxᵢ [Equation 10]
**Example:** Three values (6, 5, 7) yield mean = 6
## References
Page 100
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Recursive filter formulation and expanding-memory filter analysis.
## Content
**Recursive formulation of least-squares solution:**
X̄ₙ = X̄ₙ₋₁(1-aₙ) + xₙ(aₙ) [Equation 12]
X̄ₙ = X̄ₙ₋₁ + aₙ(xₙ - X̄ₙ₋₁)
For equally-weighted case: recursive filter factor aₙ = 1/n
**Example recursion with X₀ = 0:**
- X̄₁ = x₁ = 6
- X̄₂ = X̄₁ + ½(x₂ - X̄₁) = 6 + ½(5-6) = 5.5 [Equation 13]
- X̄₃ = X̄₂ + ⅓(x₃ - X̄₂) = 5.5 + ⅓(7-5.5) = 6.0
**Expanding-memory filter characteristics:**
- Solution always based on entire data set
- Equally-weighted: all data points have equal influence regardless of sequence position
- As n becomes very large, aₙ approaches zero
- Each data point weighted by increased number of points
**Issue:** Unknown true function; constant used as approximation to smooth/edit data.
**Desired property:** Recursive least-squares fit assigning decreasing weight to older data, de-weighting earlier recursions.
**Fading-memory filter:** Weighting factor decreases as time recedes into past. Importance of datum decreases with age.
**Example weighted by count/index:**
X̄ₙ = Σ(i·xᵢ) / Σi [Equation 14]
## References
Page 101
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View PDF ↗Index-weighted recursive filter formulation and exponentially-weighted filter analysis.
## Content
**Index-weighted fading-memory filter (position in sequence weighting):**
**Example recursion using Eq. 12:**
- n=1: a₁ = 1; X̄₁ = x₁ = 6
- n=2: a₂ = ⅔; X̄₂ = 6 + ⅔(5-6) = 5.33 [Equation 17]
- n=3: a₃ = ½; X̄₃ = 5.33 + ½(7-5.33) = 6.17
**Memory property:** 50th value 50 times more important than first; 100th value 100 times more important than first.
**Exponentially-weighted filter:**
- Uses F as weighting factor (0 < F < 1)
- i = age-count of ith data point (i=0 is current, reversed chronological)
- Weighted least-squares solution:
X̄ₙ = Σ(Fⁱ·xₙ₋ᵢ) / Σ(Fⁱ) [Equation 18]
**Example using F = 0.9 with sample (6, 5, 7):**
X̄₃ = [0.9⁰(7) + 0.9¹(5) + 0.9²(6)] / [0.9⁰ + 0.9¹ + 0.9²]
= (7 + 4.5 + 4.86) / 2.71
= 16.36 / 2.71 = 6.04 [Equation 19]
**Weighting characteristics (Figure 35):**
- F = 1: all points equally weighted
- F = 0.8: only most recent 25 data points contribute; older points weighted out
## References
Page 102
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View PDF ↗Exponential weighting properties and filter factor characteristics with graphical analysis.
## Content
**Exponentially-weighted filter properties:**
**Boundary conditions:**
- If F = 0: aₙ = 1 for all n; filter has no memory; filtered value always equals last measurement
- As F → 1: L'Hôpital's rule applies; aₙ → 1/n (equally-weighted case); memory no longer fades
**Fading rate control:** Analyst controls memory fade rate by selecting appropriate F value.
**Filter behavior as n increases:**
- aₙ decreases continuously
- Approaches 1-F asymptotically
- Larger aₙ: more emphasis on current data, less on previous
- Faster memory fade with larger filter factors
**Figure 35: Exponential Weights for Fading-Memory Filters**
- Y-axis: Data Weight (FI-1), 0.0 to 1.0
- X-axis: Data Index (older →), 0 to 300
- Shows curves for F = 1.0 (equally weighted), 0.999, 0.998, 0.995, 0.99, 0.9
- Demonstrates exponential decay with steeper slopes for lower F values
**Figure 36: Recursive Filter Factor for Last Data Point**
- Y-axis: Recursive Filter Factor (log scale), 0.001 to 1
- X-axis: Number of Data Points in Sample, 0 to 300
- Compares six filter types: Equal weighting, F = 0.995, 0.99, 0.98, 0.95, 0.8, Index weighting
- Demonstrates convergence patterns
## References
Page 103
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View PDF ↗Detailed comparison of recursive filter factors across different filter types and sample sizes.
## Content
**Filter factor behavior analysis:**
**Index-number weighting behavior:**
- For n < 30: fastest fading memory (largest filter factors)
- After ~160 data points: fades slower than exponential filter with F = 0.99
- Practice: Users calculate filter factor at maximum n (~180), then apply to subsequent points
- Result: Index-weighted filter behaves similarly to exponentially-fading filter with F = 0.99
**Key insight:** As n increases, aₙ for exponential filter decreases continuously, approaching (1-F) asymptotically.
**Practical implications:**
- Larger aₙ means faster memory fading
- Filter factor selection affects weight distribution over time
- Analyst control: select F value to match reliability estimation needs
**Figure 36 key observations:**
Shows recursive filter factor (log scale, 0.001 to 1) vs. number of data points (0-300):
- Equal weighting: linear decrease approaching zero (most conservative)
- F = 0.995: very slow fade
- F = 0.99: slow fade
- F = 0.98: moderate fade
- F = 0.95: faster fade
- F = 0.8: very fast fade
- Index weighting: rapid initial drop, then gradual approach to asymptote
Early phase (n < 30): Index-weighting has steepest drop, most aggressive weighting of recent data.
## References
Page 104
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View PDF ↗Application of fading-memory recursive filter to launch test results for failure probability estimation.
## Content
**Application methodology:** Fading-memory recursive filter (Eqs. 12, 20) applied to launch test outcomes to estimate failure probability.
**Data representation:**
- 0 = successful launch
- 1 = failure or anomalous behavior
- Filtered result after each launch = failure probability estimate at that point
**Table 37: Filter Application for Failure Probability**
Hypothetical series of 10 launches (all successful except flights 2 and 4):
Index | Outcome | F=0.98 Filter factor, aₙ | F=0.98 Fail. Prob. | F=0.90 Filter factor, aₙ | F=0.90 Fail. Prob.
1 | 0 | 1.0000 | 0.0 | 1.0000 | 0.0
2 | 1 | 0.5051 | 0.5051 | 0.5263 | 0.5263
3 | 0 | 0.3401 | 0.3333 | 0.3690 | 0.3321
4 | 1 | 0.2576 | 0.5051 | 0.2908 | 0.5263
5 | 0 | 0.2082 | 0.3999 | 0.2442 | 0.3978
6 | 0 | 0.1752 | 0.3299 | 0.2132 | 0.3129
7 | 0 | 0.1517 | 0.2798 | 0.1917 | 0.2529
8 | 0 | 0.1340 | 0.2423 | 0.1756 | 0.2085
9 | 0 | 0.1203 | 0.2132 | 0.1632 | 0.1745
10 | 0 | 0.1093 | 0.1899 | 0.1535 | 0.1477
**Key results:**
- After 10 launches: F=0.98 gives failure probability 0.1899; F=0.90 gives 0.1477
- Both estimates lower than equal-weighting (failures occurred early)
- After 4 launches: both estimates exceed 0.5 (one failure in flight 4)
**Application note:** Reversing 1's and 0's provides probability of success estimates.
## References
Page 105
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View PDF ↗Introduction to Appendix D on launch and performance histories methodology.
## Content
**Appendix D. Launch and Performance Histories**
**D.1 Basic Data**
**Purpose:** Support empirical approach using post-test results to estimate future vehicle failure rates.
**Scope:** Performance histories for four launch vehicle families:
- Atlas
- Delta
- Titan
- Thor
**Appendix structure:**
- D.2: Atlas Launch and Performance History
- D.3: Delta Launch and Performance History
- D.4: Titan Launch and Performance History
- D.5: Thor Launch and Performance History
**Data coverage:**
- All Atlas, Delta, Titan launches from Eastern and Western Ranges prior to September 1, 1996
- Thor: Eastern Range launches only (coverage complete before Thor exclusion decision for Delta prediction)
- Atlas, Titan, Thor: include weapons systems tests and space flights
- Delta: space flights only
**Data organization per vehicle (two-part structure):**
**(1) Tabular Summary listing chronologically:**
- Sequence number
- Mission identifier
- Launch date
- Vehicle configuration
- Launch range
- Failure-response mode assignment
- Flight phase of failure/anomalous behavior
- Configuration flag (0 or 1): indicates vehicle representativeness for current vehicles in reliability prediction sample
**(2) Narrative description:**
- General nature of failure
- Vehicle behavior after failure
- Effects on flight parameters
- Note: Necessarily brief due to information limitations
**D.1.1 Data Sources**
- (1) "Eastern Range Launches, 1950-1994, Chronological Summary", 45th Space Wing History Office
- (2) Extension to (1) through December 30, 1995
- (3) "Vandenberg AFB Launch Summary", Headquarters 30th Space Wing, Office of History, Launch Chronology, 1958-1995
## References
Page 106
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View PDF ↗Bibliography and methodology section of a launch vehicle reliability analysis report. Contains source citations (references 4-17) for space launch system data, and discusses data discrepancies regarding launch dates, vehicle configurations, and launch success/failure classifications.
## References
1. Booz•Allen & Hamilton, Inc. - "Spacelift Effective Capacity: Part 1 - Launch Vehicle Projected Success Rate Analysis" (19 February 1992)
2. Isakowitz, Steven J. (updated by Jeff Samella) - "International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, Second Edition" (published AIAA 1995)
3. Smith, O. G. - "Launch Systems for Manned Spacecraft" (Draft, 23 July 1991)
4. McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company - "Comparison of Orbit Parameters - Table 1" (Delta launches through 4 Nov 95)
5. 45th Space Wing - Missiles/Space Vehicle Files (1957-1995)
6. 30th Space Wing - Missile Launch Operations Logs (1963-1995, via ACTA Inc., James Baeker)
7. Lockheed Martin - "Titan IV, America's Silent Hero" (Florida Today, 13 Nov 95)
8. General Dynamics - "Atlas Program Flight History" (Report EM-1860, 26 April 1965)
9. Lockheed Martin - "Atlas Flight Program Summary" (April 1995, C. W. Fenske)
10. Lockheed Martin - "Launch History" (FAX to RTI, Bob Brater, 13 March 1996)
11. USAF Accident/Incident Reports for Atlas and Titan failures
12. Aerospace - "Launch Failures from the Eastern Range Since 1975" (Andrew H. Quintero memo, 25 February 1996)
13. Lockheed Martin - "Titan Flight Anomaly/Failure Summary" (received 4 April 1996)
14. Aerospace - "Space Launch Vehicle Failures (1984-1995)" (Report No. TOR-96(8504)-2, I-Shih Chang, January 1996)
## Assessments
- Source data contains numerous discrepancies in launch dates (local vs Greenwich time) and vehicle configurations
- Same vehicle listed differently across sources (e.g., Atlas as IIA vs IIAS)
- Launch dates used for ordering; one-day variations do not affect filtering calculations for samples >100
- Configuration discrepancies noted (e.g., same Atlas listed as different variants)
- Some launches classified as success in one document, failure in another
- Data cleaning effort was substantial but 100% accuracy cannot be assured
## Redactions
None evident
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 97 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of methodology section covering failure-response mode assignment, flight phase definitions, and representative vehicle configuration criteria for launch vehicle reliability analysis.
## Observations
**Failure-Response Modes:**
- 5 numbered failure-response modes (1-5) referenced from Appendix A
- "T" suffix indicates thrusting tumble before breakup/destruct
- "NA" indicates anomalous behavior with impacts outside normal areas or unplanned orbits without flight failure
- Blank response mode indicates success or insufficient data
**Flight Phase Assignment:**
- Numbered phases 0-5 indicating vehicle stage or thrust phase during failure
- Phases chosen to suggest which stage failed or was thrusting at failure point
- Two flight phases sometimes listed (e.g., "2 and 5") indicating failure during stage thrust that did not prevent orbit but resulted in abnormal final orbit
- Arbitrary decisions needed when stages failed to separate or upper stages failed to ignite
**Representative Configurations:**
- Binary indicator (1 = included, 0 = excluded) for predictive reliability sample
- Criteria from Booz•Allen & Hamilton based on:
- 1. Genealogy - direct/indirect derivative relationship
- 2. Operations - same operational manner (ICBM vs space-launch)
- 3. Composition - same element types (SRMs, upper stage, etc.)
## Assessments
- Considerable effort made to eliminate errors and discrepancies
- Speculative assignments necessary in some cases (distinguishing response modes 4 vs 5, or 4 vs 4T)
- Detailed information sometimes lacking for proper phase assignment
- Design criteria established to determine which historical configurations predict future reliability
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 98 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Two reference tables defining flight phase classifications and their mapping to specific launch vehicle types (Atlas, Delta/Thor, Titan).
## Tables
**Table 38: Flight-Phase Definitions**
| Flight Phase | Description |
|---|---|
| 0 | SRM auxiliary thrust phase |
| 1 | First-stage thrust phase (if no auxiliary SRMs) or after SRM separation |
| 1.5 | Attitude-control phase after first-stage or between first and second thrust phases |
| 2 | Second-stage thrust phase |
| 2.5 | Attitude-control phase after second thrust or between second and third thrust phases |
| 3 | Third-stage thrust phase or third thrust phase (if second stage restartable) |
| 3.5 | Attitude-control phase after third thrust or between third and fourth thrust phases |
| 4 | Fourth thrust phase or upper stage/payload thrust phase |
| 5 | Attitude control phase after Flight Phase 4, or orbital phase |
**Table 39: Flight Phases by Launch Vehicle**
| Phase | Atlas | Delta/Thor | Titan |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Castor burn | Castor/GEM burn | SRM solo |
| 1 | Atlas booster | First-stage burn | Stage 1 |
| 1.5 | Booster separation | Vernier solo - Sep 1/2 | Stage-1 separation |
| 2 | Sustainer | Second-stage burn | Stage 2 |
| 2.5 | Vernier/ACS solo | Coast between stg 2/3 | Vernier solo |
| 3 | Agena/Centaur | Third-stage burn | TS/Centaur/IUS |
| 3.5 | - | Coast after stg 3 | Second burn |
| 4 | Second burn | Second burn | Second burn |
| 5 | Orbit | Orbit | Orbit |
## Assessments
- Numbering scheme arbitrary but chosen to suggest failing stage
- Two flight phases sometimes assigned to single entry (indicating failure during thrust that did not prevent orbit)
- Need for detailed information sometimes lacking in source data
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 99 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Final methodology section covering representative vehicle configuration criteria and selection rationale based on Booz•Allen & Hamilton criteria for predicting future launch vehicle reliability.
## Organizations
## Observations
**Representative Configuration Criteria:**
- 1 in column = test result included in reliability prediction sample
- 0 in column = test result excluded
- Differences of opinion exist about which past configurations are representative
- RTI relied entirely on Booz•Allen & Hamilton report for determination
**Three-Part Criteria (Booz•Allen established):**
1. **Genealogy**: Is current system a direct or indirect derivative of historical configuration?
2. **Operations**: Is current system operated same manner as historical (e.g., ICBM vs space-launch)?
3. **Composition**: Does current system use same element types (SRMs, upper stage, etc.)?
**Included Configurations for Future Predictions:**
- **Atlas**: SLV-3 and later including SLV-3A, SLV-3C, SLV-3D, G, H, I, II, IIA, IIAS
- - Excluded: Atlas A, B, C, LV-3A, 3B, 3C, D, E, F
- **Delta**: 291X and later including 391X, 392X, 492X, 592X, 692X, 792X
- **Titan**: Titan IIIC and later including IIIB, IIID, IIIE, 34B, 34D, III/CT, IV, II-SLV
## Assessments
- Configuration selection uses historical genealogy, operational profile, and composition
- Exclusions focus on developmental/early variants
- Modern variants (post-1970s) generally included in predictive sample
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 100 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Overview of Atlas space-launch vehicle program history, configuration evolution, and performance summary including technical specifications and bar-graph visualization of launch performance 1955-1995.
## Organizations
- General Dynamics - original manufacturer of Atlas vehicles
- Lockheed Martin - current manufacturer
- NASA - lunar/planetary mission operations
## Observations
**Atlas Origins and Development:**
- Derived from Atlas ICBM series developed in 1950s
- Primary one-and-one-half-stage vehicle
- Played major role in early lunar exploration (Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, Surveyor)
- Used for planetary probes (Mariner, Pioneer)
**Fuel System:**
- Liquid oxygen and kerosene (RP-1) mixture
- Latest IIAS configuration includes Castor IVA solid-rocket motors
- Centaur upper stage (liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen) now typical
- Earlier flights used Agena upper stage
**Engine Configuration:**
- Early Atlas core: sustainer, verniers, two booster engines (ignited before liftoff)
- Atlas II/IIA/IIAS: vernier engines replaced by hydrazine roll-control system
- IIAS: four Castor SRBs (two ground-lit, two air-lit ~60 seconds later)
**Configuration Evolution (Table 40):**
| Configuration | Description |
|---|---|
| A | ICBM single-stage test |
| B, C | ICBM 1½-stage test |
| D | ICBM and later space-launch |
| E, F | ICBM (1960), reentry test (1964), space-launch (1968) |
| LV-3A | D with Agena upper stage |
| LV-3B | D man-rated for Project Mercury |
| SLV-3 | LV-3A with reliability improvements |
| SLV-3A | SLV-3 stretched 117 inches |
| LV-3C | Integrated with Centaur D |
| SLV-3C | LV-3C stretched 51 inches |
| SLV-3D | SLV-3C with Centaur uprated to D-1A |
| G | SLV-3D with Atlas stretched 81 inches |
| H | SLV-3D with E/F avionics, no Centaur |
| I | G with strengthened payload fairing, ring laser gyro |
| II | I with Atlas stretched 108 inches, engines uprated, hydrazine roll control, Centaur stretched 36 inches |
| IIA | II with Centaur RL-10s uprated to 20K lbs thrust |
| IIAS | IIA with 4 Castor IVA strap-on SRMs |
**Historical Phases:**
- A, B, C: Developmental ICBMs
- D, E, F: Deployed as operational ICBMs (1960s); some modified to LV series
- SLV series: Reduced lead times transforming missiles to space-launch vehicles
- G, H: Evolved from SLV series
- I, II, IIA, IIAS: Developed for commercial launch support
**Performance Summary (Figure 37):**
- Bar graph shows launches 1955-1995
- Solid blocks indicate normal performance years
- White portions indicate failures/anomalies
- Peak launch rate: mid-1960s (40-48 launches/year)
- Significant reduction in launch frequency after 1970s
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 101-102 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Beginning of comprehensive Atlas launch history table (Table 41) documenting flight performance from June 1957 through sequence number 532. Contains mission IDs, launch dates, vehicle configurations, test ranges, response modes, flight phases, and representativeness designations.
## Dates
**Launch Period**: June 1957 - 1961 (entries 1-77 visible)
**Notable Programs/Missions:**
- WS (Weapons System) launches: 06/11/57 - 01/31/61
- SCORE: 12/18/58
- Mercury Program: 07/29/60 (Mercury 1), 02/21/61 (Mercury 2), 04/25/61 (Mercury 3), 09/13/61 (Mercury 4), 10/21/61 (Mercury 5), 02/20/62 (Mercury 6)
- Ranger Program: 08/23/61 (Ranger 1), 11/18/61 (Ranger 2), 01/26/62 (Ranger 3)
- Mariner Program: 07/22/62 (Mariner 1), 08/27/62 (Mariner 2)
- Ranger 5: 10/18/62
- Various SAMOS/Midas missions (reconnaissance/early warning)
## Observations
**Test Ranges:**
- ER (Eastern Range)
- WR (Western Range)
**Vehicle Configurations (Representative sample):**
- Early: 4A, 6A, 12A, 10A, 13A, 11A, etc. (single-letter designations)
- LV-3A variants
- LV-3B (Mercury-rated)
- LV-3C/Centaur configurations
**Response Modes:**
- Response mode 1, 2, 3, 4, 4T, 5 (per flight phase)
- NA (Not Applicable) appears for anomalies not classified as failures
**Flight Phases:**
**Representativeness:**
- 0 = not representative
- 1 = representative for reliability prediction (rare in early entries)
- Most early configurations marked 0 (not representative)
## Assessments
- Comprehensive historical record from program inception
- Data spans developmental, operational, and commercial phases
- Early configurations (A, B, C, D, E, F variants) excluded from representativeness
- Later standardized variants used for reliability prediction
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 103 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table (Table 41) covering sequences 32-77, spanning September 1959 to January 1961. Documents WS, Mercury, Ranger, and Midas missions with vehicle configurations, test ranges, and response modes.
## Dates
**Period**: 09/16/59 - 01/31/61
**Specific Missions:**
- Mercury 1: 07/29/60 (LV-3B, sequence 58)
- Mercury 2: 02/21/61 (LV-3B, sequence 78)
- Mercury 3: 04/25/61 (LV-3B, sequence 82)
- Mercury 4: 09/13/61 (LV-3B, sequence 96)
- Mercury 5: 11/29/61 (LV-3B, sequence 104)
- Ranger 1: 08/23/61
- Ranger 2: 11/18/61
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- D variants (various numbered: 17D, 18D, 22D, 26D, 28D, 15D, 31D, 40D, 43D, 44D, 49D, etc.)
- LV-3A/AGENA configurations
- LV-3B configurations (Mercury program)
- Single designations: 20D, 3C, 13B, 4C, 11B, 5C, 7C, etc.
**Test Range Distribution:**
- ER (Eastern Range): majority
- WR (Western Range): selective missions
**Failure Modes:**
- Mode 1: appears occasionally (sequences 47, 48, 66, 67)
- Mode 3: rare (sequence 50: LUCKY DRAGON)
- Mode 4, 4T, 5: various entries indicating different failure mechanisms
- NA: anomalous behavior entries
**Flight Phases for Failures:**
- Phase 1: early flight failures
- Phase 1.5: booster separation issues
- Phase 2: second-stage failures
- Phase 2.5: attitude control phase anomalies
**Representativeness:**
- All entries show 0 (not representative) in visible portion
- Early LV-3 configurations excluded from predictive model
## Assessments
- Extended WS test program (1959-1961) with multiple failures documented
- Mercury program used proven LV-3B configuration
- Ranger/Midas missions used LV-3A/AGENA configurations
- Failure distribution indicates development/testing phase of program
- Later configurations would be selected for reliability prediction
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 104 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 78-123, spanning February 1961 to April 1962. Documents Mercury, Ranger, Mariner, and various reconnaissance mission launches.
## Dates
**Period**: 02/21/61 - 04/09/62
**Major Missions:**
- Mercury 2-6: 02/21/61, 04/25/61, 09/13/61, 10/02/61, 02/20/62
- Ranger 1-4: 08/23/61, 11/18/61, 01/26/62, 04/23/62
- Mariner 1: 07/22/62
- Mariner 2: 08/27/62
- Ranger 5: 10/18/62
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations Evolution:**
- Early: 67D, 9E, 13E, 16E (E variant increase)
- Mercury program: 100D, 88D LV-3B configurations
- Ranger: LV-3A/AGENA variants
- Mariner: LV-3A/AGENA
- Mixed D, E, F designations in WS missions
- Introduction of LV-3C/CENTAUR configurations (sequence 128: AC-1)
**Test Ranges:**
- ER (Eastern Range): primarily Mercury and Mariner
- WR (Western Range): primarily unmanned reconnaissance missions
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 47, 48, 99, 122 (scattered occurrences)
- Mode 3: sequence 82 (Mercury 3)
- Mode 4, 4T: multiple sequences (88, 86, 87, 96, 89, 95, 119, 127, 131, 141)
- Mode 5: sequences 94, 137, 142 (rare)
- NA: sequences 93, 101, 114, 116, 123 (anomalous behavior)
**Flight Phases:**
- Phase 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5: various stages of failures
- Later missions (Mariner, Rangers) on sequences 137-148 show phase 2 (second stage) focus
**Representativeness:**
- All entries show 0 (not representative)
- Later Centaur configurations still marked 0
## Assessments
- Operational phase of Mercury program (5 flights: 1961-1962)
- Early planetary exploration period (Mariner 1-2, Ranger 1-5)
- Mixed success rate in this period
- LV-3B configuration proven reliable for crewed flights (Mercury)
- Advanced configurations (LV-3C/Centaur) beginning introduction
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 105 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 124-169, spanning April 1962 to March 1963. Documents continuation of Ranger, Mariner, and various AFSC/DOD missions.
## Dates
**Period**: 04/11/62 - 03/21/63
**Major Missions:**
- Ranger 4-5: 04/23/62, 10/18/62
- Mariner 1: 07/22/62
- Mariner 2: 08/27/62
- Ranger 3: 01/26/62
- Mercury 7: 05/24/62
- Ranger 6: 01/30/64 (in sequence 201)
- Surveyors: AC-10 (05/30/66), AC-7 (09/20/66) referenced later
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- Continued D, E, F variants (129D through 83F)
- LV-3A/AGENA B configurations dominant
- LV-3C/CENTAUR D introduction (AC-1, AC-2, AC-3)
- SLV designations appearing
- Increased designation complexity
**Test Ranges:**
- WR (Western Range): majority of unmanned missions
- ER (Eastern Range): Mercury, Mariner, strategic missions
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 128, 150, 159, 166 (scattered)
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 131, 134, 136, 141, 142, 156, 157, 158, 159, 164, 166, 168, 169
- Mode 5: sequences 137, 142, 164
**Flight Phases:**
- Phase 1: sequences with mode 1 failures
- Phase 2, 2.5: predominant failure phases
- Phase 3: sequence 131 (Rubber Gun)
**Representativeness:**
- All entries show 0 (not representative)
- AC configurations (suborbital/advanced) marked 0
## Assessments
- High failure rate in WR missions (reconnaissance programs) during 1962-1963
- Mariner Venus missions (sequences 137, 144) successful
- Ranger program showing failures in this period
- Advanced configurations (LV-3C/Centaur) introducing new failure modes
- Development of Surveyor/Lunar Orbiter spacecraft underway
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 106 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 170-215, spanning March 1963 to July 1964. Documents Lunar Orbiter, Surveyor, and various reconnaissance mission launches with transition toward higher-reliability configurations.
## Dates
**Period**: 03/23/63 - 07/28/64
**Major Missions:**
- Vela 1&2: 10/16/63
- Rangers 6-7: 01/30/64, 07/28/64
- Project Fire: 04/14/64, 05/22/65
- Lunar Orbiter 1-4: 08/10/66, 11/06/66, 02/04/67, 05/04/67
- Surveyors 1-7: 05/30/66 - 01/07/68 (AC-10 through AC-15)
- Mariners 3-5: 11/05/64, 11/28/64, 06/14/67
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- Continued evolution to standardized designations
- LV-3A/AGENA D dominance for unmanned missions
- LV-3C/CENTAUR D for Surveyor/Lunar Orbiter programs
- Introduction of SLV-3A/AGENA D configurations
- Numbered designations (240D through 250D range)
**Test Ranges:**
- WR (Western Range): reconnaissance missions
- ER (Eastern Range): NASA/scientific missions
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 190, 207 (rare in this period)
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 170, 177, 181, 187, 188, 189, 191, 196, 202, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 216, 219, 221, 222, 227
- Mode 5: sequences 164, 187, 188, 189
- NA: sequences 171, 173 (anomalous behavior)
**Flight Phases:**
- Phase 1: sequences 170, 177, 181, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 196, 207
- Phase 2, 2.5: various sequences
- Phase 3, 4: advanced configurations
**Representativeness:**
- All entries show 0 (not representative)
- AC (advanced/suborbital) configurations marked 0
## Assessments
- Extended operational period with high launch tempo (1963-1964)
- Reconnaissance missions (WR) continue high failure rate
- NASA missions (Vela, Rangers, Lunar Orbiter) establishing reliability baseline
- Transition to standardized configurations underway
- Lunar Orbiter program preparing for Apollo support
- Surveyor program beginning (AC-10 through AC-15 sequences 289-350)
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 107 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 216-261, spanning July 1964 to August 1965. Primarily unmanned reconnaissance and scientific missions with focus on SLV-3/AGENA D standardized configurations.
## Dates
**Period**: 07/29/64 - 08/05/65
**Major Missions:**
- Mariner 3-4: 11/05/64, 11/28/64
- Ranger 7: 07/28/64
- OGO-1: 09/04/64
- Surveyor 1-5: 05/30/66 - 09/08/67 (AC-series)
- Mariner 5 (Venus): 06/14/67
- Project Fire: 04/14/64, 05/22/65
- Vela 5&6: 07/20/65
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- SLV-3A/AGENA D dominant in unmanned missions
- LV-3A/AGENA D variants (7101-7112 numbered configurations)
- SLV-3/AGENA D configurations
- LV-3C/CENTAUR D for advanced missions (AC-series)
- High prevalence of standardized "SLV" designations
**Test Ranges:**
- WR (Western Range): vast majority
- ER (Eastern Range): selective scientific missions
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 218, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 237, 242, 246, 248, 250, 255, 259, 260
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 216, 219, 227, 235, 251, 256
- Mode 5: sequences 257 (rare)
**Flight Phases:**
- Phase 1: majority of mode 1 failures
- Phase 2: phase 2 & 2.5 for modes 4/5
- Phase 3: selective entries
**Representativeness:**
- Entries marked 1 appear in this section (sequences with SLV-3/AGENA D)
- Indicates shift to "representative" configurations for reliability prediction
- Most recent entries (1965) marked 1 for representativeness
## Assessments
- Standardized SLV-3A/AGENA D configuration achieving operational maturity
- High success rate in later entries (1965)
- Transition from D/E/F variants to SLV designations complete
- Configuration reliability improving as program matures
- Many entries marked "1" (representative) indicating inclusion in predictive model
- WR missions (reconnaissance) continue with historical configuration
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 108 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 262-307, spanning August 1965 to October 1966. Marks period of high standardization with SLV-3/AGENA D configurations and introduction of Surveyor lunar missions.
## Dates
**Period**: 08/11/65 - 10/05/66
**Major Missions:**
- Lunar Orbiter 1-5: 08/10/66 - 08/01/67 (sequences 301, 312, 321, 329, 340)
- Surveyor 1-2: 05/30/66, 09/20/66 (AC-10, AC-7)
- OGO-1, OGO-3: 04/08/66, 06/06/66
- Mariner 5 (Venus): 06/14/67
- ATS missions: various (AC-series)
- GTV missions (Gemini Test Vehicles): sequences 267, 277, 287, 290, 298, 304, 313
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- SLV-3/AGENA D: 7110-7123 numbered designations
- LV-3C/CENTAUR D: AC-series Surveyor/ATS missions
- High standardization achieved
- All visible D variant numbers replaced by SLV designations
**Test Ranges:**
- WR (Western Range): vast majority
- ER (Eastern Range): AC-series and GTV missions
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 262, 265, 267, 268, 277, 278, 299 (common in SLV designations)
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 267, 276, 281, 284
- Mode 5: sequences 276, 279, 287
**Flight Phases:**
- Phase 1, 2, 3, 4: distributed across failure modes
- Phase 5: rare in this period
**Representativeness:**
- Entries marked 1 predominant: sequences 262-307 mostly show "1"
- Indicates these configurations selected for reliability prediction
- SLV-3/AGENA D standardized configuration fully representative
- AC-series (advanced Centaur) marked 0 (not representative)
## Assessments
- Peak standardization period (1965-1966)
- Mature reliable configuration established
- SLV-3/AGENA D variants marked as representative for future predictions
- Lunar Orbiter program (sequences 301, 312, 321, 329, 340) in full operation
- Surveyor lunar landing program beginning (AC-series)
- Configuration clearly suitable for future reliability modeling
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 109 | RTI*
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 308-353, spanning October 1966 to March 1968. Period of increased Surveyor missions and transition toward advanced Centaur-based configurations for planetary missions.
## Dates
**Period**: 10/11/66 - 03/04/68
**Major Missions:**
- Lunar Orbiter 2-3: 11/06/66, 02/04/67
- Surveyor 2-5: 09/20/66 - 09/08/67 (AC-7, AC-10 through AC-13)
- Mariner 6-7 (Mars): 02/24/69, 03/27/69
- OGO missions (3, 5): various
- ATS missions: AC-8, AC-9, AC-17 series
- AFSC missions: reconnaissance program continuation
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- SLV-3/AGENA D: 7122-7203 numbered designations (continued standardization)
- LV-3C/CENTAUR D: AC-series advanced missions
- Introduction of SLV-3/BURNER II (sequence 365)
- Mixed designations in AFSC missions
**Test Ranges:**
- WR (Western Range): SLV-3/AGENA D missions
- ER (Eastern Range): AC-series and AFSC/DOD missions
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 310, 314, 318, 320, 323, 325, 331, 332, 335, 341, 344, 345
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 308, 311, 313, 317, 338, 344
- Mode 5: sequences 310, 315, 324, 337, 339, 345, 346
- NA: sequences 310, 313, 333, 340
**Flight Phases:**
- Phase 1, 2, 3, 4, 5: distributed
- Advanced configurations showing phase 1 focus
**Representativeness:**
- SLV-3/AGENA D: marked 1 (representative)
- AC-series: mostly marked 0 (not representative)
- AFSC missions marked 0
## Assessments
- Continued reliance on proven SLV-3/AGENA D configuration
- AC-series Centaur configurations advancing (Surveyor, Mariner, ATS programs)
- Mariner Mars program preparation underway
- High success rate in standardized SLV-3/AGENA D missions
- Advanced configurations still marked non-representative despite operational use
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 110 | RTI*
Page 119
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Atlas launch history table covering sequences 354-399, spanning March 1968 to January 1972. Period of declining launch frequency with focus on planetary (Mariner), communications (INTELSAT), and continued reconnaissance missions.
## Dates
**Period**: 03/06/68 - 01/22/72
**Major Missions:**
- Mariner 6-7 (Mars): 02/24/69, 03/27/69
- Mariner 8-9 (Mars): 05/08/71, 05/30/71
- OAO-A2, OAO-B (AC-16, AC-21): 12/07/68, 11/30/70
- ATS-D, ATS-E (AC-17, AC-18): 08/10/68, 08/12/69
- INTELSAT IV F-2 through F-4: 01/25/71, 12/19/71, 01/22/72
- Various AFSC/DOD and ABRES missions throughout
## Observations
**Vehicle Configurations:**
- SLV-3A/AGENA D: continued (363-387)
- SLV-3/BURNER II: sequence 365 (experimental)
- SLV-3C/CENTAUR D: AC-series advanced missions
- SLV-3O/CENTAUR D: sequences 350, 364, 372, 374, 376, 388, 390, 392-399
- Increasing Centaur adoption for high-performance missions
**Test Ranges:**
- ER (Eastern Range): AC-series and planetary missions
- WR (Western Range): ABRES/reconnaissance missions (declining)
**Response Modes:**
- Mode 1: sequences 364, 372 (rare in this period)
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 358, 365, 368, 379, 392
- Mode 5: sequence 358
**Flight Phases:**
**Representativeness:**
- SLV-3A/AGENA D: marked 1 (representative)
- SLV-3C/CENTAUR D: marked 1 (representative for AC-series)
- Indicates Centaur configurations selected for predictive model
- AFSC/DOD missions marked 0
## Assessments
- Dramatic shift from AGENA to Centaur upper stage (1968-1972)
- Mariner Mars program successful (high-profile missions)
- INTELSAT communications satellites driving advanced configurations
- Launch frequency declining significantly from 1960s peak
- Successful Centaur integration by early 1970s
- WR (reconnaissance) missions declining and marked non-representative
- ER (scientific/communications) missions becoming predominant
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 111 | RTI*
Page 120
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View PDF ↗Final section of Atlas launch history table (Table 41) entries 354-399 spanning March 1968 to January 1972. Represents end of comprehensive historical record with focus on mature platform configurations supporting planetary and communications missions.
## Dates
**Coverage Period**: 03/06/68 - 01/22/72 (entries 354-399)
**Final Programs:**
- Mariner Mars missions: 02/24/69, 03/27/69, 05/08/71, 05/30/71
- INTELSAT IV series: 01/25/71, 12/19/71, 01/22/72
- OAO/ATS scientific missions: 1968-1970
- ABRES/AFSC reconnaissance missions: declining through period
## Organizations
- NASA - Mariner, OAO missions
- INTELSAT - Communications satellites
- DOD/USAF - Reconnaissance/ABRES missions
## Observations
**Vehicle Configuration Summary:**
- SLV-3A/AGENA D: sequences 354-387 (WR missions declining)
- SLV-3C/CENTAUR D: AC-series (ER scientific missions)
- SLV-3O/CENTAUR D: advanced Centaur variant (sequences 350, 388-399)
- Final configuration represents mature, proven design
**Test Range Distribution:**
- ER (Eastern Range): 40%+ of launches
- WR (Western Range): declining to <30% by 1972
- Shift reflects end of large reconnaissance program and focus on civilian/scientific missions
**Response Mode Summary:**
- Mode 4, 4T: sequences 358, 365, 368, 379, 392 (failures in thrust phase)
- Mode 5: sequence 358 (anomalous orbital insertion)
- Blank entries: predominant (successful flights)
**Representativeness Final Assessment:**
- SLV-3A/AGENA D: marked 1 (included in reliability model)
- SLV-3C/CENTAUR D: marked 1 (included in reliability model)
- SLV-3O/CENTAUR D: marked 1 (included in reliability model)
- Final entries (398, 399) marked 1 - latest configurations representative
## Assessments
- Mature Atlas program by 1972 with proven reliability
- Centaur transition complete - SLV-3C/O dominant in final entries
- Significant shift from reconnaissance (AGENA) to scientific/communications (Centaur) missions
- Successful Mariner Mars missions demonstrate platform reliability at highest mission level
- INTELSAT deployment shows confidence in Atlas-Centaur stack
- Launch frequency stabilizing at lower sustainable level by 1972
- Final configurations (SLV-3C/O with Centaur) selected as basis for future reliability predictions
- Program demonstrates evolution from development (1957-1962) through operational maturity (1965-1972)
*Report date: 9/10/96 | Page: 111 | RTI*
*End of Table 41 (Atlas Launch History) - Sequence 1-399 spanning June 1957 to January 1972*
Page 121
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## Doc Type
Technical report - launch vehicle test data table
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Page Description
Flight test sequence table (rows 400-445) containing Atlas/satellite mission launch records with columns for flight number, mission/ID, launch date, vehicle configuration, test range, response mode, and flight phase.
## Dates
- 03/02/72 (Pioneer 10)
- 06/13/72 (INTELSAT IV F-5)
- 08/21/72 (OAO-C)
- 10/02/72 (AFSC)
- 12/20/72 (DOD AA-32)
- 03/06/73 (DOD AA-33)
- 04/05/73 (Pioneer 11)
- 08/23/73 through 10/06/78 (multiple missions)
## Organizations
- AFSC (Air Force Space Command)
- DOD (Department of Defense)
- NASA (implied via Pioneer, OAO, Mariner, Skylab programs)
- Commercial operators (INTELSAT)
## Observations
- 46 flight records documented on page
- Multiple SLV-3D/CENTAUR configurations
- Various test ranges: ER (Extended Range), WR (Western Range)
- Response modes: 1, 2, 4, 4T, 5
- Flight phases: 1, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5
- Rep. Conf. values ranging from 0-4
## Notes
Table format shows systematic testing of Atlas launch vehicle variants carrying payloads from 1972-1978.
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## Doc Type
Technical report - launch vehicle test data table (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Page Description
Flight test sequence table (rows 446-491) continuing Atlas/satellite mission launch records with same column structure as page 121. Dates span 1978-1987.
## Dates
- 10/13/78 (TIROS N)
- 11/13/78 (HEAO-B)
- 12/10/78 (NAVSTAR IV)
- 02/24/79 (STP-78-1)
- 05/04/79 (FLTSATCOM-B)
- 06/27/79 (NOAA-A)
- 09/20/79 (HEAO-C)
- 01/17/80 (FLTSATCOM-C) through 06/19/87 (DMSP F-8)
## Organizations
- AFSC
- DOD
- NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)
- Military space programs
## Observations
- Extensive use of SLV-3D/CENTAUR D-1A configuration
- Mix of operational satellite programs (NAVSTAR, NOAA, INTELSAT, FLTSATCOM, DMSP)
- Test range primarily ER (Extended Range)
- Response modes: 1, 2, 4, 4T, 5
- 46 flight records on this page (rows 446-491)
- Rep. Conf. values range 0-1 with some showing 4T response mode with 1 flight phase
## Notes
Represents period of mature Atlas program with operational military and commercial satellite launches.
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## Doc Type
Technical report - launch vehicle test data table (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Page Description
Flight test sequence table (rows 492-535) documenting Atlas/satellite missions 1988-1996. Continues systematic flight test record from pages 121-122.
## Dates
- 02/02/88 (DMSP F-9)
- 09/24/88 (NOAA-H)
- 09/25/89 (FLTSATCOM F-8)
- 04/11/90 (P87-2)
- 07/25/90 (CRRES)
- 12/01/90 (DMSS 10)
- 04/18/91 (BS-3H COMSAT) through 07/25/96 (UHF F7)
## Organizations
- AFSC
- DOD
- NOAA
- Commercial satellite operators
- Military communication programs
## Observations
- Transitions to more modern Centaur configurations (CENT I, II, IIA, IAS)
- 44 flight records documented (rows 492-535)
- Extended range (ER) and Western range (WR) test sites
- Response modes: 1, 3, 4, 4T, NA
- Flight phases: 1, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5
- Rep. Conf. values predominantly 0 and 1
- Mix of military (UHF, DSCS, EHF) and commercial (INTELSAT, DIRECT TV, PALAPA-C) payloads
- Final entry: UHF F7 on 07/25/96
## Notes
Represents evolution of Atlas program through 1990s with increasing satellite constellation launches.
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives
## Page Description
Beginning of detailed failure narratives for Atlas launch vehicle. Covers failures #1, 2, 5, 6, 7 from the 1950s.
## Dates
- 11 June 1957 (Flight 4A)
- 25 Sep 1957 (Flight 6A)
- 7 Feb 1958 (Flight 13A)
- 20 Feb 1958 (Flight 11A)
- 5 Apr 1958 (Flight 15A)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 4A (11 June 57)
- Engine: B2 fuel supply drop at 24.7 sec
- B1 engine failed at 27 sec
- Fuel fire in aft end
- Missile destroyed at 50.1 sec
- Altitude: 9,800 feet at 38 sec
- Impact: 1/4 mile south (105° azimuth)
### 6A (25 Sep 57)
- Both engines to 35% normal performance at 32.5 sec
- Shutdown at 37 sec
- Cause: LOX regulator loss in booster gas generator
- Impact: 8,000 feet downrange, 1,000 feet right
### 13A (7 Feb 58)
- B2 turbopump/engine stopped at ~118 sec
- B1 ceased 0.3 sec later
- Cause: Vernier engine feedback transducer shorting
- Vehicle breakup at 167 sec
- Impact: 280 miles downrange, 3 miles crossrange
### 11A (20 Feb 58)
- Vernier engine hardover oscillations 51.9-124.8 sec
- Rate-gyro divergent oscillations
- Engines oscillated between stops
- Vehicle breakup at 125.8 sec
- Impact: 105 miles downrange, 8 miles right
### 15A (5 Apr 58)
- B1 turbopump failure at 105.3 sec
- Premature booster shutdown
- Impact: 180 miles downrange, slightly left
## Observations
- Early 1950s flight test campaign
- Multiple failure modes: propellant system, hydraulic, electrical, structural
- Range Safety Officer (RSO) destruction capability documented
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21.
## Dates
- 19 July 1958 (Flight 3B)
- 28 Aug 1958 (Flight 5B)
- 14 Sep 1958 (Flight 8B)
- 18 Sep 1958 (Flight 6B)
- 17 Nov 1958 (Flight 9B)
- 15 Jan 1959 (Flight 13B)
- 27 Jan 1959 (Flight 4C)
- 20 Feb 1959 (Flight 5C)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 3B (19 July 58)
- Yaw rate gyro random failure
- LO2 tank rupture
- Engine shutdown and lube oil drain fire
- Missile breakup at 42 sec
- Impact: 2 miles downrange, 0.4 miles left
### 5B (28 Aug 58)
- Normal to SECO
- Post-SECO hydraulic system failure
- Loss of vernier engine control
- Warhead near target impact (Phase 2.5)
### 8B (14 Sep 58)
- Control lost after SECO
- Vernier-engine hydraulic system failure
- Warhead near target (Phase 2.5)
### 6B (18 Sep 58)
- Late-opening sustainer fuel valve
- B1 turbopump failed at 80.8 sec
- B2 system shutdown 0.1 sec later
- Missile explosion at 82.9 sec
- Impact: 25 miles downrange, 0.6 miles right
### 9B (17 Nov 58)
- Termination at 227.6 sec
- Premature fuel depletion
- Cause: Propulsion utilization system failure or tanking error
- Impact: 2,300 miles downrange, 850 miles short of target
### 13B (15 Jan 59)
- Obscured by clouds at 50-60 sec
- Erratic pitch/yaw/roll rates beginning ~101 sec
- Excessive rates at 106.6 sec
- Yaw/pitch rates increased at 121 sec
- All thrusting stopped 121-123 sec
- Reentry at 281 sec
- Impact: 170 miles downrange, 7.5 miles left
### 4C (27 Jan 59)
- Guidance system inoperative
- Pre-programmed flight control
- Impact: 80 miles long, 30 miles left of target (Phase 2)
### 5C (20 Feb 59)
- Normal booster phase
- Explosion at 173 sec (BECO 149.2 sec)
- Cause: Fuel tank pressure loss, LOX/fuel-tank bulkhead rupture
- Impact: 1,000 miles downrange, 6 miles left
## Observations
- Period 1958-1959
- Recurring hydraulic system failures
- Propellant system vulnerabilities
- Guidance system issues emerging
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #22-37, covering period March 1959-November 1959.
## Dates
- 18 Mar 1959 (Flight 7C)
- 14 Apr 1959 (Flight 3D)
- 18 May 1959 (Flight 7D)
- 6 June 1959 (Flight 5D)
- 9 Sep 1959 (Flight 10D Mercury)
- 16 Sep 1959 (Flight 17D)
- 29 Oct 1959 (Flight 26D)
- 4 Nov 1959 (Flight 28D)
- 24 Nov 1959 (Flight 15D)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 7C (18 Mar 59)
- Booster shutdown at 129.4 sec
- Booster jettison delayed to 153 sec
- Guidance inoperative
- Sustainer gimbal limitation
- Sustainer shutdown 40 sec early
- RV spin rockets premature at 86.3 sec
### 3D (14 Apr 59)
- B2 engine performance dropped 36% at launch
- Violent pitch at liftoff
- Thrust section explosion at 26.1 sec
- Sustainer continued with reduced thrust
- RSO shutdown at 36 sec
- Impact: 3,000 feet from launch point
### 7D (18 May 59)
- Pneumatic system failure
- Missile explosion at 65 sec
- Cause: Thrust-structure fairing failure at liftoff
- Pneumatic line leaks and disconnects
### 5D (6 June 59)
- Booster staging structural damage or valve failure
- Fuel leak and explosion at 159.3 sec
- Impact: Near flight line, 780 miles downrange
### 10D Mercury (9 Sep 59)
- Booster section failed to jettison
- Final velocity 3,000 ft/sec low
- Impact: 500 miles short of target (Phase 2)
### 17D (16 Sep 59)
- Near-success, impact within 2 miles of target
- Vernier hydraulic package failure
- V2 vernier engine lost chamber pressure during booster jettison
- Loss of missile control during vernier solo phase
### 26D (29 Oct 59)
- V2 vernier engine lost thrust
- Chamber pressure loss during booster jettison
- Unstable vernier solo phase
- Impact: 14 miles short, out of splash net
### 28D (4 Nov 59)
- Normal flight
- Premature termination by range-safety impact-predictor system failure
- Response Mode: NA, Phase 2
### 15D (24 Nov 59)
- Normal flight except reentry vehicle issues
- Failed to arm or separate
- Response Mode: NA, Phase 2.5
## Observations
- High failure rate in 1959
- Persistent vernier/hydraulic system issues
- Range safety systems functioning for flight termination
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #38-57, spanning November 1959-July 1960.
## Dates
- 26 Nov 1959 (Flight 20D Able M)
- 26 Jan 1960 (Flight 6D Dual Exhaust)
- 26 Feb 1960 (Flight 29D Midas I)
- 8 Mar 1960 (Flight 42D)
- 10 Mar 1960 (Flight 51 D)
- 7 Apr 1960 (Flight 48D)
- 6 May 1960 (Flight 23D Lucky Dragon)
- 22 June 1960 (Flight 62D)
- 2 July 1960 (Flight 60D)
- 22 July 1960 (Flight 74D Tiger Skin)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 20D Able M (26 Nov 59)
- Third and fourth stages broke off at 47 sec
- Atlas flight normal
- Second stage ignited properly after Atlas SECO
### 6D Dual Exhaust (26 Jan 60)
- Full-scale positive yaw command at 175 sec
- Erroneous heading stabilization
- Range-rate flag loss at 195 sec
- Differentiated range-rate data substitution
- Slightly erratic steering
- Premature VECO signal
- Vernier cutoff by backup signal
### 29D Midas I (26 Feb 60)
- Normal flight until retro rocket firing post-Atlas separation
- Explosion at separation
- Cause: Agena inadvertent separation destruct system activation
- Destroyed both Atlas and Agena vehicles
### 42D (8 Mar 60)
- Deemed success despite vernier hydraulic failure
- Loss of attitude control during vernier solo phase
- Impact within acceptable range
### 51 D (10 Mar 60)
- Combustion instability in B1 chamber before missile movement
- Explosion at 2.5 sec after 2-inch motion
- Missile destroyed at 2.5 sec
### 48D (7 Apr 60)
- Destroyed on launch stand
- Combustion instability in B2 thrust chamber
- During launch attempt
### 23D Lucky Dragon (6 May 60)
- Inoperative pitch gyro
- Pitch instability
- Destruct at 25.6 seconds
### 62D (22 June 60)
- Vernier engines cutoff by autopilot backup
- Guidance discrete not sent
- Impact: 18 miles long
### 60D (2 July 60)
- Helium bottle pressure depletion
- Low sustainer and vernier engine thrust
- Early engine shutdown
- Impact: 40 miles short of target
### 74D Tiger Skin (22 July 60)
- Pitchover rate 69% above nominal
- Vehicle breakup at 69.2 seconds
## Observations
- 1960 marked by diverse failure modes
- Guidance system malfunctions emerging
- Combustion instability issues
- Agena integration problems noted
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #58-73, covering July 1960-December 1960.
## Dates
- 29 July 1960 (Flight 50D Mercury)
- 12 Sep 1960 (Flight 47D Golden Journey)
- 25 Sep 1960 (Flight 80D Able V/Pioneer)
- 29 Sep 1960 (Flight 33D High Arrow)
- 11 Oct 1960 (Flight 3E)
- 11 Oct 1960 (Flight 57D LV-3A/Agena A Gibson Girl)
- 12 Oct 1960 (Flight 81D Diamond Jubilee)
- 29 Nov 1960 (Flight 4E)
- 15 Dec 1960 (Flight 91D)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 50D Mercury (29 July 60)
- Flight appeared normal until 57.6 sec
- LO2 tank forward section rupture
- Missile breakup
### 47D Golden Journey (12 Sep 60)
- Normal flight to 222 sec
- Missile acceleration decay
- LOX regulator failure
- Low sustainer performance
- Impact: 535 miles short
### 80D Able V/Pioneer (25 Sep 60)
- Atlas normal except vernier engine cutoff failure
- Agena chamber pressure 70% of normal
- Stage tumbled before cutoff 30 sec early
- Third-stage nose-down attitude
### 33D High Arrow (29 Sep 60)
- Booster engines cut off prematurely
- Failed to separate from sustainer
- Missile remained intact
- Reduced range due to booster weight
### 3E (11 Oct 60)
- Sustainer hydraulic pressure decay at 41 sec
- Zero pressure at 62 sec
- Sustainer tumbling at booster staging
- Thrust continued ~18 sec
- Impact: 270 miles farther downrange, 27 miles crossrange
- Explosion at 155 sec
### 57D LV-3A/Agena A Gibson Girl (11 Oct 60)
- Atlas performance satisfactory
- Umbilical failed to release properly from Agena
- Loss of pneumatic supply to Agena attitude control
- Guidance beacon failed at 106 sec (autopilot flight)
- Satisfactory orbit not achieved
### 81D Diamond Jubilee (12 Oct 60)
- LOX tank overpressurization
- Tank rupture
- Vehicle breakup at 71.6 seconds
### 4E (29 Nov 60)
- Sustainer hydraulic pressure lost at 41 sec
- Missile tumbled after booster staging
- Sustainer thrust terminated ~150 sec (22 sec after BECO)
- Impact: 120 miles downrange, 44 miles crossrange
### 91D (15 Dec 60)
- Normal performance to 66.7 sec
- Blast-band failure
- Forward LOX tank rupture
- Upper stages separated
- Atlas engines continued to 71 sec
- Control lost 72-73 sec
- Explosion at 74 sec
- Impact: 8 miles downrange, 1 mile crossrange
## Observations
- Late 1960 period
- Persistent hydraulic failures
- Tank structural failures (blast-band rupture)
- Early Agena integration issues
- Multiple vehicles destroyed by tank rupture mechanism
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #76-93, covering January 1961-August 1961.
## Dates
- 24 Jan 1961 (Flight 5E)
- 31 Jan 1961 (Flight 70D LV-3A/Agena A Jawhawk Jamboree)
- 13 Mar 1961 (Flight 13E)
- 24 Mar 1961 (Flight 16E)
- 25 Apr 1961 (Flight 100D Mercury 3)
- 7 June 1961 (Flight 27E Sure Shot)
- 22 June 1961 (Flight 17E)
- 23 Aug 1961 (Flight 111D Ranger-1)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 5E (24 Jan 61)
- Missile stability lost at 161 sec (30 sec after BECO)
- Probable cause: Servo-amplifier power supply failure
- Sustainer shutdown at 248 sec
- Vernier shutdown ~10 sec later
- Impact: 1,316 miles downrange, 215 miles crossrange (Phase 2)
### 70D LV-3A/Agena A Jawhawk Jamboree (31 Jan 61)
- Successful mission overall
- Loss of rate lock at 222 sec
- Slightly erratic steering last 20 sec of Atlas sustainer thrusting
- Vehicle pitch-over failure during vernier solo period
- Response Mode: NA, Phase 2
### 13E (13 Mar 61)
- Sustainer main fuel valve remained full open throughout flight
- Fuel depletion
- Premature sustainer shutdown at 251 seconds
### 16E (24 Mar 61)
- Helium-bottle pressure depletion
- Booster section failed to jettison
- Fuel depletion
- Impact far short of target (Phase 1.5)
### 100D Mercury 3 (25 Apr 61)
- Flight terminated at 40 sec by RSO
- Vehicle failed roll and pitchover maneuvers
- Cause: Autopilot programmer failure
- Plastic coating on connector pins caused open circuit
- Major debris: 1,800 feet downrange, 6,100 feet crossrange left
### 27E Sure Shot (7 June 61)
- Apparent combustion instability
- Explosion and missile destruction
- 3.86 seconds after liftoff
### 17E (22 June 61)
- Missile self-destruction at 101.5 sec
- Flight-control system failure
- Pitch rate ~1.55 times normal
- Pitch over ~90° before breakup
- Breakup at 66,000 feet altitude
- Impact: 64 miles downrange
### 111D Ranger-1 (23 Aug 61)
- Agena achieved normal parking orbit
- Normal flight until Agena second burn
- Restart sequence: fuel valve failed to open
- Only oxygen pumped into thrust chamber
- Final orbit apogee slightly above normal circular parking-orbit altitude
## Observations
- Early 1961 period
- Increased emphasis on Agena second stage integration
- Servo-amplifier power supply identified as failure mode
- Pilot electrical/connector issues noted
- Mercury program flights documented
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## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #94-110, covering September 1961-December 1961.
## Dates
- 8 Sep 1961 (Flight 26E)
- 9 Sep 1961 (Flight 106D LV-3A/Agena B First Motion)
- 21 Oct 1961 (Flight 105D LV-3A/Agena B Big Town Midas IV)
- 10 Nov 1961 (Flight 32E)
- 18 Nov 1961 (Flight 117D Ranger-2)
- 22 Nov 1961 (Flight 108D LV-3A/Agena B Round Trip)
- 12 Dec 1961 (Flight 5F)
- 20 Dec 1961 (Flight 6F)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 26E (8 Sep 61)
- Sustainer engine premature shutdown during booster jettison
- Probable cause: Fuel flow drop to gas generator
- Vernier engines burned ~28 sec after sustainer shutdown
- Vernier thrust decay at 137 sec
- Guidance platform tumble at 163 sec
- Missile intact to at least 470 sec
- Impact: 525 miles downrange (Phase 2)
### 106D LV-3A/Agena B First Motion (9 Sep 61)
- Umbilical failure (eject malfunction)
- Commit/stop-power signal reached missile
- Electrical power loss 0.265 sec after liftoff
- Vehicle fell back on pad after 18-inch rise (Phase 1)
### 105D LV-3A/Agena B Big Town Midas IV (21 Oct 61)
- Regarded as success despite anomalies
- Atlas roll control lost at 186 sec
- Roll rate over 40° per second at Agena separation
- Pitch and yaw control maintained
- LOX leak affected sustainer before SECO and during vernier phase
### 32E (10 Nov 61)
- Sustainer engine shutdown 0.7 sec after liftoff
- Fire in thrust section at 19 sec
- B2 engine performance decay at 24.5 sec
- All control lost
- RSO destruction at 35 sec
- Impact: 2,500 feet downrange, 320 feet crossrange
### 117D Ranger-2 (18 Nov 61)
- Atlas booster functioned normally
- Parking orbit attained despite roll gyro failure
- Roll control not maintained
- Control gas depletion caused tumble
- Second Agena burn lasted 1 second only
### 108D LV-3A/Agena B Round Trip (22 Nov 61)
- Failed to achieve orbit
- Loss of pitch control at 244 sec
- Attributed to aerodynamic heating
- Atlas pitched up 145° at Agena separation (Phase 2)
### 5F (12 Dec 61)
- Inertial guidance system failure (1.06 sec duration)
- Inertial X velocity inserted in Z-velocity channel
- Impact: 575 miles short, 30 miles left of target (Phase 2)
### 6F (20 Dec 61)
- Normal flight until staging
- Sustainer/vernier hydraulic pressure decay during booster jettison
- Complete loss sustainer yaw control at 229 sec
- Complete loss sustainer pitch control at 232 sec
- Missile tumbling at ~226 sec
- Sustainer shutdown at 282 sec
- Impact: 1,300 miles downrange, 18 miles crossrange (Phase 2)
## Observations
- Mid-1961 period
- Multiple Ranger/Agena integration failures
- Emphasis on roll control instability with Agena
- Inertial measurement unit (IMU) errors emerging
- Continued hydraulic system vulnerability
Page 131
View PDF ↗## Status
Readable with content
## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #111-128, covering December 1961-May 1962.
## Dates
- 22 Dec 1961 (Flight 114D LV-3A/Agena B Ocean Way)
- 26 Jan 1962 (Flight 121 D Ranger 3)
- 16 Feb 1962 (Flight 137D Big John)
- 21 Feb 1962 (Flight 52D Chain Smoke)
- 28 Feb 1962 (Flight 66E Silver Spur)
- 9 Apr 1962 (Flight 11F)
- 9 Apr 1962 (Flight 110D LV-3A/Agena B Night Hunt Midas)
- 8 May 1962 (Flight 104D)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 114D LV-3A/Agena B Ocean Way (22 Dec 61)
- Considered successful overall
- Flight programmer failure prevented SECO signal cutoff
- Sustainer burned additional 2.5 sec to propellant depletion
- Excess Atlas velocity produced (Phase 2)
### 121 D Ranger 3 (26 Jan 62)
- Pulse beacon failure in guidance system at 49 sec
- Sustainer burned to LOX depletion
- 300 ft/sec overspeed
- No guidance steering commands or discretes given
- Booster cutoff by backup accelerometer signal
- Sustainer by fuel depletion
- Spacecraft passed 22,000 miles in front of moon
- Primary mission objective not met
- Other Atlas/Agena systems performed as planned (Phase 2 and 5)
### 137D Big John (16 Feb 62)
- Considered successful
- RV did not separate properly (Phase 1.5)
### 52D Chain Smoke (21 Feb 62)
- Fire in engine compartment
- All engines shutdown at 60 sec
- Vehicle explosion at 72 seconds
### 66E Silver Spur (28 Feb 62)
- Helium-bottle pressure loss
- Booster engines failed to jettison
- Premature vernier-engine cutoff at 131.5 sec
- Loss of roll control
- Vehicle explosion at 295 seconds
### 11F (9 Apr 62)
- Thrust section explosion at 0.9 sec (after ~6 feet motion)
- Further explosion in propellant tanks
- Total missile destruction at 1.2 seconds
### 110D LV-3A/Agena B Night Hunt Midas (9 Apr 62)
- Autopilot malfunction
- Insufficient pitchover during booster/sustainer phase
- Improper SECO conditions
- Improper orbit (Phase 1)
### 104D (8 May 62)
- Flight normal until 45 sec
- Weather shield shifted
- Further shocks at 50 sec (weather shield loss)
- Booster cutoff initiated at 55 sec
- Missile self-destruction at 57 sec
- Centaur upper stage breakup
- Impact: 8,500 feet downrange, 8,200 feet crossrange
## Observations
- Early 1962 period
- Ranger lunar mission failures documented
- Centaur upper stage introduced with early structural failures
- Weather shield anomalies noted
- Flight programmer/autopilot issues persisting
Page 132
View PDF ↗## Status
Readable with content
## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #131-153, covering June 1962-November 1962.
## Dates
- 17 June 1962 (Flight LV-3A/Agena B Rubber Gun)
- 13 July 1962 (Flight 67E Extra Bonus)
- 22 July 1962 (Flight 145D Mariner R-1)
- 9 Aug 1962 (Flight 87D Peg Board II)
- 10 Aug 1962 (Flight 57F Crash Truck)
- 27 Aug 1962 (Flight 179D Mariner R-2)
- 2 Oct 1962 (Flight 4D Briar Street)
- 18 Oct 1962 (Flight 215 D Ranger-5)
- 14 Nov 1962 (Flight 13F Action Time)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 131 LV-3A/Agena B Rubber Gun (17 June 62)
- Atlas performance satisfactory
- Mission apparently failure overall
- No other data available (Phase 3)
### 67E Extra Bonus (13 July 62)
- LOX leak in high-pressure line
- Apparent freezing of sustainer control components
- Residual sustainer thrust after cutoff (~30 sec)
- 120-mile overshoot (Phase 2 and 2.5)
### 145D Mariner R-1 (22 July 62)
- Booster/flight normal until guidance enable (~157 sec)
- Guidance rate beacon intermittent operation
- Faulty guidance equations
- Erroneous commands based on invalid rate data
- Vehicle deviations at 172 sec
- Maximum yaw deviation 60°, pitch 28° (at 270 sec)
- Gross trajectory deviation
- RSO destruction at 293.5 sec (12 sec after SECO)
### 87D Peg Board II (9 Aug 62)
- Sustainer/vernier hydraulic system pressure loss
- Prevented normal vernier solo phase operation (Phase 2.5)
### 57F Crash Truck (10 Aug 62)
- Roll program failed
- RSO destruction at 68 seconds (Phase 1)
### 179D Mariner R-2 (27 Aug 62)
- Regarded as successful
- Roll control lost 140-190 sec period
- Vernier engine #2 erratic performance
- Before/after interval: normal performance
- Other Atlas/Agena systems normal (Phase 2)
### 4D Briar Street (2 Oct 62)
- Self-destruction at 183 sec
- Vernier engines shutdown at 46 sec
- Vernier bleed valve closure caused high sustainer performance
- Premature sustainer shutdown at 181.3 sec (Phase 2)
### 215 D Ranger-5 (18 Oct 62)
- Regarded as successful
- Ground control system failure 35 minutes post-launch
- Prevented lunar impact and study mission
- Guidance rate beacon failed at 94.6 sec
- Backup differentiated tracking data maintained normal limits (Phase 5)
### 13F Action Time (14 Nov 62)
- Sustainer/vernier engines shutdown prematurely at 94.3 sec
- Thrust-section fire before 20 sec
- Apparent lube oil system failure
- Cessation of propellant flow (Phase 1)
## Observations
- Mid-1962 period
- Mariner mission emphasis
- Persistent guidance rate beacon issues
- Vernier bleed valve problems emerging
- Pressure regulator and control component freezing noted
- Ranger program continued
Page 133
View PDF ↗## Status
Readable with content
## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #156-169, covering December 1962-March 1963.
## Dates
- 17 Dec 1962 (Flight 131D LV-3A/Agena B Bargain Counter)
- 18 Dec 1962 (Flight 64E Oak Tree)
- 22 Dec 1962 (Flight 160D Fly High)
- 25 Jan 1963 (Flight 39D Big Sue)
- 9 Mar 1963 (Flight 102D Tall Tree 3)
- 15 Mar 1963 (Flight 64D Tall Tree 1)
- 16 Mar 1963 (Flight 193D Leading Edge)
- 21 Mar 1963 (Flight 83F Kendall Green)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 131D LV-3A/Agena B Bargain Counter (17 Dec 62)
- Atlas hydraulic failure
- Missile lost stability at 77.5 sec
- Rolled clockwise, pitched down, yawed left
- Breakup at 80.5 seconds (Phase 1, Response 4T)
### 64E Oak Tree (18 Dec 62)
- B2 engine failure at 37.1 sec
- Lubrication loss to pinion gear
- Booster shutdown caused violent rolling yaw maneuver
- Missile breakup followed by explosion at 38 sec (Phase 1, Response 4T)
### 160D Fly High (22 Dec 62)
- Noisy data in range safety system
- Automatic cutoff system limits exceeded
- All-engines-cutoff signal generated
- Vernier cutoff 10 sec early
- RV 12.3 miles short (Phase 2, Response 4)
### 39D Big Sue (25 Jan 63)
- Booster engine performance decay at 78 sec
- Booster shutdown shortly after
- Probable cause: Excessive heating in gas-generator regulator
- Sustainer normal to at least 106 sec
- Shutdown between 106-126 sec
- Breakup at 300 sec
- Impact: 100 miles downrange (Phase 1, Response 4)
### 102D Tall Tree 3 (9 Mar 63)
- Flight-control malfunction at ~15 sec
- Pitch program start
- Excessive pitch reaching 310°
- Altitude 5,000 feet at 33.5 sec
- Breakup and debris near pad (Phase 1, Response 5)
### 64D Tall Tree 1 (15 Mar 63)
- Sustainer hydraulic-system failure at 83.5 sec
- Loss sustainer engine control by 86 sec
- Loss vernier control at 99 sec
- Booster engines maintained control until cutoff
- Roll clockwise, pitch up, yaw left
- Sustainer thrust decay at 131 sec
- Tumbling at 136.6 sec
- Self-destruct at 146 sec
- Impact: 600 miles downrange (Phase 2, Response 4T)
### 193D Leading Edge (16 Mar 63)
- Loss of B2 pitch feedback signal at 103.5 sec
- Loss vehicle stability
- Tumble then self-destruct at 270 sec (Phase 2, Response 4T)
### 83F Kendall Green (21 Mar 63)
- Defective solder joint
- Two instances erroneous velocity computations
- X and Z velocity channels affected
- Impact: 12 miles short, 0.2 miles right of target (Phase 2.5, Response 4)
## Observations
- Late 1962/early 1963 period
- "Tall Tree" series test flights
- Hydraulic system failures recurring theme
- Guidance/feedback signal failures noted
- Solder joint defect identified in inertial platform
- Gas-generator regulator heating issues
Page 134
View PDF ↗## Status
Readable with content
## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #170-189, covering March 1963-September 1963.
## Dates
- 23 Mar 1963 (Flight 52F Tall Tree 4)
- 24 Apr 1963 (Flight 65E Black Buck)
- 12 June 1963 (Flight 139D Big Four)
- 26 July 1963 (Flight 24E Silver Doll)
- 6 Sep 1963 (Flight 63D Cool Water III)
- 11 Sep 1963 (Flight 84D Cool Water IV)
- 25 Sep 1963 (Flight 71E Filter Tip)
- 3 Oct 1963 (Flight 45F Hot Rum)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 52F Tall Tree 4 (23 Mar 63)
- Self-destruction at 91 sec for unknown reasons
- Impact: Near flight line, 120 miles downrange (Phase 1, Response 4)
### 65E Black Buck (24 Apr 63)
- Vernier hydraulic-system pressure loss at 301 sec
- Loss vernier-engine control during vernier solo phase
- RV impact point not perceptibly affected (Phase 2.5, Response NA)
### 139D LV-3A/Agena B Big Four (12 June 63)
- Flight normal until 88.4 sec
- Hydraulic failure
- Violent right and down maneuver
- Missile breakup at 93.4 seconds (Phase 1, Response 4T)
### 24E Silver Doll (26 July 63)
- Spurious voltage transients
- Premature vernier solo tanks pressurization at 101.3 sec
- Premature sustainer shutdown just after booster separation (141 sec) (Phase 2, Response 4)
### 63D Cool Water III (6 Sep 63)
- All systems satisfactory to 110 sec
- Sustainer/vernier hydraulic pressure drop from 3080 to 490 psig
- Premature sustainer shutdown at 136 sec
- Booster cutoff normal at 140.3 sec
- Booster successfully jettisoned
- Impact: 620 miles downrange (Phase 1, Response 4)
### 84D Cool Water IV (11 Sep 63)
- Flight normal through SECO
- Pneumatic precharge loss to vernier solo accumulator at 96.6 sec
- Missile stability lost near vernier solo phase start
- RV probably failed to separate (Phase 2.5, Response 4T)
### 71E Filter Tip (25 Sep 63)
- Visual observers: boat-tail fire reported
- Radical oscillations in yaw
- Rough running booster and sustainer engines
- Sustainer hydraulic system failure during staging
- Loss missile stability at 140 sec
- Sustainer/vernier shutdown at 267 sec
- Impact: 600 miles downrange (Phase 2, Response 4T)
### 45F Hot Rum (3 Oct 63)
- B-1 booster fuel valve failed to open during start
- Engine did not ignite
- Missile toppled over and exploded (Phase 1, Response 1)
## Observations
- Mid-1963 period
- "Cool Water" series test flights
- Continued hydraulic system vulnerabilities
- Voltage transient issues emerging
- Pneumatic accumulator precharge failures noted
- Booster fuel valve failure mode identified
Page 135
View PDF ↗## Status
Readable with content
## Doc Type
Technical report - failure analysis narrative (continuation)
## Classification
RTI (Rocket Test Information)
## Section
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives (continued)
## Page Description
Failure narratives for Atlas flights #191-236, covering October 1963-January 1965. Final page of failure narratives in section D.2.2.
## Dates
- 7 Oct 1963 (Flight 163D Cool Water V)
- 28 Oct 1963 (Flight 136F ABRES)
- 13 Nov 1963 (Flight 158D Cool Water VI)
- 12 Feb 1964 (Flight 48E Blue Bay)
- 3 Apr 1964 (Flight 3F High Ball)
- 30 June 1964 (Flight 135D AC-3)
- 27 Aug 1964 (Flight 57E Gallant Gal)
- 5 Nov 1964 (Flight 289D Mariner-3)
- 11 Dec 1964 (Flight 146D)
- 21 Jan 1965 (Flight 172D/ABRES Beaver's Dam)
## Technical Failures Documented
### 163D Cool Water V (7 Oct 63)
- Flight normal to 73 sec then explosion
- Suspected: Intermediate bulkhead reversal/rupture
- Cause: Insufficient helium pressure (Phase 1, Response 4)
### 136F ABRES (28 Oct 63)
- Normal booster phase and staging
- Sustainer hydraulic system failure at 138 sec
- Loss sustainer control and stability
- Sustainer/vernier shutdown at 260 sec (28 sec early)
- RV impact: 507 miles downrange (Phase 2, Response 4T)
### 158D Cool Water VI (13 Nov 63)
- Trajectory low throughout flight
- Sustainer/vernier hydraulic pressure loss at 112.7 sec
- Missile self-destruct at 118 sec
- Impact: 280 miles downrange, on azimuth (Phase 1, Response 4)
### 48E Blue Bay (12 Feb 64)
- Booster shutdown at 119.5 sec
- Sustainer premature shutdown at 198.8 sec
- Impact: Near flight line, 635 miles downrange (Phase 2, Response 4)
### 3F High Ball (3 Apr 64)
- B1 booster engine failed to ignite
- Missile destroyed on pad (Phase 1, Response 1)
### 135D AC-3 (30 June 64)
- Centaur engines shutdown early
- Probable cause: Hydraulic coupling failure
- Propellant system failure
- Impact: 2,340 miles downrange (Phase 3, Response 4)
### 57E Gallant Gal (27 Aug 64)
- Early SECO
- No vernier burn thereafter
- Cause: Guidance-system malfunction
- Impact: 88 miles short, 0.4 miles right of target (Phase 2, Response 4)
### 289D Mariner-3 (5 Nov 64)
- Short Agena second burn
- Prevented desired orbit attainment
- Resulted in heliocentric orbit (Phase 4, Response 4)
### 146D (11 Dec 64)
- Completely normal through Centaur first burn
- Liquid hydrogen venting through vent valve during coast
- Vehicle instability and tumbling
- Insufficient LH2 at boost-pump sump for second firing
- Combustion sustaining failure (Phase 5, Response NA)
### 172D/ABRES Beaver's Dam (21 Jan 65)
- Atlas apparently normal except sustainer shutdown 1.35 sec early
- OV1 (Orbiting Vehicle-1) failed to separate
- Failed to orbit spacecraft (Phase 2 and 3, Response 4)
## Observations
- Late 1963-early 1965 period
- Centaur upper stage integration issues expanding
- Helium pressure system vulnerabilities
- Spacecraft separation mechanism failures noted
- Liquid hydrogen venting and handling issues
- Mariner Mars program flights documented
- ABRES test vehicle flights
- Transition to operational constellation missions
## Notes
Final failure narrative entries represent evolution toward more frequent successful flights with occasional anomalies rather than catastrophic failures.
Page 136
View PDF ↗## Dates
- 2 Mar 65 (Incident 240)
- 27 May 65 (Incident 251)
- 12 Jul 65 (Incident 257)
- 25 Oct 65 (Incident 267)
- 4 Mar 66 (Incident 276)
- 19 Mar 66 (Incident 279)
- 7 Apr 66 (Incident 281)
## Observations
### Incident 240 - 156D
- Booster fuel pump pressure dropped at 0.36 seconds
- Fuel prevalue failure caused booster thrust loss
- Vehicle fell back on launch pad
- Destroyed at 3.26 seconds
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 1
### Incident 251 - 68D/ABRES (Tennis Match)
- Booster gas-generator loop failure
- Decreasing booster performance after 116 seconds
- Explosion in thrust section at 122 seconds
- Further vehicle breakup at 218 seconds
- Destruct sent at 293 seconds
- Debris impacted near intended ground track
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4
### Incident 257 - SLV-3/Agena D (White Pine)
- Circuit board failure caused by excessive vibrations
- Sustainer shutdown at BECO
- Atlas booster engines did not separate immediately
- Separation occurred ~50 seconds later after event timer recycled
- Agena separated and ignited at ~198 seconds
- Wild uprange movements on IP display by 255 seconds
- Destruct at 257 seconds
- Flight Phase 2 & 3, Response Mode 4 & 5
### Incident 267 - SLV-3 (GTV-6)
- Agena engine shutdown after ~1 second of operation
- Propellants ceased flowing but helium pressurization continued
- Propellant tanks burst
- Flight Phase 3, Response Mode 4
### Incident 276 - 303D (Eternal Camp)
- Track and rate lock lost at 88 seconds
- Vehicle spiraling reported by skyscreen operator at ~112 seconds
- Hydraulic system failure during staging sequence
- Loss of vehicle stability at 153 seconds
- Sustainer engine shutdown at 194 seconds
- Impact point initially appeared to stop ~800 miles downrange
- Rapidly varying pitch, roll, yaw rates and engine shutdown indicated by telemetry
- Final impact estimated 976 miles downrange, 3° left of nominal track
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 5
### Incident 279 - 304D (White Bear)
- Reentry vehicle impacted 82 miles beyond target point
- Head suppression valve failed to close at SECO
- LOX tank vented through sustainer chamber
- Added impulse in process
- Flight Phase 2, Response Mode 5
### Incident 281 - 184D (AC-8)
- Flight appeared normal until second Centaur burn
- Both Centaur engines started but one could not maintain thrust
- Thrust imbalance resulted in tumbling
- Fuel starvation and early thrust termination followed
- Flight Phase 4, Response Mode 4T
Page 137
View PDF ↗## Dates
- 3 May 66 (Incident 284)
- 17 May 66 (Incident 287)
- 10 Jun 66 (Incident 294)
- 13 Jul 66 (Incident 298)
- 8 Aug 66 (Incident 300)
- 20 Sep 66 (Incident 306)
- 11 Oct 66 (Incident 308)
- 26 Oct 66 (Incident 310)
## Observations
### Incident 284 - 208D (Crab Claw)
- High engine-compartment temperatures first noted at 41 seconds
- Sustainer pitch-actuator feedback-loop failed open at 136 seconds
- Failure occurred a few seconds before planned BECO
- Flight appeared normal to safety officer until roll and pitch rates increased
- IIP apparently stopped at ~155 seconds
- General Dynamics reported vehicle stability not lost until 216 seconds
- Shutdown of sustainer and vernier engines at 235 seconds
- Suspected cause: excessive heating in boat-tail section
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 287 - SLV-3 (GTA-9)
- Vehicle became unstable when B2 pitch control lost at 121 seconds
- Loss of pitch control resulted in pitch-down maneuver >90°
- Guidance control lost at 132 seconds
- After BECO, vehicle stabilized in abnormal attitude
- Vehicle did not follow planned trajectory
- SECO at 280 seconds, VECO at 298 seconds
- Agena separation occurred normally from programmer commands
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 5
### Incident 294 - 96D (Veneer Panel)
- Reentry vehicle undershot target by 20 miles
- Vernier engines shut down early
- Failure caused by abnormal decay of control-bottle helium pressure
- Flight Phase 2.5, Response Mode 4
### Incident 298 - 58D/ABRES (Stony Island)
- Regarded as success
- One of two orbital vehicles failed to orbit
- OV impacted structure door which had not been opened
- Flight Phase 3, Response Mode NA
### Incident 300 - 149F (Busy Ramrod)
- Sustainer engine shut down 27 seconds early
- Caused by fuel depletion
- Unfavorable ratio of propellant usage during booster stage
- Verniers burned to fuel depletion
- Flight Phase 2, Response Mode 4
### Incident 306 - 194D (AC-7)
- Atlas Centaur performance was normal
- Surveyor spacecraft lost stability on way to moon
- Flight Phase 5, Response Mode NA
### Incident 308 - 115F (Low Hill)
- Missile normal until ~85 seconds
- Appeared to lose thrust and breakup
- Several major pieces impacted 32 to 40 miles downrange
- Impact near intended flight line
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4
### Incident 310 - 174D (AC-9)
- Atlas pressurization system anomaly
- Decaying sustainer engine performance
- Early SECO
- No mission objectives compromised
- Flight Phase 2, Response Mode NA
Page 138
View PDF ↗## Dates
- 17 Jan 67 (Incident 318)
- 27 Oct 67 (Incident 344)
- 3 May 68 (Incident 358)
- 10 Aug 68 (Incident 364)
- 16 Aug 68 (Incident 365)
- 16 Nov 68 (Incident 368)
- 24 Feb 69 (Incident 372)
- 10 Oct 69 (Incident 379)
## Observations
### Incident 318 - 148F (Busy Stepson)
- Flight was normal except reentry vehicle failed to separate
- Flight Phase 2.5, Response Mode NA
### Incident 344 - 81F (ABRES/AFSC)
- Various anomalous events occurred early in flight
- Missile appeared to follow intended trajectory until ~24 seconds
- Diverging roll oscillations began at 21.4 seconds
- Pitch and roll stability lost by 24.8 seconds
- At 27.9 seconds: vehicle tumbling at 6.5 degrees/second pitch and yaw, 12 degrees/second roll
- Vehicle lost all thrust and began breakup by 30 seconds
- Fuel cutoff and destruct sent at 35 and 39 seconds respectively
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 358 - 95F (ABRES/AFSC)
- Immediately after liftoff: missile was erratic per telemetered roll and yaw rates
- First 10 seconds: missile yawed hard to left
- Then hard yaw to right, crossed flight line
- Continued toward right destruct line
- Missile apparently pitched up violently
- IIP began moving back toward beach
- Destructed at ~45 seconds
- Altitude ~14,000 feet, downrange distance ~9 miles
- Major pieces impacted <1 mile offshore
- Uprange movement of impact point indicated during last part of thrusting flight
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 5
### Incident 364 - 5104C AC-17 (ATS-D)
- Normal parking orbit achieved
- Centaur restart attempted but thrust could not be maintained
- Inoperative boost pumps caused failure
- Frozen H2O2 line was apparent root cause
- Flight Phase 4, Response Mode NA
### Incident 365 - 7004 SLV-3/Burner II/Agena D (AFSC)
- Atlas performance was normal
- Vehicle failed to achieve orbit
- Protective shroud surrounding second stage failed to separate
- Flight Phase 3, Response Mode 4
### Incident 368 - 56F (ABRES/AFSC)
- Flight was normal through SECO
- Missile then lost attitude control
- Executed hard yaw rate turn throughout and beyond vernier solo phase
- Flight Phase 2.5, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 372 - 5403C AC-20 (Mariner 6 Mars)
- Early Atlas BECO due to staging accelerometer failure
- Compensated for by extended Atlas sustainer and Centaur burns
- Mission was successful
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode NA
### Incident 379 - 98F (ABRES/AFSC)
- Missile appeared normal until ~66 seconds
- Sustainer engine shut down prematurely
- Booster engine apparently continued normally to BECO
- Payload SPDS engine ignited at ~255 seconds
- Destruct sent at 272 seconds
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4
Page 139
View PDF ↗## Dates
- 30 Nov 70 (Incident 388)
- 8 May 71 (Incident 392)
- 4 Dec 71 (Incident 397)
- 20 Feb 75 (Incident 419)
- 12 Apr 75 (Incident 420)
- 29 Sep 77 (Incident 432)
- 29 May 80 (Incident 457)
- 8 Dec 80 (Incident 460)
## Observations
### Incident 388 - 5003C AC-21 (OAO-B)
- Nose fairing failed to separate
- Centaur did not have enough energy to make orbit
- Payload impacted in Africa
- Flight Phase 2, Response Mode 4
### Incident 392 - 5405C AC-24 (Mariner 8 Mars)
- Atlas boost phase was normal
- Shortly after Centaur main-engine start: pitch stabilization lost
- Failure of rate gyro or electrical failure in pitch channel of flight control system
- Vehicle began accelerated nose-down tumbling motion
- Early and erratic main-engine shutdown resulted from propellant starvation
- Mission requirements not met
- Flight Phase 3, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 397 - SLV-3A (Agena)
- Sustainer engine turbine damage during engine start
- Hot gas leaks resulted
- Eventual failure of thrust-section hardware
- Vehicle broke up at 87 seconds
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4
### Incident 419 - 5015D AC-33 (Intelsat IV F-6)
- Atlas booster-section electrical disconnect failed at booster staging
- Harness was pulled apart
- Flight-control avionics unable to maintain vehicle stability
- Missile appeared normal until IP stopped at 200 seconds
- Precautionary destruct sent at 414 seconds
- Flight Phase 2, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 420 - 71F (AFSC)
- Abnormal overpressure at base of missile 620 msec before liftoff
- Vehicle appeared normal until ~45 seconds
- Sustainer manifold and fuel-pump pressures began dropping
- By 61 seconds: both sustainer and vernier engines shut down
- Booster engines continued thrusting until ~123 seconds
- IIP stopped moving, radar operator reported multiple pieces
- Breakup resulted from external explosion in flame bucket
- Explosion damaged thrust section
- Destruct sent at 303 seconds when missile elevation dropped to 5°
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4
### Incident 432 - 5701D AC-43 (Intelsat IVA F-5)
- Leak in booster hot-gas generator at 2.3 seconds
- Fire in thrust section at 36.5 seconds
- Vehicle went into violent maneuver at 54.9 seconds
- Structure failed
- Atlas exploded at 55.8 seconds
- Centaur left intact
- Centaur destroyed by RSO at 61.7 seconds
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 457 - 19F (NOAA-B)
- Failure of turbopump seal
- Fuel entered gear box
- 21% low thrust in B1 booster engine
- Payload inserted into abnormal orbit
- Mission lost
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode NA
### Incident 460 - 68E
- Flight appeared normal until 102.7 seconds
- Lube oil pressure on B2 booster engine suddenly dropped
- Engine shut down at 120.1 seconds
- Guidance shutdown of B1 engine followed 385 msec later
- Asymmetric thrust during shutdown caused yaw and roll rates flight control system could not correct
- Attitude control lost
- Thrusting sustainer pivoted missile to retrofire attitude
- After booster package jettisoned, missile stabilized by 148 seconds
- Sustainer continued thrusting in retrofire mode until 282.9 seconds
- Reentry heating apparently caused sustainer shutdown and vehicle breakup
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 5
Page 140
View PDF ↗## Dates
- 6 Aug 81 (Incident 464)
- 18 Dec 81 (Incident 466)
- 9 Jun 84 (Incident 477)
- 26 Mar 87 (Incident 489)
- 18 Apr 91 (Incident 498)
## Observations
### Incident 464 - 5039D AC-59 (FLTSATCOM)
- Basic mission accomplished
- Three increasingly severe shock events recorded at 56.2, 70.7, and 120.8 seconds
- Structural damage sustained by spacecraft
- Severely limited on-orbit operations
- Flight Phase 1 and 5, Response Mode NA
### Incident 466 - 76E (NAVSTAR VII)
- Shortly after clearing launch tower (~two tower heights altitude)
- B1 engine thrust performance began to decay
- Engine shut down completely by 7.4 seconds
- Unbalanced thrust caused missile to pitch over to right
- Traveled horizontally for ~1 second
- Then pitched toward ground
- Small explosion occurred ~one-third way down
- Larger explosion when missile impacted ground directly behind launch pad
- Impact occurred ~19 seconds after liftoff
- Cause: plugging of gas-generator fuel-cooling parts
- Gas-generator burn-through resulted
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 2
### Incident 477 - 5042G AC-62 (Intelsat V)
- Performance normal until abnormal shock event at Atlas/Centaur separation
- Centaur oxygen tank leak resulted
- Loss of 1483 pounds of LOX during Centaur first burn
- LOX tank pressure fell below LH2 tank pressure
- Collapse of intermediate bulkhead during coast phase
- Bulkhead collapse caused unexpected tumbling forces during coast
- Centaur engines restarted after coast
- Burned only 6 or 7 seconds of planned 90-second burn
- Flight Phase 4, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 489 - 5048G AC-67 (FLTSATCOM F-6)
- Vehicle performance normal until 48.4 seconds
- Vehicle struck by lightning
- Guidance computer commanded hard right turn
- Vehicle breakup resulted from inertial and aerodynamic loads
- RSO sent destruct at 70.7 seconds
- Flight Phase 1, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 498 - 5050 AC-70 (BS-3H COMSAT)
- Atlas performance was normal
- Both Centaur main engines began start sequence properly
- C-1 turbo-machinery decelerated and stopped
- C-1 engine thrust remained at ignition level
- Air entered through stuck-open check valve
- Air liquefied and froze in LH2 pump and gear box of C-1 engine
- Engine prevented from achieving full thrust
- Resulting thrust imbalance caused vehicle to tumble out of control
- Destruct sent ~80 seconds after Centaur ignition
- Flight Phase 3, Response Mode 4T
Page 141
View PDF ↗## Dates
- 22 Aug 92 (Incident 506)
- 25 Mar 93 (Incident 507)
## Observations
### Incident 506 - 5051 AC-71 (Galaxy 1R)
- Centaur engine check valve stuck open
- Air allowed into turbopumps
- Air entering through stuck-open check valve liquefied and froze in LH2 pump and gear box
- Prevented C-1 engine from achieving full thrust
- Destruct sent by RSO ~193 seconds after Centaur ignition
- Same failure experienced by AC-70 launched on 18 Apr 91
- Flight Phase 3, Response Mode 4T
### Incident 507 - 5054 AC-74 (UHF Follow On-1)
- Flight considered successful although below normal Atlas performance
- Low spacecraft apogee: 5000 nm (planned 9225 nm)
- Perigee altitude near nominal at 120 nm
- Loose screw allowed oxygen regulator to go out of adjustment
- Booster-engine thrust dropped to 65% of nominal at 103 seconds
- Booster engines remained attached to sustainer
- Sustainer flew to propellant depletion
- Depletion shutdown of Centaur stage 22 seconds early
- Flight Phase 2 and 5, Response Mode NA
Page 142
View PDF ↗## Organizations
- NASA
- Douglas Aircraft Company
- McDonnell Douglas Corporation
- USAF (Thor IRBM program)
- USN (Vanguard program)
- Hercules (GEM motors manufacturer)
## Dates
- 1959 (Program origin - NASA contract)
- May 13, 1960 (First Delta launch)
- 18 months later (Operational status)
## Observations
### Delta Launch Vehicle Family Overview
- Originated in 1959 with NASA contract to Douglas Aircraft Company
- Now McDonnell Douglas Corporation
- Used components from USAF's Thor IRBM program and USN's Vanguard launch-vehicle program
- Operational 18 months after contract
- First launch May 13, 1960 from Cape Canaveral
- Payload: 179-pound Echo-I passive communications satellite
- Evolved to meet increasing payload demands
- Carries weather, scientific, and communications satellites
- Each modification corresponded to payload capacity increase
### Delta 7925 Configuration (Latest)
- Three-stage liquid-propellant vehicle
- Nine solid-propellant strap-on booster motors
- Stage 1 propellants: RP1 and liquid oxygen
- Stage 2 propellants: nitrogen tetroxide and aerozine 50
- Stage 3: Payload Assist Module (PAM) with solid-propellant motor
- Strap-on boosters: Hercules graphite epoxy motors (GEMs) using HTPB-type solid propellant
- At liftoff: liquid-propellant Stage-1 engine and six of nine GEMs ignited
- Remaining three GEMs ignited ~65 seconds later
### Delta Configurations Summary
Configuration variants listed from original Delta through 7925:
- Major modifications: Stages 0, 1, 2, 3
- Engine replacements and upgrades
- Propellant tank modifications
- Payload fairing enlargements
- Solid rocket motor evolutions (Castor I, II, IVs, NA)
- Transtage engine implementations
Page 143
View PDF ↗## Observations
### Delta Configuration Evolution (Continued)
Configurations 1910-7925 with detailed stage modifications:
**1910, 1913, 1914 Series:**
- Stage 0: Nine Castor IIs employed
- Stage 3 variations: none (1910), TE-364-3 (1913), TE-364-4 (1914)
- Payload Fairing: 96-inch diameter replaced 65-inch
**2310, 2313, 2314 Series:**
- Stage 0: Three Castor IIs employed
- Stage 1: RS-27 replaced MB-3
- Stage 2: TR-201 engine replaced AJ10-118F
- Stage 3 variations: none (2310), TE-364-3 (2313), TE-364-4 (2314)
**2910, 2913, 2914 Series:**
- Stage 0: Nine Castor IIs employed
- Stage 3 variations: none (2910), TE-364-3 (2913), TE-364-4 (2914)
**3910, 3913, 3914 Series:**
- Stage 0: Nine Castor IVs replaced Castor IIs
- Stage 3 variations: none or PAM (3910), TE-364-3 (3913), TE-364-4 (3914)
**3920, 3924 Series:**
- Stage 2: AJ10-118K engine replaced TR-201
- Stage 3 variations: none or PAM (3920), TE-364-4 (3924)
**4920:**
- Stage 0: Castor IVA replaced Castor IV
- Stage 1: MB-3 replaced RS-27
**5920:**
**6925:**
- Stage 1: Tanks lengthened 12 feet
- Stage 3: STAR 48B motor used
- Payload Fairing: Bulbous 114-inch diameter used
**7925 (Latest):**
- Stage 0: GEM replaced Castor IVA
- Stage 1: RS-27A replaced RS-27
Page 144
View PDF ↗## Observations
### Delta Launch Performance Summary (1955-1995)
The entire Delta history through 1995 is depicted in bar-graph form showing:
- Solid block portions of bars: number of launches during calendar year with entirely normal vehicle performance
- Clear white portions at tops of bars: launches that were failures or experienced anomalous behavior
- Every launch with an entry in the response-mode column falls into the anomaly category
- Anomalous behavior did not necessarily prevent mission objective attainment (some, or even all, might still succeed)
### Launch Year Distribution (Graph Data)
Graph shows Delta missions from 1955 through 1995:
- Earliest period (1960): 2-3 launches total, mostly successful
- Peak activity years (1965-1975): 8-12 launches annually
- High anomaly period (1970s): significant proportion of anomalous missions
- Sustained activity (1980s-1990s): 8-11 launches per year with fewer anomalies
- Latest period (1995): approximately 3 launches
- Overall trend: improved reliability in recent years with fewer anomalies proportionally
### Key Observations
- Delta program demonstrates long operational history spanning 35+ years
- Reliability improvements evident in later configurations
- Anomalous events tracked and categorized per response mode classifications
- Distinction made between total mission failure and partial anomalies that still achieve objectives
Page 145
View PDF ↗## Dates
## Organizations
- NASA
- Various payload operators: NOAA, OSO, DOS, INSAT, etc.
## Observations
### Delta Launch History Table (Missions 1-30)
**Early Missions (1960-1962):**
- Mission 1: ECHO I (05/13/60) - DM-19 configuration, Eastern Range, Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5
- Missions 2-11: Mixture of successful and anomalous flights
- TIROS series: Weather satellites with varied performance
- ECHO series: Communications satellites
- TIROSA variants: Various configurations tested
**Mid-Period (1962-1964):**
- Mission 12-30: Increased launch cadence
- DSV-3 series configurations introduced (DSV-3A, DSV-3B, DSV-3C, DSV-3D variants)
- RELAY, SYNCOM, S-series, TIROS, IMPA missions
- Response Mode entries indicate anomalies in some flights
- Most flights achieved operational objectives despite anomalies
- Eastern Range (ER) used exclusively in this period
- Representative configuration column (Rep. Cont.) shows 0 for all early variants, indicating older configurations not representative of contemporary vehicles
### Notable Observations
- Missions 24, 26, 28, 33 had response mode entries (anomalies)
- Mission 25 (SYNCOM A-27): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 5
- All early vehicles employed DSV configurations
- Transition from DM-19 to DSV-3 series represents major upgrade
- Consistent payload diversity from communications to meteorological satellites
Page 146
View PDF ↗## Dates
## Observations
### Delta Launch History Table (Missions 31-76)
**1965-1966 Missions (31-50):**
- Configuration evolution: DSV-3C, DSV-3E variants dominant
- OSO-C (Mission 33): Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2.5 - anomaly recorded
- GEOSA (Mission 34): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2&5
- AE-8, AIMP-D (Missions 38-39): Response Mode NA entries with multiple flight phases
- INTELSAT series introduced (F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4)
- PIONEER series missions
- TOS/TOSO missions on WR (Western Range) vs ER (Eastern Range)
- Increasing diversity of payloads
**1967-1968 Missions (51-65):**
- Response Mode entries for multiple missions indicating continued anomalies
- INTELSAT 111 series launches (multiple F-variants)
- PIONEER series continuation
- TOS-C, TOS-E, TOS-F, TOS-G, TOS series showing WR range usage
- OSO-D, OSO-E, OSO-F series
- ISIS-A, ISIS-B missions
- Configuration transitions from DSV-3E/3L to more advanced variants
- GEOS series missions
**1968-1970 Missions (59-76):**
- Mission 59 (INTELSAT III-A): Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1 - anomaly
- Mission 63 (INTELSAT III-C): Response Mode NA
- Mission 70 (BIOS-D): Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 3&5
- Mission 71 (INTELSAT III-E): Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 3&5
- Mission 73 (PIONEER-E): Response Mode 5, Flight Phase 1
- Mission 76 (TIROS-M): DSV-3L configuration, WR range
### Configuration Trends
- DSV-3L configuration becoming standard in late 1960s
- Mix of ER (Eastern Range) and WR (Western Range) launches
- All missions through this period show Rep. Cont. = 0, indicating older configurations
- Response Mode entries show continuing reliability issues requiring attention
Page 147
View PDF ↗## Dates
## Observations
### Delta Launch History Table (Missions 77-122)
**1970-1971 Missions (77-87):**
- Mission 78 (INTELSAT III-G): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1&5
- Mission 85 (OSO-H): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2&5
- Mission 86 (ITOS-B): Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2 - anomaly
- NATO and INTELSAT series continuations
- IDCSP/A series introduced
- Configuration 900, 1604, 1410 variants introduced
- Continued DSV-3L usage
**1972-1973 Missions (88-99):**
- Mission 96 (ITOS-E): Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 2 - vehicle tumbled anomaly
- Configuration upgrades to 900, 1604, 1410, 1604, 1900, 1914
- TELESAT series (A, B)
- NIMBUS series missions
- EATS-A introduced with 900 configuration
- RAE-B mission (1913 configuration)
- AE-C mission (1900 configuration)
- Most missions show Rep. Cont. = 0
**1974-1976 Missions (100-122):**
- Mission 100 (SKYNET IIA): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 4&5
- Mission 101 (WESTAR-A): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1 - anomaly
- Mission 102 (SMS-A): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1&5 - anomaly
- Mission 103 (WESTAR-B): Response Mode 1 entry
- Mission 106 (SYMPHONIE-A): Configuration 2914, Rep. Cont. = 1 (current configuration)
- Missions 101-122 increasingly show Rep. Cont. = 1, indicating contemporary configurations
- Configuration shifts to 2310, 2313, 2914, 2910, 1410, 1910, 1913
- GOES series introduces (GOES-A)
- SYMPHONIE, MARISAT, PALAPA, LAGEOS missions
- ERTS, SMS, GEOS, COS-B series
- AE-D, AE-E missions
### Configuration Evolution
- Transition from older DSV variants (Rep. Cont. = 0) to 2900-series and 3900-series
- Introduction of contemporary configurations becoming dominant in mid-1970s
- Improved reliability indicated by fewer response mode entries in later missions
Page 148
View PDF ↗## Dates
## Observations
### Delta Launch History Table (Missions 123-168)
**1976-1977 Missions (123-133):**
- Mission 123 (LAGEOS): Configuration 2913, WR range, Rep. Cont. = 1
- Mission 130 (ESRO-GEOS): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5&5 - anomaly
- Configuration 2913, 2914, 2310, 2914 primary variants
- MARISAT, PALAPA, NATO, ITOS-E2, NATOIIIB series
- All contemporary configurations (Rep. Cont. = 1)
- Primarily Eastern Range (ER) with some Western Range (WR) flights
**1977-1979 Missions (134-150):**
- Mission 134 (OTS): Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1, Configuration 3914 - anomaly
- Configuration evolution to 3914, 2914 series
- SIRIO mission (2313 configuration)
- IUE, OTS-2, BSE, GOES, ESRO-GEOS2, ISEE, NIMBUS, NATO, TELESAT missions
- All Rep. Cont. = 1 (contemporary configurations)
- Sustained activity with high success rates
- Payload variety: scientific, communications, weather satellites
**1980-1983 Missions (151-168):**
- Mission 155 (DE): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2&5 - anomaly
- Configuration 3910, 3914, 3913, 3920, 3924 variants dominant
- Mission 162 (WESTAR-V): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1 - anomaly
- SMM, GOES, SBS, INSAT, WESTAR, RCA series
- TELESAT-F, IRAS missions
- Introduction of PAM (Payload Assist Module) configurations
- All flights Rep. Cont. = 1
### Reliability Trends
- Anomalies becoming less frequent
- Few response mode entries compared to earlier periods
- Contemporary configurations stable and mature
- Diverse payload spectrum successfully accommodated
Page 149
View PDF ↗## Dates
## Observations
### Delta Launch History Table (Missions 169-214)
**1983-1986 Missions (169-179):**
- Mission 178 (GOES-G): Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 1, Configuration 3914 - anomaly
- Configuration primary variants: 3924, 3920, 3914
- EXOSAT, GALAXY, TELSTAR, RCA, GOES missions
- L&SAT (Land Satellite) series
- AMPTE mission
- NATO IIID mission
- All Rep. Cont. = 1 (contemporary configurations)
- All flights Eastern Range (ER)
- High success rate with minimal anomalies
**1987-1989 Missions (180-191):**
- DELTA 180, DELTA 181 missions
- GOES-H, PALAPA B2-P missions
- NAVSTAR series introduces (multiple II-1 through II-6 flights)
- BSB-R1 mission
- OOBE mission (5920 configuration, WR)
- LOSAT mission (6920-8 configuration)
- Introduction of 6925 and 6920 configurations for GPS satellites
- All Rep. Cont. = 1
**1990-1992 Missions (192-214):**
- Mission 196 (INSAT-1D): Configuration 4925, ER
- NAVSTAR series continuation (II-7 through II-15)
- ROSAT, INMARSAT missions
- PALAPA B-2R mission
- NATO IVA mission
- AURORA II mission
- Configuration variants: 6920-8, 6920-10, 6925, 4925, 7925
- EUVE, GEOTAIL, SATCOM missions
- COPERNIKUS, NAVSTAR II-16 through II-23
- NATO IVB mission
- GALAXY I-R mission
- All Rep. Cont. = 1
### Configuration Evolution
- Transition to 6900-series and 7900-series for advanced payloads
- 7925 configuration introduced and becoming standard
- GPS (NAVSTAR), communications, and scientific payloads successfully deployed
- Sustained high mission success rate
Page 150
View PDF ↗## Dates
## Observations
### Delta Launch History Table (Missions 215-237)
**1992-1993 Missions (215-224):**
- Mission 228 (KOREASAT): Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 1&5, Configuration 7925 - anomaly
- COPERNIKUS mission (7925)
- NAVSTAR II-16 through II-23 series (7925)
- NATO IVB mission (7925)
- Configuration 7925 established as standard
- All Rep. Cont. = 1 (contemporary configurations)
- Eastern Range (ER) primary launch site
**1994-1995 Missions (225-232):**
- GALAXY I-R mission (7925-8 variant)
- NAVSTAR II-24 (7925)
- WIND mission (7925-10)
- RADAR SAT mission (7920-10)
- X-RAY EXPLORER mission (7920A-10)
- KOREASAT-2 mission (7925)
- NEAR mission (7925-8)
- Configuration variants: 7925, 7925-8, 7925-10, 7920-10, 7920A-10
**1996 Missions (233-237):**
- POLAR mission (7925-10, WR)
- GPS-7 mission (7925-8, ER)
- MSX mission (7920-10, WR)
- GALAXY IX mission (7925A, ER)
- GPS-26 mission (7925-9.5, ER)
- Launches through July 16, 1996
- All Rep. Cont. = 1 (contemporary configurations)
- Mix of ER and WR launch sites
- No response mode entries indicating high reliability in final missions
### Summary Observations
- Delta program achieved 237 launches from 1960-1996
- Configuration evolution from simple DM-19 to advanced 7925 variants
- Transition from older DSV configurations (Rep. Cont. = 0) to contemporary 7900-series
- Overall trend shows increasing reliability and capability
- Final 30+ missions show no anomalies
- Primary payloads: GPS (NAVSTAR), communications, scientific, weather satellites
- Launch operations sustained across 35+ year period
Page 151
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Section D.3.2 Delta Failure Narratives detailing launch failures 1-39 of the Delta program. Technical failure descriptions organized by flight sequence number.
## Dates
- Echo I: 13 May 1960
- Tiros E: 19 June 1962
- S-66: 19 March 1964
- Imp B: 3 October 1964
- Tiros I: 22 January 1965
- OSO-C: 25 August 1965
- GEOS A: 6 November 1965
- AF-ff: 25 May 1966
- AIMP-D: 1 July 1966
## Observations
- Attitude control lost during second stage coast (Echo I)
- BTL guidance system failures causing propellant depletion
- Third-stage motor interruptions and ignition failures
- Orbital insertion failures
- WECO guidance failures
- Coast-control system malfunctions
## Assessments
Multiple failures attributed to guidance systems (BTL, WECO), structural issues (spin table separation), and control system anomalies. Failures resulted in incorrect orbits, orbital altitude deficiencies, and in some cases total loss of payload.
Page 152
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Delta Failure Narratives continuation covering failures 59-86. Detailed technical accounts of launch vehicle malfunctions and their consequences.
## Dates
- Intelsat III A: 18 September 1968
- Intelsat III E: 26 July 1969
- Pioneer E: 27 August 1969
- Intelsat III G: 22 April 1970
- OSO-H: 29 September 1971
- ITOS-B (WTR): 21 October 1971
## Observations
- Loss of rate gyro causing undamped pitch oscillations (Intelsat III A)
- Vehicle pitch down 270°, then up 210°, large yaw maneuvers
- First-stage hydraulics system failure during burnout (Pioneer E)
- Vehicle tumbling and loss of control
- Second-stage separation/ignition occurring while out of control
- Low first-stage velocity causing propellant depletion
- Stage-2 hydraulic-system failure during second-stage burn
- Contamination in oxygen vent valve preventing proper operation
- Bulkhead rupture during second-stage burn
## Assessments
Failures in guidance systems (rate gyro loss), hydraulic systems, and component contamination resulted in loss of vehicle control, tumbling, and in some cases destruction of the second stage or reentry of satellite.
Page 153
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Delta Failure Narratives continuation covering failures 96-178. Technical descriptions of launch vehicle malfunctions affecting orbital insertions and vehicle control.
## Dates
- ITOS-E (WTR): 16 July 1973
- Skynet IIA: 19 January 1974
- WESTAR-B: 13 April 1974
- SMS-A: 17 May 1974
- ESRO-GOES: 20 April 1977
- OTS: 13 September 1977
- DE: 3 August 1981
- WESTAR-V: 9 June 1982
- GOES-G: 3 May 1986
## Observations
- Pump-motor failure during second-stage burn at 490 seconds
- Loss of hydraulic pressure and vehicle tumbling
- Short circuit in second-stage electronics package
- Liquid oxygen pressure line failure
- Booster shroud snagging issues
- Premature third-stage separation
- Motor burnthrough
- Fuel loading deficiency
- Electrical short in first-stage relay box causing premature main-engine shutdown
## Assessments
Failures in hydraulic systems, electrical systems, and structural components (shroud, bolts) resulted in tumbling, loss of control, premature vehicle breakup, improper spacecraft orbits, and orbital degradation. Apogee and perigee deficiencies ranged from 800 to 13,000 miles below planned values.
Page 154
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Delta Failure Narratives final entry (failure 228). Single short narrative for Koreasat mission.
## Dates
## Observations
- One of three air-ignited strap-on GEMs did not separate
- Malfunction in separation explosive transfer system
- Failure to drop GEM motor
- Depletion of second-stage propellants
- Perigee close to nominal
- Apogee 3,450 nm below planned value
- Outside 3-sigma limits
## Assessments
Failure of solid rocket motor separation system resulted in excess vehicle mass and incomplete propellant depletion, causing significant orbital altitude deficiency while maintaining approximate perigee target.
## Redactions
Page contains significant blank space below failure entry 228, indicating section conclusion.
Page 155
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Section D.4 Titan Launch and Performance History. Historical overview of Titan family of launch vehicles from 1955 through mid-1990s. Development narrative and program context.
## Dates
- Titan program established: 1955
- Titan I developed (first two-stage ICBM, silo-based)
- Titan II development (storable propellants, Gemini program)
- Titan III outgrowth of Titan II and Minuteman technology
- 1984: DOD called for space-launch system complementary to Space Shuttle
- Titan IV program began as 10-vehicle short-term program
- 1986: Challenger accident; program expanded to 41 vehicles
- Titan II SLV designed same time as Titan IV
- 1986: Martin Marietta announced commercial Titan III plans
- December 1989: First commercial Titan III launch
## Organizations
- Martin Company (later Martin Marietta)
- Air Force
- NASA
- DOD (Department of Defense)
## Observations
Titan vehicles represent evolution from ICBM platforms to space launch systems. Titan III derived from Titan II and Minuteman programs. Titan IV expanded from 10 to 41 vehicles following Space Shuttle Challenger accident and policy decision to offload DOD payloads. Commercial Titan III developed with company funds after 1986.
## Assessments
Titan family represents continuous technological refinement using structural and propulsion techniques proven in ballistic missile programs. Program expansion driven by national security payload requirements and Space Shuttle operational constraints.
Page 156
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Table 44 providing summary of Titan vehicle configurations from Gemini through IV. Detailed specifications of vehicle staging, upper stages, and payload fairing characteristics.
## Observations
- **II Gemini**: Titan II ICBM converted to man-rated vehicle
- **IIIA**: Stretched stages 1 and 2, integral Transtage upper stage
- **IIIB**: Same as IIIA except Agena upper stage instead of Transtage
- **34B**: Same as IIIA except stretched stage 1
- **IIIC**: Same as IIIA with added 5½-segment SRMs
- **IIID**: Same as IIIC except no upper stage
- **IIIE**: Same as IIID except Centaur upper stage and 14-foot diameter PLF
- **34D**: Same as 34B with added 5½-segment SRMs, uses Transtage or IUS upper stage
- **II SLV**: Refurbished II ICBM with 10-foot diameter PLF
- **III Commercial**: Same as 34D except stretched stage 2, single or dual carrier, enhanced liquid-rocket engines, 13.1-foot diameter PLF. Can use PAM-D2, Transtage, or TOS upper stage
- **IV**: Same as 34D except stretched stages 1 and 2, 7-segment SRM or 3-segment SRMU, 16.7-foot diameter PLF. Can use IUS or Centaur upper stage
## Assessments
Titan vehicle family demonstrates modular design evolution with progressive stretching of stages, addition of solid rocket motors, and multiple upper-stage options for mission flexibility.
Page 157
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Figure 39 bar graph depicting Titan launch history 1955-1995. Visual representation of launch frequency and failure/anomaly distribution by calendar year.
## Observations
- Solid-block portions indicate launches with entirely normal vehicle performance
- Clear white portions indicate failures or anomalous behavior flights
- Every launch with entry in response mode column falls in failure/anomaly category
- Launches spanning from 1955 to 1995
- Peak launch activity appears in 1960-1970 period with 20-30 missions per year
- Activity decreases to approximately 3-5 launches per year by 1990s
- Failure/anomaly rate appears highest during early program years (1960s-1970s)
- Anomalous behavior did not necessarily prevent mission objective attainment
## Assessments
Graph demonstrates that anomalous behavior did not always result in mission failure. Launch activity peaked during Cold War competition period, declining after space policy shift. Early program showed higher anomaly rates, consistent with technology maturation pattern.
Page 158
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Section D.4.1 Titan Launch History. Table 45 summarizing all Titan and Titan-boosted space-vehicle launches since program beginning. Comprehensive tabular data from launch 1-30, covering 1958-1961.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 12/20/1958 (WS 1) through 02/10/1961 (WS 30).
## Observations
- Launch sequence numbers provided in first column
- Mission/ID identifiers (WS = Weapons System designation)
- Vehicle configurations listed (I with various designations)
- Test ranges listed (ER = Eastern Range)
- Response Modes documented (1, 2, 4, 4T, 5 for failures; blank for successful launches)
- Flight phases identified (1, 2, 2.5 for failure launches)
- Rep. Conf. (Representative Configuration) column shows 0 for all early launches
- Failures include Response Mode 4, 4T, 5, and Mode 2
- Multiple tumbling indicators (T suffix) indicating vehicle instability
## Organizations
## Assessments
Early Titan program (1958-1961) shows 30 launches with approximately 13 experiencing failures or anomalies. Representative Configuration value of 0 indicates early developmental vehicles, not representative of operational vehicles in service.
Page 159
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 31-76 from 1961-1963. Mix of Weapons System tests (WS), operational missions with codenames, and first Titan II launches.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 02/20/1961 through 05/01/1963.
## Observations
- Transition from WS designations to operational mission codenames (SILVER SADDLE, BIG SAM, DOUBLE MARTINI, BLUE GANDER, etc.)
- Introduction of Titan II configuration beginning launch 54 (03/16/1962)
- Test ranges: ER (Eastern Range) and WR (Western Range)
- Codenames suggest military/intelligence operational nature
- Failure modes: 1, 2, 4, 4T, 5
- Flight phases: 1, 2, 2.5, 4
- Rep. Conf. column shows 0 for all entries (developmental vehicles)
- Notable failures include tumbling vehicles (4T designation)
- Response Mode 5 failure documented for THREAD NEEDLE (06/20/1963)
## Organizations
Mission codenames suggest Air Force operational control.
## Assessments
Period shows increasing operational mission frequency with named payloads and codename assignments. Transition from Titan I to Titan II represents significant vehicle evolution. Failure rates remain steady with various response modes indicating different failure mechanisms.
Page 160
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 77-122 from 1963-1965. Includes first Titan III space vehicle (SV) and initial Gemini program launches.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 05/09/1963 through 06/30/1965.
## Observations
- Introduction of Space Vehicle (SV) designation beginning launch 99 (SV: GEMINI GT-1)
- First Titan III vehicle: launch 104 (09/01/1964) - SV (first Titan III)
- IIIA configuration with Transtage upper stage documented
- Gemini program launches (GT-1 through GT-4 visible)
- LES (Lincoln Experimental Satellite) missions on Titan III
- Mix of military codename missions (FLYING FROG, FIRETRUCK, etc.) and SV designations
- Western Range (WR) and Eastern Range (ER) launches
- Rep. Conf. values: 0 for early vehicles, 1 beginning with IIIC configuration (Transtage) launches
- Failure modes: 1, 2, 4, 4T, 5, and NA (not applicable)
- Flight phases: 1, 2, 2.5, 4, 4&5
## Assessments
Period marks significant transition to human-rated Gemini program use of Titan II, and introduction of Titan III with upper-stage capability. Rep. Conf. = 1 begins for vehicles representative of operational configurations in use.
Page 161
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View PDF ↗Continuation of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 123-168 from 1965-1967. Continued Gemini program, IIIC and IIID configurations, and classified AFSC missions with Agena D upper stages.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 07/21/1965 through 10/25/1967.
## Observations
- Continued Gemini program launches (GT-5 through GT-12)
- IIIC configuration Transtage launches with designations IIIC (66-001) through (66-007)
- Multiple classified AFSC (Air Force Systems Command) missions with Agena D upper stages
- Classification indicated by "1118/AGENA D (238)" or similar designations
- IDCSP (Initial Defense Communications Satellite Program) missions documented
- Vela satellite missions noted (VELA/RSCH designation)
- Gemini GT-1 through GT-12 span from April 1964 to November 1966
- Rep. Conf. values: 0 for Gemini missions, 1 for IIIC/IIID variants and classified missions
- Response modes: 1, 4, 4T, NA
- Flight phases: 0, 1, 2, 2.5
- No 4T (tumbling) failures noted for Gemini missions (all successful)
## Assessments
Period demonstrates mature Gemini program operations with 100% success rate, concurrent with classified AFSC operations on Titan III variants. Agena D upper stage became primary upper-stage configuration for classified missions.
Page 162
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 169-214 from 1967-1972. Continued AFSC classified missions, IDCSP, VELA, and other DOD space vehicle launches.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 12/05/1967 through 03/17/1972.
## Observations
- Dominance of classified AFSC missions with 1118/AGENA D upper stage variants
- SV-IDCSP, SV-VELA/RSCH, SV-LES/OV, SV-TACCOM, SV-DSCS, SV-DOD missions documented
- Introduction of IIIC and IIID configurations with Transtage upper stages
- GLORY TRIP series missions noted (4T, 10T, 5T, 8T, 18T, 26T, 39T designations)
- Mission 177: SV-IDCSP (06/13/1968) Response Mode 1, Flight Phase not indicated
- IIIC-17/Trans., IIIC-15/Trans., IIIC-18/Trans., IIIC-19/Trans. variants launched
- Rep. Conf. values: 0 for Titan II/GLORY TRIP missions, 1 for IIIC/IIID classified variants
- Response modes: 1, 3.5&5, 4, NA
- One response mode 4, phase 3 noted for AFSC mission 212 (02/16/1972)
- Flight phases: 2, 3, 3.5&5
## Assessments
Period represents peak AFSC classified operations on Titan III platforms. Continued operational reliability with documented failures/anomalies in flight phases 2-3. GLORY TRIP series appears to be unclassified test program.
Page 163
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 215-260 from 1972-1976. Continued classified AFSC/SV-DOD missions, IIIC/IIID Transtage and Centaur configurations, and civil space missions (Viking, Voyager, HELIOS).
## Dates
Launch dates range from 05/20/1972 through 08/06/1976.
## Observations
- M-series test/evaluation launches (M2-1, M2-10, M2-14, M2-27, M2-31)
- Major civil space missions: Viking (02/11/1974), HELIOS-A (12/10/1974), HELIOS-B (01/15/1976), Voyager (08/20/1975, 09/09/1975)
- SV-DSP, SV-DSCS, SV-ATS-F missions continuing
- IIIE/CENT-1T and IIIE/CENT. D-1T configurations with Centaur upper stage introduced
- Transtage variants documented (IIIC-24 through IIIC-30)
- Rep. Conf. values: 0 for Titan II and test missions, 1 for classified variants
- Response modes: NA, 2, 2.5, 4, 4T, 5
- Flight phases: 1, 2, 2.5, 3, 4
- Mission 268: SV-VOYAGER (TC-6) 09/05/1977 Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2
## Assessments
Period demonstrates successful launch of major civil planetary missions (Viking Mars lander, Voyager deep space probes, Helios solar probes). Centaur upper stage introduced for high-energy missions. Classified operations continued in parallel with civil program.
Page 164
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Continuation of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 261-306 from 1976-1985. Continued AFSC classified missions, SV-DOD, SV-DSP, and other military space vehicle launches. Introduction of 34D configuration.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 09/15/1976 through 08/28/1985.
## Observations
- Predominant 1118/AGENA D (various designations 23B through 34B) Agena upper stage missions
- 34D configuration introduced and became primary variant for latter half of period
- IIID (23D series) Transtage missions continuing
- SV-DOD, SV-DSP, SV-DSCS (Defense Satellite Communications System) missions documented
- Response modes: NA, 2, 4, 4T
- Flight phases: 0, 1, 2
- One 4T tumbling failure noted: mission 306 (08/28/1985) AFSC 34D-7, Response Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1
- One NA mode with phase 2 failure: mission 261 (09/15/1976)
- Rep. Conf. values: 1 throughout (all representative configurations)
- Launch range: WR (Western Range) predominant
## Assessments
Period characterized by highly reliable 34D configuration becoming operational standard. Documented failures minimal with only one tumbling event. Transition from Agena to 34D variant marks maturation to operational baseline.
Page 165
View PDF ↗Page Description
View PDF ↗Final portion of Table 45 Titan Launch History covering launches 307-339 from 1986-1996. Transition to Titan IV (TIV) variants with Centaur upper stages, classified DOD missions, and commercial/civil missions.
## Dates
Launch dates range from 04/18/1986 through 07/02/1996.
## Observations
- Introduction of Titan IV (TIV) beginning mission 315 (06/14/1989): first T-IV with IV-1/IUS configuration
- 34D configuration continues for AFSC missions through 1989
- TIV-CENTAUR upper stage variants introduced (K-series designations: K-10, K-7, K-9, K-14, K-23, K-19, K-21, K-16, K2)
- II/SLV configuration for AFSC missions introduced
- TIV-IUS (Inertial Upper Stage) variant documented
- Notable civil missions: MARS OBS. (09/25/1992), CLEMENTINE (01/25/1994), LANDSAT 6 (10/05/1993)
- Response modes: NA, 4, 0
- Flight phases: 0, 1, 2, 2.5, 5
- Mission 328 (AFMC 08/02/1993) IV (K-11) Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 0
- Mission 329 (LANDSAT 6 10/05/1993) II/SLV Response Mode 4, Flight Phase 2
- Mission 319 (SV-INTELSAT VI 03/14/1990) Response Mode NA, Flight Phase 2.5&5
- Rep. Conf. values: 1 throughout (all representative configurations)
- Launch range: ER, WR
## Assessments
Period marks transition to modern Titan IV with enhanced Centaur capability. Documented operational successes with major civil planetary and Earth observation missions. Minimal documented failures with proper response mode classification. Program extends through mid-1996 with 339 total launches documented.
Page 166
View PDF ↗# Page 166 - Titan Failure Narratives (1959-1960)
## page_description
Continuation of Titan I failure narratives. Documents 8 individual launch failures with technical details on root causes and flight phase termination points. Includes narrative entries 7-25.
## observations
- Entry 7 (B-5, 14 Aug 59): Premature umbilical disconnection caused engine shutdown at pad
- Entry 8 (C-3, 12 Dec 59): Missile self-destructed just before liftoff
- Entry 10 (C-4, 5 Feb 60): Structural failure in transition section during pitch program; nose cone separation and aerodynamic instability
- Entry 12 (C-1, 8 Mar 60): Gas-generator valve failure prevented Stage-II ignition
- Entry 13 (G-5, 22 Mar 60): Premature vernier engine shutdown resulted in 38-mile short impact
- Entry 14 (C-5, 8 Apr 60): Stage II turbopump malfunction caused data loss ~50 seconds after ignition
- Entry 20 (J-2, 1 Jul 60): Hydraulic power loss to engine actuators caused control failure; missile destroyed by RSO at 11 seconds
- Entry 21 (J-4, 28 July 60): Stage I terminated prematurely at 101 seconds; Stage II engine failed to start due to insufficient turbopump head pressure
- Entry 22 (J-7, 10 Aug 60): Stage II engine shutdown 0.17 seconds early; 107-mile short impact
- Entry 25 (G-8, 29 Sep 60): Low-level sensor malfunction caused premature Stage I shutdown; 3600 miles short of 8700-mile target
## dates
- 14 Aug 1959 (B-5)
- 12 Dec 1959 (C-3)
- 5 Feb 1960 (C-4)
- 8 Mar 1960 (C-1)
- 22 Mar 1960 (G-5)
- 8 Apr 1960 (C-5)
- 1 Jul 1960 (J-2)
- 28 Jul 1960 (J-4)
- 10 Aug 1960 (J-7)
- 29 Sep 1960 (G-8)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.4.1 of the report
Page 167
View PDF ↗# Page 167 - Titan Failure Narratives (1960-1962)
## page_description
Continuation of Titan I launch failure narratives. Documents 8 individual failures (entries 28-58) spanning December 1960 to July 1962, with technical root-cause analysis and flight termination details.
## observations
- Entry 28 (J-9, 20 Dec 60): Gas generator failure prevented Stage II ignition
- Entry 29 (J-10, 20 Jan 61): Erroneous umbilical disconnect signal prevented Stage-II operation; 420-mile impact
- Entry 32 (J-12, 3 Mar 61): Stage-II pump drive assembly failure after 54-second burn; 730-mile impact
- Entry 34 (J-15, 31 Mar 61): Booster shutdown at 74 seconds; missile tumbled and broke up
- Entry 37 (M-1, 24 Jun 61): Stage II hydraulic power loss during Stage I flight caused control loss and tumbling
- Entry 42 (M-3, 7 Sep 61): Guidance computer transient at 218.35 seconds caused 20-mile short, 2.8-mile left miss
- Entry 45 (M-4, 6 Oct 61): One-bit velocity accumulation error caused 86-mile short, 14-mile right miss
- Entry 50 (M-6, 15 Dec 61): Stage II start signal not generated; no ignition
- Entry 51 (I, 20 Jan 62): Self-destruct after Stage 2 ignition failure; fuel-cutoff at 248 seconds
- Entry 53 (I, 23 Feb 62): Self-destruct after Stage 2 ignition failure; fuel-cutoff at 240 seconds
- Entry 56 (N-1, 7 Jun 62): Subnormal sustainer performance from reduced oxidizer flow; 1100-mile impact
- Entry 58 (N-4, 25 July 62): Fuel leak between thrust chamber valve and injector caused 50% thrust reduction; 2888 miles short
## dates
- 20 Dec 1960 (J-9)
- 20 Jan 1961 (J-10)
- 3 Mar 1961 (J-12)
- 31 Mar 1961 (J-15)
- 24 Jun 1961 (M-1)
- 7 Sep 1961 (M-3)
- 6 Oct 1961 (M-4)
- 15 Dec 1961 (M-6)
- 20 Jan 1962 (I)
- 23 Feb 1962 (I)
- 7 Jun 1962 (N-1)
- 25 Jul 1962 (N-4)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.4.1; RSO = Range Safety Officer
Page 168
View PDF ↗# Page 168 - Titan Failure Narratives (1962-1963)
## page_description
Continuation of Titan I and Titan II failure narratives. Documents 9 individual failures (entries 63-80) spanning December 1962 to May 1963, including first Titan II mission and mission-specific codenames.
## observations
- Entry 63 (Yellow Jacket, 5 Dec 62): Missile command destructed at 250 seconds; no other data
- Entry 64 (N-11, 6 Dec 62): Stage I shutdown 11.4 seconds early; no velocity-dependent discretes issued; Stage II shutdown prematurely from oxidizer bootstrap-line failure
- Entry 66 (N-15, 10 Jan 63): Stage II terminated by backup SECO after 34 seconds due to low thrust from reduced oxidizer flow through gas-generator injector; 556-mile impact
- Entry 68 (N-16, 6 Feb 63): Oxidizer depletion before normal SECO; 71 miles short
- Entry 69 (Awful Tired, 16 Feb 63): Self-destruct at 56 seconds at 18,000 feet altitude due to loss of roll control from improper umbilical release and vehicle electrical control loss
- Entry 70 (N-18, 21 Mar 63): Vernier #2 received no commands and gimbaled erratically; 4-5 mile short impact
- Entry 74 (N-21, 19 Apr 63): Stage II engine shutdown from oxidizer bootstrap-line failure
- Entry 76 (Mares Tail, 1 May 63): First-stage engine failed at liftoff or shutdown immediately; missile rose 50 feet then fell uprange 7.5 seconds after liftoff
- Entry 77 (N-14, 9 May 63): Oxidizer leak caused premature Stage II shutdown and short impact
- Entry 80 (N-20, 29 May 63): Fuel leak in Stage I engine compartment at ignition caused fire; Stage I destroyed at 52 seconds; Stage II destroyed by RSO
## dates
- 5 Dec 1962 (Yellow Jacket)
- 6 Dec 1962 (N-11)
- 10 Jan 1963 (N-15)
- 6 Feb 1963 (N-16)
- 16 Feb 1963 (Awful Tired)
- 21 Mar 1963 (N-18)
- 19 Apr 1963 (N-21)
- 1 May 1963 (Mares Tail)
- 9 May 1963 (N-14)
- 29 May 1963 (N-20)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.4.1; SECO = Second-stage Engine Cutoff; RSO = Range Safety Officer
Page 169
View PDF ↗# Page 169 - Titan Failure Narratives (1963-1965)
## page_description
Continuation of Titan I and Titan II failure narratives. Documents 8 individual failures (entries 81-120) spanning June 1963 to June 1965, including advanced staging and transtage operations.
## observations
- Entry 81 (Thread Needle, 20 June 63): Titan II. Abnormally long staging event due to low second-stage thrust from reduced oxidizer flow through gas-generator injector; slow left turn noted at 480 seconds; destruct at 532 seconds after track loss
- Entry 82 (Silver Spur, 16 July 63): Titan I. Normal through first-stage cutoff; separation occurred but second-stage failed to ignite
- Entry 85 (Polar Route, 30 Aug 63): Titan I. Flight normal through first and second-stage thrusting; at SECO, vernier engines shut down due to gas generator shutdown
- Entry 89 (Fire Truck, 9 Nov 63): Titan II. Missile tumbled out of control at 130 seconds, then broke up
- Entry 104 (IHA 65-210, 1 Sep 64): Titan IIIA. Nominal through first transtage burn; transtage propellant-tank pressurization system failed causing thrust reduction; 2700-mile impact
- Entry 107 (West Wind I, 8 Dec 64): Titan I. First-stage power-level malfunction combined with guidance deviations caused missile to drift far left then overcorrect far right, passing north of Midway Island
- Entry 109 (West Wind III, 14 Jan 65): Titan I. First-stage apparently normal, but second stage failed to ignite
- Entry 112 (West Wind II, 5 Mar 65): Titan I. Impact 80 miles short due to propellant depletion
- Entry 116 (Card Deck, 30 Apr 65): Titan I. IP slowed and stopped at 100 seconds due to turbopump failure; self-destruct at 115 seconds; 115 miles offshore impact
- Entry 120 (Gold Fish, 14 Jun 65): Titan II. Vehicle failed during vernier solo phase due to loss of vernier nozzle
## dates
- 20 Jun 1963 (Thread Needle)
- 16 Jul 1963 (Silver Spur)
- 30 Aug 1963 (Polar Route)
- 9 Nov 1963 (Fire Truck)
- 1 Sep 1964 (IHA 65-210)
- 8 Dec 1964 (West Wind I)
- 14 Jan 1965 (West Wind III)
- 5 Mar 1965 (West Wind II)
- 30 Apr 1965 (Card Deck)
- 14 Jun 1965 (Gold Fish)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.4.1; SECO = Second-stage Engine Cutoff; IP = Impact Point; IHA = Inertial Upper Stage
Page 170
View PDF ↗# Page 170 - Titan Failure Narratives (1965-1967)
## page_description
Continuation of Titan II and Titan III failure narratives. Documents 8 individual failures (entries 127-160) spanning September 1965 to April 1967, including IIIC variants and Agena D upper stage flights.
## observations
- Entry 127 (Bold Guy, 21 Sep 65): Titan II. Second stage shut down immediately after start due to erroneous guidance command
- Entry 128 (IIIC 65-212, 15 Oct 65): Titan IIIC. Normal through transtage second ignition and burn; one transtage engine chamber failed to shutdown completely causing pitch-up deviation, loss of control, vehicle tumbling, and unplanned orbit
- Entry 131 (Cross Fire, 30 Nov 65): Titan II. Rate and track beacons lost between 208-214 seconds; radar tracked to 360-380 seconds indicating ballistic trajectory veering right; loss of control from fuel leak at crossover manifold
- Entry 134 (IIIC 66-001, 21 Dec 65): Titan IIIC, Vehicle 8. Normal through transtage second burn shutdown; attitude control system engine failed to shutdown following vernier burn causing fuel depletion and loss of attitude control
- Entry 135 (Sea Rover, 22 Dec 65): Titan II. Erratic movement left and right of nominal during second-stage burn with little downrange movement; automatic fuel cutoff at 396 seconds; failure from improper sustainer actuator rigging exceeding control-system capability
- Entry 142 (Silver Bullet, 24 May 66): Titan II. Normal flight except R/V did not separate causing 20-mile uprange miss
- Entry 148 (IIIC 66-005, 26 Aug 66): Titan IIIC, Vehicle 12. Payload fairing failed during Stage-0 powered flight at 79 seconds; violent maneuvering and self-destruct (ISDS)
- Entry 159 (Glamour Girl, 12 Apr 67): Titan II. First-stage normal; yaw-rate gyro failure 15 seconds into second-stage caused violent roll and pitch maneuvers; 660-mile impact
- Entry 160 (Busy Tailor, 26 Apr 67): Titan IIIB/Agena D. Normal through first-stage cutoff and separation; fuel-line blockage 15 seconds into second-stage reduced thrust to half; IP moved slightly farther downrange, remained on azimuth until 300-second loss of signal; 600-mile impact
## dates
- 21 Sep 1965 (Bold Guy)
- 15 Oct 1965 (IIIC 65-212)
- 30 Nov 1965 (Cross Fire)
- 21 Dec 1965 (IIIC 66-001)
- 22 Dec 1965 (Sea Rover)
- 24 May 1966 (Silver Bullet)
- 26 Aug 1966 (IIIC 66-005)
- 12 Apr 1967 (Glamour Girl)
- 26 Apr 1967 (Busy Tailor)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.4.1; R/V = Reentry Vehicle; IP = Impact Point; ISDS = Inadvertent-Separation Destruct System
Page 171
View PDF ↗# Page 171 - Titan Failure Narratives (1970-1993)
## page_description
Continuation of Titan III, Titan IIIE, and Titan IV failure narratives. Documents 8 individual failures (entries 200-329) spanning November 1970 to October 1993, spanning multiple decades of operational flights and advanced variants.
## observations
- Entry 200 (IIIC-19, 6 Nov 70): Vehicle 19. All booster systems normal; transtage guidance anomaly during coast prior to second burn resulted in improper orbit
- Entry 212 (IIIB/Agena D AFSC, 16 Feb 72): After normal Titan IIIB boost phase, Agena failed to ignite; payload impacted 1500 miles downrange
- Entry 232 (Titan IIIE #E1, 11 Feb 74): All Titan booster functions and Centaur separation proper; Centaur stage failed to ignite
- Entry 244 (TIIIC-25, 20 May 75): Vehicle 25. All systems satisfactory through Stage II/III separation; IMU power supply failed ~230 milliseconds after staging discrete; transtage tumbled, first transtage burn failed; left in parking orbit
- Entry 252 (TIIIC-29, 14 Dec 75): Vehicle 29. All launch vehicle objectives met; satellite propulsion system malfunction put satellite in uncontrollable position
- Entry 261 (IIIB/Agena D AFSC, 15 Sep 76): Stage-2 engine failed to respond to shutdown commands and burned to propellant depletion; hard contaminant thought to have blocked fuel valve
- Entry 268 (23E-6/Centaur D-1T, 5 Sep 77): Regarded as success despite low second-stage velocity, probably from detached line diffuser lodged on top of prevalve
- Entry 272 (TIIIC-17, 25 Mar 78): Vehicle 35. Stage-2 hydraulic system over-pressurized 16.4 seconds beyond Stage-2 start; system burst after 125 seconds; pressure dropped to zero, vehicle tumbled, guidance shutdown second stage; RSO destruct at 630 seconds
- Entry 306 (34D AFSC, 28 Aug 85): First-stage engine suffered three major anomalies: oxidizer leak (165 lb/sec) at 110 sec, internal fuel leak (30 lb/sec) at 213 sec in S/A-1 downstream of combustion chamber
- Entry 307 (34D AFSC, 18 Apr 86): SRM No. 2 insulation and case debonded 8.8 seconds after liftoff causing case rupture; core vehicle destroyed by fragments
- Entry 311 (34D-3/Transtage, 2 Sep 88): Transtage pressurization system failed from damage to upper fuel tank and pressurization lines; 1,340-pound leak during park orbit; insufficient helium for second burn; payload left in geostationary transfer orbit
- Entry 315 (Titan IV-1/IUS, 14 June 89): One Stage-1 engine failed late in burn; other engine gimbaled sufficiently to maintain control; trajectory inaccuracies compensated during Stage-2; mission success
- Entry 319 (Commercial Titan, 14 Mar 90): Payload separation system miswired; single satellite harness miswired, satellite never received separation signal; PKM and satellite did not separate from Stage II; ground controllers separated satellite hours later but PKM remained attached
- Entry 328 (IV, 2 Aug 93): SRM#1 leak at 99.9 seconds enveloped vehicle in propellant gases; vehicle disintegrated 1.6 seconds later from inadvertent-separation destruct system activation; destruct transmitted at 104.5 seconds
- Entry 329 (II/SLV Landsat 6, 5 Oct 93): Following successful Titan-II second-stage burn and payload separation, apogee-kick motor failed to ignite and circularize highly-elliptical orbit; Landsat and Titan II followed ballistic trajectory back into atmosphere; burnup occurred
## dates
- 6 Nov 1970 (IIIC-19)
- 16 Feb 1972 (IIIB/Agena D)
- 11 Feb 1974 (Titan IIIE #E1)
- 20 May 1975 (TIIIC-25)
- 14 Dec 1975 (TIIIC-29)
- 15 Sep 1976 (IIIB/Agena D AFSC)
- 5 Sep 1977 (23E-6/Centaur D-1T)
- 25 Mar 1978 (TIIIC-17)
- 28 Aug 1985 (34D AFSC)
- 18 Apr 1986 (34D AFSC)
- 2 Sep 1988 (34D-3/Transtage)
- 14 June 1989 (Titan IV-1/IUS)
- 14 Mar 1990 (Commercial Titan)
- 2 Aug 1993 (IV)
- 5 Oct 1993 (II/SLV Landsat 6)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.4.1; S/A = Subassembly; IMU = Inertial Measurement Unit; SECO = Second-stage Engine Cutoff; RSO = Range Safety Officer; IUS = Inertial Upper Stage; PKM = Payload Kick Motor
Page 172
View PDF ↗# Page 172 - Thor Launch and Performance History Introduction
## page_description
Introductory section for Thor launch history. Includes D.5 heading and Figure 40 (Thor Launch Summary bar graph spanning 1955-1995).
## observations
- Bar graph shows Thor launch data from calendar years 1955-1995
- Solid black portions represent launches with entirely normal vehicle performance
- Clear white portions represent launches with failures or anomalous behavior
- Launch rate peaked in 1959-1960 period with approximately 30 launches per year
- Significant decline in launch rate after early 1960s
- Some anomalous launches continued throughout operational period through 1995
- Annotated legend: "Failure/Anomaly" and "Normal Performance"
## assessments
The Thor program experienced substantial early difficulties in 1957-1958 period with high anomaly rates, followed by improved reliability through 1959-1962. Late-period operations (1970-1995) show significantly reduced launch rates with occasional anomalies.
## references
Entire Thor history is depicted in bar-graph form in Figure 40. Launch data from calendar years 1955-1995 inclusive. Section D.5 heading indicates this section covers Thor and Thor-boosted vehicle history, excluding Delta variants.
## notes
Document dated 9/10/96 with page number 164 and RTI attribution.
Page 173
View PDF ↗# Page 173 - Thor and Thor-Boosted Launch History (Section D.5.1) and Table 46 Start
## page_description
Introduction to Thor launch history data and beginning of Table 46 Thor Launch History. Explains methodology for response mode classification and vehicle configuration tracking. Table begins with launches 1-41 (January 1957 - May 1959).
## page_description_continued
## observations
- Response Mode column uses codes 1-5 and NA, with 'T' suffix indicating vehicle tumble
- Successful launches shown by blank in Response Mode column
- Launch configurations include: WS (Weapons System), ABLE series (variants I, II, III), PIONEER series
- Test Range: ER (Eastern Range) for all 41 launches shown
- Early launches (1957-1958) show high anomaly rate with many Mode 4, 5, and 1 (pad failures)
- Later launches (1958-1959) show improving success rate with more blank response modes
- Vehicle configurations evolve from basic WS to ABLE-series variants
## dates
- 25 Jan 1957 (Launch 1, WS 101)
- 19 Apr 1957 (Launch 2, WS 102)
- 21 May 1957 (Launch 3, WS 103)
- Through 22 May 1959 (Launch 41, WS 184)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references throughout. Explanation of response modes (1 through 5 and NA) indicates RTI analysis of failure classification. Mode 3 or 4 failures with 'T' suffix indicate vehicle tumbled. Section D.5.1 designation indicates this is subsection 1 of D.5 (Thor History).
## notes
Document dated 9/10/96 with page number 165 and RTI attribution.
Page 174
View PDF ↗# Page 174 - Table 46 Thor Launch History Continuation (Launches 42-85)
## page_description
Continuation of Table 46 Thor Launch History. Tabular data for launches 42-85 spanning June 1959 through February 1965. Includes mission names, dates, vehicle configurations, test ranges, response modes, and flight phases.
## observations
- Launch 42 (6/11/59): WS, ABLE II (137), blank mode (success)
- Launch 44 (6/29/59): WS 194, Mode NA, Flight Phase 1.5
- Launch 45 (7/21/59): WS 203, Mode 3, Flight Phase 1
- Launch 59 (12/01/59): WS 254, Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1 (tumble)
- Launch 68 (8/18/60): COURIER-1A, ABLE-STAR (262), Mode 4T, Flight Phase 1 (tumble)
- Launch 70 (11/30/60): TRANSIT-3A, ABLE-STAR (283), Mode 4, Flight Phase 1
- Launch 75 (1/24/62): COMPOSITE-1, ABLE-STAR (311), Mode 5, Flight Phase 2
- Launch 77 (5/10/62): ANNA-1A, ABLE-STAR (314), Mode 4, Flight Phase 2
- Launch 81 (3/24/64): ASSET ASV-2 (240), Mode 4, Flight Phase 2
- Progression of mission names: PIONEER, TRANSIT, COMPOSITE, ANNA, ASSET variants (ASV, AEV)
- All launches on ER (Eastern Range)
- Vehicle configurations evolve from ABLE variants to ABLE-STAR variants starting ~1960
- SLV II configuration appears by 1964 (Launch 84)
## dates
## references
Table 46 continuation; Representative Configuration column (Rep. Conf.) all show '0' indicating non-current configurations as of report date (1996).
Page 175
View PDF ↗# Page 175 - Table 46 Thor Launch History Continuation (Launches 42-85, Tabular Format)
## page_description
Reformatted tabular continuation of Table 46 Thor Launch History showing launches 42-85 in structured table format. Columns: No., Mission/ID, Launch Date, Vehicle Configuration, Test Range, Response Mode, Flight Phase, Rep. Conf.
## observations
Complete tabular data for launches 42-85 spanning 6/11/59 to 2/23/65:
- Launch 42 (WS, 6/11/59): ABLE II (137), ER, blank mode
- Launch 44 (WS, 6/29/59): 194, ER, Mode NA, Phase 1.5
- Launch 45 (WS, 7/21/59): 203, ER, Mode 3, Phase 1
- Launch 52 (TRANSIT 1A, 9/17/59): ABLE (136), ER, Mode 4, Phase 2.5
- Launch 59 (WS, 12/01/59): 254, ER, Mode 4T, Phase 1
- Launch 64 (PIONEER-5, 3/11/60): ABLE (219), ER, blank mode
- Launch 68 (COURIER-1A, 8/18/60): ABLE-STAR (262), ER, Mode 4T, Phase 1
- Launch 70 (TRANSIT-3A, 11/30/60): ABLE-STAR (283), ER, Mode 4, Phase 1
- Launch 75 (COMPOSITE-1, 1/24/62): ABLE-STAR (311), ER, Mode 5, Phase 2
- Launch 77 (ANNA-1A, 5/10/62): ABLE-STAR (314), ER, Mode 4, Phase 2
- Launch 81 (ASSET ASV-2, 3/24/64): 240, ER, Mode 4, Phase 2
- Launch 84 (ASSET AEV-2, 12/08/64): SLV II (247), ER, blank mode
- Launch 85 (ASSET ASV-4, 2/23/65): 248, ER, blank mode
## dates
6/11/59 through 2/23/65
## references
All launches test range ER (Eastern Range). Rep. Conf. column all '0' (not representative of contemporary configuration as of 1996 report).
Page 176
View PDF ↗# Page 176 - Table 46 Thor Launch History Conclusion (Launches 1-41 Summary Table)
## page_description
Summary table format of Table 46 Thor Launch History for launches 1-41. Reformatted from textual list into structured columns: No., Mission/ID, Launch Date, Vehicle Configuration, Test Range, Response Mode, Flight Phase, Rep. Conf.
## observations
Comprehensive launch data for Thor program launches 1-41:
Early launches 1-11 (Jan-Jan 1958): High anomaly rates
- Launch 1 (WS 101, 1/25/57): Mode 1, Phase 1
- Launch 2 (WS 102, 4/19/57): Mode 4, Phase 1
- Launch 3 (WS 103, 5/21/57): Mode 1, Phase 1
- Launch 4 (WS 104, 8/30/57): Mode 4T, Phase 1 (tumble)
- Launch 5 (WS 105, 9/20/57): Mode 4, Phase 1
- Launch 6 (WS 107, 10/3/57): Mode 1, Phase 1
- Launch 7 (WS 108, 10/11/57): Mode 4, Phase 1
- Launch 9 (WS 112, 12/7/57): Mode 5, Phase 1
- Launch 10 (WS 113, 12/19/57): Mode 4, Phase 1.5
- Launch 11 (WS 114, 1/28/58): Mode 5, Phase 1
Mid-period launches 12-25 (Feb-Nov 1958): Mixed success/failure
- Several Mode 4 and 5 anomalies
- Launch 15 (WS 115, 6/4/58): blank mode (success)
- Launch 16 (WS 122, 6/13/58): blank mode (success)
Later launches 26-41 (Nov 1958-May 1959): Improving reliability
- Launch 33 (WS, 3/21/59): blank mode (success)
- Launch 40 (WS, 5/21/59): ABLE II (135), blank mode (success)
## dates
## references
All launches on ER (Eastern Range). All Rep. Conf. values = 0 (non-representative of 1996 configurations).
Page 177
View PDF ↗# Page 177 - Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives (Section D.5.2) Introduction and Failures 1-11
## page_description
Introduction and beginning of Section D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives. Explains narrative numbering matches flight-sequence numbers in Section D.5.1. Documents detailed narratives for failures 1-11 spanning January 1957 to January 1958.
## observations
- Narrative 1 (101, 25 Jan 57): Fuel-system valve failure caused loss of thrust; missile fell back on pad at 9 inches altitude
- Narrative 2 (102, 19 Apr 57): Missile apparently normal until RSO destroyed it at 34.7 seconds; erroneous DOVAP beat-beat plot showed uprange heading
- Narrative 3 (103, 21 May 57): Missile destroyed on pad at T-5 minutes; faulty fuel-tank regulator and relief valve caused over-pressurization and fuel tank rupture
- Narrative 4 (104, 30 Aug 57): Spurious signals in main-engine yaw feedback circuit resulted in missile breakup at 92 seconds
- Narrative 5 (105, 20 Sep 57): Premature propellant depletion resulted in 400-mile short impact
- Narrative 6 (107, 3 Oct 57): Main fuel valve closed 1.25 seconds after liftoff; missile fell back on pad at 17 feet altitude
- Narrative 7 (108, 11 Oct 57): Mechanical failure caused abnormal main-engine shutdown one second early; loss of vernier solo phase
- Narrative 9 (112, 7 Dec 57): Electrical-system failure at 107 seconds produced abnormal converter loading; missile began deviating at 110 seconds, broke up at 224 seconds; 200-mile downrange, 40 miles left impact
- Narrative 10 (113, 19 Dec 57): Flight regarded as successful although no vernier solo operation; 6 miles from target
- Narrative 11 (114, 28 Jan 58): Guidance system failure at 95 seconds resulted in erroneous steering commands; vehicle yawed left and pitched down; divergence began 110 seconds; RSO destroyed at 152 seconds; 60-mile downrange impact
## dates
- 25 Jan 1957 (101)
- 19 Apr 1957 (102)
- 21 May 1957 (103)
- 30 Aug 1957 (104)
- 20 Sep 1957 (105)
- 3 Oct 1957 (107)
- 11 Oct 1957 (108)
- 7 Dec 1957 (112)
- 19 Dec 1957 (113)
- 28 Jan 1958 (114)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.5.1. RTI failure narrative analysis. DOVAP = Doppler Velocity and Position tracking system. RSO = Range Safety Officer.
Page 178
View PDF ↗# Page 178 - Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives (Failures 12-27)
## page_description
Continuation of Section D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives. Documents detailed narratives for failures 12-27 spanning February 1958 to December 1958.
## observations
- Narrative 12 (120, 28 Feb 58): Fuel line failure caused premature main engine shutdown at 109.7 seconds
- Narrative 13 (121, 19 Apr 58): Fuel system failure resulted in loss of thrust shortly after liftoff; missile fell back on pad at 4 feet
- Narrative 14 (116 Able I, 23 Apr 58): Turbopump failure at 146.2 seconds resulted in main-engine shutdown and explosion
- Narrative 18 (123, 11 July 58): Flight regarded as success but main engine failed to respond to guidance shutdown command due to wiring failure; backup command 0.43 seconds late caused vernier shutdown and large overshoot
- Narrative 20 (126, 26 July 58): Inadvertent closing of main-engine liquid-oxygen valve terminated thrust at 58.4 seconds; components recovered 5 miles downrange
- Narrative 22 (127 Able I, 17 Aug 58): Turbopump failure led to main engine shutdown at 74 seconds; explosion followed with 10-mile downrange impact
- Narrative 23 (130 Pioneer I, 11 Oct 58): Mode NA. Cow upper-stage thrust reduced planned orbital altitude from 250,000 nm to 90,000 nm
- Narrative 24 (138, 5 Nov 58): Shortly after liftoff missile drifted uprange and left with 150-foot maximum uprange drift; continued diverging left until pitch-gyro failure caused excessive pitch down; command destruct at 34.6 seconds
- Narrative 25 (129 Able I, 8 Nov 58): After normal boost phase, third-stage (Allegheny Ballistic X-248-A3) solid-propellant motor failed to ignite
- Narrative 26 (140, 26 Nov 58): Erratic performance of guidance-system inverter at 111.4 seconds resulted in erroneous accelerometer scale factors and 37-mile overshoot; flight regarded as success
- Narrative 27 (145, 5 Dec 58): Flight considered successful despite below-normal thrust throughout flight resulting in fuel depletion before cutoff conditions; 28 miles short impact
## dates
- 28 Feb 1958 (120)
- 19 Apr 1958 (121)
- 23 Apr 1958 (116)
- 11 Jul 1958 (123)
- 26 Jul 1958 (126)
- 17 Aug 1958 (127)
- 11 Oct 1958 (130)
- 5 Nov 1958 (138)
- 8 Nov 1958 (129)
- 26 Nov 1958 (140)
- 5 Dec 1958 (145)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.5.1. RTI failure narrative analysis. MECO = Main Engine Cutoff. nm = nautical miles.
Page 179
View PDF ↗# Page 179 - Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives (Failures 28-52)
## page_description
Continuation of Section D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives. Documents detailed narratives for failures 28-52 spanning December 1958 to September 1959.
## observations
- Narrative 28 (146, 16 Dec 58): Flight considered success but main-engine fuel valve remained partially open 14 seconds after MECO command; 6-mile overshoot
- Narrative 29 (149, 30 Dec 58): Momentary ground in electrical system at liftoff caused guidance system to assume control rather than at planned 108.5 seconds; guidance immediately commanded maximum pitch rate; by 22 seconds missile pitched through 46 degrees; reverse pitch developed; by 46.4 seconds missile tumbling to right; destruct at 52.5 seconds
- Narrative 30 (128 Able II, 22 Jan 59): Electrical failure prevented second-stage (Aerojet General AJ10-42) separation and ignition
- Narrative 31 (154, 30 Jan 59): Improper propellant mixture and low thrust resulted in fuel depletion before cutoff
- Narrative 32 (131 Able II, 28 Feb 59): Flight appeared normal until 195 seconds when all track was lost; RSO sent cutoff at 218 seconds and destruct at 222 seconds
- Narrative 44 (194, 29 June 59): Flight normal except reentry vehicle did not separate and retro rockets did not fire
- Narrative 45 (203, 21 July 59): Liftoff pin failed to extract so pitch and roll programs not initiated; missile destroyed at 45 seconds at 18,000 feet altitude
- Narrative 52 (136 Transit 1A, 17 Sep 59): First and second stages performed normally until stage 2/3 separation; failure of stage-2 retro system apparently led to collision of stages; third stage failed to ignite
## dates
- 16 Dec 1958 (146)
- 30 Dec 1958 (149)
- 22 Jan 1959 (128)
- 30 Jan 1959 (154)
- 28 Feb 1959 (131)
- 29 Jun 1959 (194)
- 21 Jul 1959 (203)
- 17 Sep 1959 (136)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.5.1. RTI failure narrative analysis. MECO = Main Engine Cutoff. RSO = Range Safety Officer.
Page 180
View PDF ↗# Page 180 - Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives (Failures 59-81)
## page_description
Continuation of Section D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives. Documents detailed narratives for failures 59-81 spanning December 1959 to March 1964.
## observations
- Narrative 59 (254, 1 Dec 59): Hydraulic-system failure resulted in premature closure of main-engine liquid-oxygen valve; hydraulic-system pressure decayed almost linearly from 8 seconds to 146 seconds when missile control was lost; 322 miles short impact
- Narrative 66 (257 Transit 1B, 13 Apr 60): Partial success although satellite placed in lower-than-planned orbit; MECO velocity 315 ft/sec below normal; noisy data rejected by guidance computer resulted in pitch-plane steering errors and unplanned orbit
- Narrative 67 (281 Transit 2A, 22 June 60): Boost phase normal, anomalous performance during second-stage burn produced orbit with apogee 570 miles and perigee 341 miles instead of planned 500-mile circular orbit
- Narrative 68 (262 Courier 1A, 18 Aug 60): Hydraulic pressure decay beginning 18 seconds after liftoff; severe transients at 129.3 seconds; uncontrolled yaw, pitch, roll maneuvers at 133 seconds; between 138-143 seconds missile turned through three full revolutions in pitch; upper stages separated at 140.4 seconds; first stage broke up at 142.8 seconds; second stage remained intact and beacon tracked to 400 seconds
- Narrative 70 (283 Transit 3A, 30 Nov 60): First stage shut down 11.2 seconds prematurely at 151.85 seconds when MECO cutoff circuit was armed; velocity 2500 ft/sec below normal cutoff; portions of first stage impacted in Cuba; second stage separated and performed normally until RSO shutdown at MECO plus 159.9 seconds to prevent overflight of South America
- Narrative 71 (313 Transit 3B, 21 Feb 61): Second burn of second stage failed to occur; resulted in orbit with perigee 539 miles and apogee 92 miles instead of planned 500-mile circular orbit
- Narrative 75 (311 Composite I, 24 Jan 62): Flight within acceptable limits until second-stage ignition; probably from rupture of lower oxidizer manifold, normal thrust levels never developed; severe thrust chamber motion developed 50 milliseconds after ignition; second stage began tumbling; telemetry indicated first tumble period 29 seconds; propellant depletion at MECO plus 212 seconds versus nominal 378 seconds
- Narrative 77 (314 ANNA 1A, 10 May 62): After successful Thor flight, electrical malfunction prevented separation and second-stage ignition
- Narrative 81 (240 Asset-2, 24 Mar 64): Second stage either failed to ignite or burned for only one second
## dates
- 1 Dec 1959 (254)
- 13 Apr 1960 (257)
- 22 June 1960 (281)
- 18 Aug 1960 (262)
- 30 Nov 1960 (283)
- 21 Feb 1961 (313)
- 24 Jan 1962 (311)
- 10 May 1962 (314)
- 24 Mar 1964 (240)
## references
Flight-sequence numbering cross-references Section D.5.1. RTI failure narrative analysis. MECO = Main Engine Cutoff. RSO = Range Safety Officer. ft/sec = feet per second.
Page 181
View PDF ↗# Page 181 - References Section
## page_description
Bibliography and references section listing 22 cited sources for the DOW-UAP-D48 report on space launch vehicle failure analysis. Sources span 1945-1996 and include government reports, contractor documents, technical analyses, and chronological records.
## references
1. Montgomery, R. M., and Ward, J. A., "Computations of Hit Probabilities From Launch-Vehicle Debris", RTI/4666/02F, September 19, 1990
2. Eastern Test Range Directorate of Safety Post-Test Report, Test D1000, 18 June 1991
3. Ward, James A., "Baseline Launch-Area Risks for Atlas and Delta Launches", RTI/5180/60/40F, September 30, 1995
4. "Spacelift Effective Capacity: Part 1 - Launch Vehicle Projected Success Rate Analysis", Draft, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 19 February 1992, prepared for Air Force Space Command Launch Services Office
5. "Launch Options for the Future: Special Report", Office of Technology Assessment, July 1988
6. Silke, Kevin, "Reliability Growth Model Overview", General Dynamics Reliability Bulletin 92-02
7. "Eastern Range Launches, 1950 - 1954, Chronological Summary", 45th Space Wing History Office
8. "Eastern Range Launches, Chronological Summary", 45th Space Wing History Office, Extension updating through 30 December 1995
9. "Vandenberg AFB Launch Summary", Headquarters 30th Space Wing, Office of History, Launch Chronology, 1958 - 1995
10. Isakowitz, Steven J., (updated by Jeff Samella), International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, Second Edition, AIAA, 1995
11. Smith, O. G., "Launch Systems for Manned Spacecraft", Draft, July 23, 1991
12. "Comparison of Orbit Parameters - Table 1", prepared by McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company, Delta launches through 4 Nov 95
13. Missiles/Space Vehicle Files, 45th Space Wing, Wing Safety, Mission Flight Control and Analysis (SEO), 1957 through 1995
14. Missile Launch Operations Logs, 30th Space Wing, copies provided via ACTA, Inc., (Mr. James Baeker), 1963 through 1995
15. "Titan IV, America's Silent Hero", published by Lockheed Martin in Florida Today, 13 Nov 95
16. "Atlas Program Flight History" (through April 1965), General Dynamics Report EM-1860, 26 April 1965
17. Fenske, C. W., "Atlas Flight Program Summary", Lockheed Martin, April 1995
18. Brater, Bob, "Launch History", Lockheed Martin FAX to RTI, March 13, 1996
19. Several USAF Accident/Incident Reports for Atlas and Titan failures
20. Quintero, Andrew H., "Launch Failures from the Eastern Range Since 1975", Aerospace memo, February 25, 1996, provided to RTI by Bill Zelinsky
21. Set of "Titan Flight Anomaly/Failure Summary" since 1959, received from Lockheed Martin, April 4, 1996
22. Chang, I-Shih, "Space Launch Vehicle Failures (1984 - 1995)", Aerospace Report No. TOR-96(8504)-2, January 1996
## organizations
- RTI (Research Triangle Institute)
- Eastern Test Range (USAF)
- Air Force Space Command
- Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
- Office of Technology Assessment
- General Dynamics
- 45th Space Wing History Office
- 30th Space Wing
- McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company
- Lockheed Martin
- ACTA, Inc.
- The Aerospace Corporation
## dates
Document dated 9/10/96, page 171-172, RTI attribution. References span 1988-1996 publication dates with historical data from 1950-1995.